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INTRODUCTION: LAND REFORM AT A CROSSROADS
1.1 ISSUES
Zimbabwe reached a crucial crossroads in its land reform with the expiration of the
Lancaster House Constitution in April 1990, which opened the door for policy debate on
alternative land-redistribution options. Proponents of the land reform have aggressively called
for an expansion of the resettlement program to help redress the unequal distribution of land
resources and to rectify acute land scarcity in communal areas. Opponents of rapid and
substantial land reform have emphasized the superior efficiency of the commercial farming
sector and the adverse consequences that a substantially expanded resettlement sector would
have on agricultural output and the balance of trade.
Many key questions lie at the heart of the land policy debate. First, what tenure
arrangements might best serve farmers in the different sectors—communal, commercial, and
resettlement—and how might they be instituted to provide equitable access, secure tenure, and
flexibility in the face of changing economic conditions? Second, what legal framework ought
to be instituted to facilitate the movement of land between farmers and enterprises within the
system and what outcomes would be expected in terms of the distribution of agricultural
landholdings among individuals and groups in society? Third, how would the process of land
reform influence output, trade, and income distribution? Specifically, should land reform
continue, and if so, what form should it take? What is the comparative efficiency of
production in the commercial and communal sectors, and what gains or losses might be
anticipated from resettlement? What legislative, institutional, and market reforms are needed
to complement resettlement and to resolve the problems of land resource degradation in
communal areas? These and other questions serve to focus this study.
1.2 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND RESETTLEMENT
Over a century ago, the British South Africa Co. (BSAc) moved into what is now
Zimbabwe in search of minerals. Failing in that endeavor, it turned to granting land to
soldiers as payment for services and later to the sale of land to white settlers for profit. The
Southern Rhodesia 1898 Order in Council led to the designation of native reserves. Under
pressure from the settlers, BSAC selected the most productive lands for European settlement
on the recommendations of the Native Reserves Commission of 1914. The Land Apportion-
ment Act of 1931 legalized the segregation of land between European settlers and Africans.
By 1931, 19.7 million hectares, including most of Zimbabwe's best agricultural land had been
designated as "European," and 11.6 million hectares, as African reserves (World Bank 1986).2
Between 1945 and 1960, fifteen amendments to the Land Apportionment Act addressed
concerns of land scarcity and resource degradation in the reserves. However, by 1969, the
size of "European areas" had declined only slightly to 18.1 million hectares. Land in the
African reserves had increased to 18.2 million hectares mainly due to the reallocation of
previously "unassigned" lands (Moyo 1987). This skewness in land distribution prevailed up
to the time of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.
At independence, targets were established for the resettlement of 162,000 families on
9 million hectares of land. Over the period spanning from 1980 to July 1989, 3.2 million
hectares were redistributed to 53,968 settler families, including 0.5 million hectares of state
land and 2.7 million hectares acquired by government from the large-scale commercial sector
(LSCS) on a "willing buyer-willing seller" basis at a cost of Z$68.9 million.' Over 83 percent
of the 3.2 million hectares had been acquired by 1983/84. The land acquisition and
resettlement program slowed substantially in the late 1980s as the government experienced
difficulties in acquiring land and providing infrastructure for the resettlement schemes.
Despite past achievements with land reform, Zimbabwe's land distribution still
remains highly skewed. As of 1988, 4,660 farms still held 11.2 million hectares, while over
1 million African families in the communal sector lived on 16.4 million hectares. Critics of
the willing buyer-willing seller provision assert that it has hampered land acquisition because
prices are high due to speculation, and the land offered is too small or located in low rainfall
zones.
1.3 LAND REFORM POLICY
Following the expiration of the Lancaster House Constitution, the constitution of
Zimbabwe Amendment Bill No. 11 was passed by Parliament in December 1990, and the
Land Acquisition Bill, in March 1992. Under the 1992 Land Act, 6.9 million hectares would
be acquired by the government from the LSCS. Of this amount, 5.0 million hectares would
be added to the resettlement sector, expanding its size from 3.3 million hectares to 8.3
million hectares, and 1.9 million hectares would be added to the state farm sector, increasing
its size from 0.5 million hectares to 2.4 million hectares. Land allocations in the communal
and small-scale commercial sectors would remain unchanged at 16.3 million hectares and 1.2
million hectares, respectively. Only land in "designated" areas will be acquired. The
government has stated its intent to concentrate first on acquiring underutilized land, and only
after these farms have been acquired will it begin procuring more intensively utilized farms.
More resources will be provided to the Rural State Land Office and the Farm Management
Section of the Ministry of Land, Agriculture, and Rural Resettlement (MLARR) to strengthen
their capacity in carrying out land inspections for land underutilization and absentee
landlordism. To facilitate government land acquisition, the new land policy stipulates state
control of land prices, limits on size and number of farms, and "designation" of areas for
1. In June 1990, Z$2 = US$1.3
land acquisition and resettlement. The policy seeks a politically acceptable land distribution
while maintaining or increasing agricultural production and exports. Achieving these multiple
goals will not be easy. In implementing the reforms, three principal issues will have to be
given careful consideration.
First, resettlement cannot solve the problems of poverty and landlessness in communal
areas. Based on an existing population of 1 million families and an annual population growth
rate of 3.0 percent in communal areas, the resettlement of 110,000 families would lower the
communal population for only 4-5 years before the original population of 1 million families
is surpassed. Combatting poverty in the communal areas will thus require a more
comprehensive set of policies than land reform alone.
Second, land redistribution runs the risk of destabilizing agricultural investment,
employment, food security, and export earnings. The LSCS employs 231,589 workers and
generates 75 percent of gross agricultural output, 82 percent of commercial crop sales, 94
percent of livestock sales, and 50 percent of total export earnings. Redistributing 6.9 million
hectares of land from the LSCS to the resettlement sector raises important unanswered
questions about the impact of the reforms on white-farmer confidence, investment, and
agricultural production. The status of the country's two pressing problems—high unem-
ployment and foreign exchange shortages—will depend crucially on the magnitude and process
of land reform.
Third, the process used to acquire land is as important as the amount of land being
redistributed because efficiency varies among producers and the process determines from
whom and where the land is acquired. Bratton (1993) discusses numerous policy options to
redistribute land, including land taxation to encourage sales, lengthening the time for
government to exercise its right of first refusal on land offered for sale, controls on land
purchases for land not consolidated into blocks or without access to rural infrastructure, and
mandatory acquisition of unused, misused, and underutilized commercial farmland in the
event that the above measures fail to provide sufficient land for accelerated resettlement. The
land acquisition bill calls for land valuation procedures to replace the willing buyer-willing
seller provision in determining the purchase price; for limits on the number of farms owned,
on farm size, on absentee landlords, and on foreign ownership; and for designated areas for
land acquisition and resettlement (Masoka 1993).
The government's land policy and to a lesser extent Bratton's proposals seek
nonmarket solutions and greater government intervention to resolve the land question in
Zimbabwe. Other authors (Bruce 1990a; Roth 1993) have recommended greater reliance on
quasi-land market mechanisms and less emphasis on these nonmarket solutions. The land
question in Zimbabwe thus engenders an economic and political debate over the appropriate
policy framework: that is, quasi-land market versus nonmarket approaches to government land
acquisition, and dispersed land acquisition and resettlement versus "block" acquisition and
large-scale resettlement schemes in designated areas.4
While most would agree that land reform is necessary to achieve both more equitable
land distribution and certain social objectives, there is also considerable agreement within
government that:
► a "core" commercial sector comprised of large-scale farms is needed to
maintain agricultural productivity, exports, and farm employment;
► the confidence of the white minority population in commercial farming is
essential to ensure the economic health and vitality of the economy;
► sustained growth will depend on a more equitable and integrated agrarian
structure with equal access to markets; and
► land is a valuable asset and must be allocated to those best able to use it
productively; new settler criteria must emphasize farm management skills and
farm experience.
How to achieve these goals while at the same time minimizing the social and economic
disruption of land redistribution is the greatest challenge that the government now faces.
1.4 OVERVIEW OF REPORT
After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 defines the two macro levels of disaggrega-
tion—natural region and administrative province—by which data are presented and analyzed
in the paper, followed by an examination of data sources, strengths, and weaknesses. The
historical evolution of land distribution in Zimbabwe is explored in chapter 3, which
introduces both the tenure categories in which land is held and the system of land
classification by agricultural potential and examines the relationship between them. Chapter
4 reviews in greater detail the rules governing land access and use in the different tenure
categories, the legal mechanisms for land reform, and the legal framework for resettlement
of land acquired. Chapter 5 introduces the idea of a market-based land reform, evaluates the
operation of the land market under the government program of land acquisition, and examines
changes in the agrarian structure from 1900 to the present. In chapter 6, the focus shifts to
changes in land use patterns in the 1970s and 1980s, and the influence of market and
nonmarket forces on determining these changes. Chapter 7 investigates rates of protection in
the agricultural sector and the comparative advantage of selected commodities among sectors
and natural regions. In chapter 8, data on cropping patterns and land resource endowments
are used to estimate rates of arable land utilization for crop production and grazing land
utilization for livestock production. Chapter 9 analyzes various government policy options
being legislated for land reform.5
Chapter 2
DATA
The scope of analysis in this paper fundamentally depends on data availability,
coverage by sector, length of time series, and content (whether census, forecast, or survey
by sampling). The subsequent investigation thus warrants some discussion at the outset of data
origin and availability. This chapter focuses on official data sources and specifically is
concerned with agricultural data. No primary data collection was undertaken for this study,
though the statistical results of several official data sets, which had not been previously
analyzed or published, are reported here for the first time. Despite perceptions that Zimbabwe
is relatively well endowed with data compared to other African countries, significant data
voids or weaknesses are apparent for certain types of information (e.g., inputs) and for
certain sectors (e.g., communal, resettlement). In some cases, information is collected but




Regional data are published by province, providing some indication of variability in
land use according to climatic factors. But data are limited by two problems. First, provinces
comprise one or more natural regions. Second, the number and boundaries of provinces
changed in 1983, affecting data reporting. Current provincial boundaries are illustrated in
figure 2.1. Boundary demarcations prior to and after 1983 are illustrated in table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1


























Land Area by Provinces Land Area (km2)
Manicaland 34 870
Mashonaland Central 27 284
Mashonaland East 24 934
Mashonaland West 60 467
Matebeleland North 73 537




Map Source: Zimbabwe, 1987 Statistical Yearbook (Harare: Central Statistics Office, 1987)
Map Produced By: Land Tenure Center and ANNAGRAPHICS, Madison, WI, 19947
FIGURE 2.2
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1987 Statistical Yearbook (Harare: Central Statistics Office, 1987)
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1 Specialized and Diversified Farming Region
2a Intensive Farming Region
2b Intensive Farming Region
(crop yields in certain years affected by relatively
short rainy seasons or dry spells during the seasons)
3 Semi-Intensive Farming Region
4 Semi-Extensive Fanning Region
5 Extensive Farming Region
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2.1.2 NATURAL REGIONS
The concept and delineation of natural regions in Zimbabwe were first put to use in
the work of Vincent, Thomas, and Staples (1962) starting in the early 1950s. This classical
work demarcated natural land-use regions on the basis of climate, soil, and topography;
assessed arable and nonarable landholdings by sector; and evaluated current and potential
land-use practices within each natural region.
Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions (NR) on the basis of soil type, rainfall,
and other climatic factors (figure 2.2):
NR I. Specialized and diversified farming: 700,000 hectares; rainfall is relatively high
with more than 1,000 millimeters per annum in areas lying below 1,700 meters and
more than 900 millimeters per annum at greater altitudes; normally some precipitation
is received in all months of the year. Relatively low temperatures and high rainfall
enable forestation, fruit, and intensive livestock production. In frost-free areas,
plantation crops such as tea, coffee, and macadamia nuts are possible.
NR II. Intensive farming: 5,860,000 hectares; rainfall is moderately high (750-1,000
mm), but is confined to the summer months. Two subregions have been defined.
Subregion IIA receives an average of at least 18 rainy pentads per season and is
normally reliable, rarely experiencing severe dry spells in summer.
2 The region is
suitable for intensive crop or livestock farming systems. Subregion IIB receives an
average of 16-18 pentads per season, but is subject to severe dry spells during the
rainy season or to relatively short rainy seasons. Crop yields are affected in certain
years, but not frequently enough to justify shifting cropping practices away from
intensive farming systems.
NR III. Semi-intensive farming: 7,290,000 hectares; precipitation is moderate
(650-800 mm), but its effectiveness is limited by severe midseason dry spells and high
temperatures. Growing conditions are marginal for maize, tobacco, and cotton
production or for enterprises based on crop production alone. Farming systems are
suited to livestock production and to fodder crops and cash crops on soils with good
moisture retention.
NR IV. Semi-extensive farming: 14,780,000 hectares; rainfall is relatively low
(450-600 mm) and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells
during the rainy season. Low and uncertain rainfall make cash cropping risky except
for drought-resistant crops and soils with better water retention. Farming systems are
suited to livestock production with some intensification possible with drought-resistant
fodder crops.
2. A rainy pentad is defined as the center period of three 5-day periods (pentads) which together
receive more than 40-mm rainfall, two of which receive at least 8-mm rainfall.9
NR V. Extensive farming: 10,440,000 hectares; rainfall is too low and erratic for
reliable production of even drought-resistant fodder and grain crops. Included in this
region are areas below 900 meters in altitude, where the mean rainfall is below 650
millimeters in the Zambezi Valley and below 600 millimeters in the Sabi-Limpopo
valleys. Farming systems based on extensive cattle or game ranching are best suited
to these conditions.
While natural regions now form the basis of land use planning in most government
ministries, data on land use patterns by natural region are available only since 1987, and then
only for the large-scale commercial sector.
2.1.3 SPATIAL OVERLAP
Despite the widespread use of natural regions in land-use planning, most agricultural
data, particularly time-series data, are available only at the provincial level. Analysis by
natural region thus requires some knowledge of the proportion of each province in each
ecological zone. Unfortunately, such a breakdown proved difficult to locate. One study, by
the Zimbabwe Energy Accounting Office, provides such data, but with slight modifications.
It combines regions IIB and III into just one region III, and regions IV and V into just region
IV. While not strictly comparable with AGRITEX plans, it provides a useful construct for
evaluating provincial data (table 2.2).
TABLE 2.2
Provincial areas by natural region
NR I NR II NR III NR IV
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Manicaland 17.0 5.3 42.4 35.3
Mashonaland Central 42.1 18.2 39.7
Mashonaland East 31.5 40.9 27.6
Mashonaland West 36.9 34.0 29.1
Midlands 64.2 35.8
Masvingo 14.9 85.1
Matabeleland North 6.2 93.8
Matabeleland South 100.0
Source: D.K. Munasirei, "Methodology for the Assessment of Land-Used in
Zimbabwe" (Harare, n.d.).10
Ecological diversity is greatest in Manicaland, with widely varying altitude, rainfall,
and soils. Yet 64.7 percent of its land mass falls in either NR I, NR II, or NR III. A sizable
area of Mashonaland Central, East, and West also lies in these more productive rainfall
zones, that is, 60.3, 72.4, and 70.9 percent, respectively. Conversely, Matabeleland North,
Matabeleland South, and Masvingo all have at least 85 percent of their land area in NRs IV
and V, which are the most arid and least productive rainfall zones.
2.2 DATA SOURCES
Three primary sources comprise the base of agricultural data in Zimbabwe: (1) census
data on the commercial sector and resettlement schemes; (2) national household survey of
communal lands; and (3) projections of the crop forecasting committee within AGRITEX. The
schematic diagram in table 2.3 illustrates years and quality of data availability as of 1990.
2.2.1 CENSUS DATA-LARGE-SCALE AND SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTORS
Farmers in the large-scale and small-scale commercial sectors are required under the
Agricultural Statistics Regulations of 1969 (amended 1970 and 1973) to complete an annual
census of their crop and livestock activities. The census is conducted by the Central Statistics
Office (CSo) for the agricultural year ending 30 September. Detailed data are collected on:
(a) area and output (bags, tons, or value) of cereals, industrial crops, vegetables, fodder
crops, and tree crops; and (b) livestock holdings (number of cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats;
age and sex of cattle) and dynamics of animal herds (purchases, sales, slaughter, deaths,
losses, and other transfers). Data are also collected on the number of owners, partners, and
occupiers involved in the farm operation and on the number of permanent and seasonal (or
casual) workers employed on the farm. While farmers are queried about their use of chemical
fertilizers, such information is not published in official bulletins. Up through 1985, data were
reported only by province. However, since 1987 data have been processed by province and
natural region.
As shown in table 2.3, data for the large-scale commercial sector have been published
annually in the Crop Production of Commercial Agricultural Units from 1980 through 1985.
Data for 1986 were collected but never processed or tabulated. Crop and livestock data for
1987 and 1988, though not in printed form, have been processed and are available on
computer printouts at CSo. Preliminary computer printouts of the 1989 data were computed
in June 1990, but were awaiting verification and correction.
Up to 1983, data for the small-scale commercial sector (SSCS) were published along
with the LSCS. Since 1983, the "Survey of Small-Scale Commercial Farms" has continued to
be administered annually, but data have not been processed due to computer and data
management-related problems in the CSo. Census crop and livestock data are thus available
only up to 1983.11
TABLE 2.3
Data sources and years of availability
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Census data (by province,
1980-89; by NR, 1987-89)
Lscs + + + + + + ?
Sscs + + + + - ? ?
Resettlement (DERUDE) - p ? ?
National household survey of
communal lands + + + ?
Crop Forecasting Committee
estimates (national) + + + + + + + + + +
Note: Blanks indicate surveys not administered. Other symbols apply as follows:
surveys administered but data never processed (-); data processed and published in
official government bulletins (+); data processed but results available only on
computer printouts in Cso (=); provisional (p); and data either not yet automated on
computer or entered but not verified (?).
2.2.2 AGRICULTURAL CENSUS OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES
An annual census of resettlement schemes has been administered by the Department
of Rural Development since 1983 for both Model A and B schemes. For each scheme, data
are collected on number of growers, total area and production of crops grown on the scheme,
amount of crop output sold and retained by households, amount of fertilizer used, inventory
of equipment, livestock numbers and changes in animal stocks, demographic information, and
number of permanent and seasonal employees. Since its inception, data on crop area and
production have been established on computer but never processed. Data on inputs have been
automated for only the 1986/87 season. No data base could be identified for inventory of
equipment, livestock holdings, or employment.
2.2.3 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OF COMMUNAL AREAS
Starting in 1983/84, the permanent Sample Survey Unit of the CSo has administered
the agriculture and livestock survey in communal lands. Based on a stratified sampling design
and on maps and household lists recorded in the 1982 population census, surveys were
administered to 3,920 households in the 1983 and 1984 seasons, and 1,460 households in
1985. Data were collected on area and production of principal crops, animal stocks, inventory
of farm equipment, and credit facilities.
Despite the comprehensive nature of the survey instruments, data have been published
only for crop area and production. As illustrated in table 2.3, results for communal lands
were published for 1983, 1984, and 1985. Data bases have been established for subsequent12
years, but constraints on data processing have prevented analysis. Published data are reported
only by province.
2.2.4 CROP FORECASTING COMMITTEE ESTIMATES
Annual estimates of crop area and production are also made by the Crop Forecasting
Committee of the CSo, derived from AGRITEX field worker estimates. Forecasts are made for
the LSCS, SSCS, communal, and resettlement sectors at the national level. Because data are
summed upward from district-level measurement, breakdowns by province and natural region
are theoretically possible. For example, the MLARR (Will Masters, personal conversations)
has disaggregated district-level data on crop area for communal areas into natural regions by
approximating on maps the proportion of a district lying in a natural region and by assuming
that crops are evenly distributed among natural regions within that district. While this
approach enables a rough calculation of crop area, large potential errors are possible when
disaggregating production data since yields are strongly influenced by rainfall across natural
regions.
2.3 SUMMARY
The above analysis points out several problems with data that have important
implications for a regional analysis of land use by sector. First, only for the LSCS are regional
data on crop area and production reasonably current and complete. Published data for the
SSCS, the communal areas, and the resettlement schemes are either out of date, incomplete,
or have never been analyzed or published. Second, compared with many African countries
which underinvest in primary data collection, the annual surveys employed in Zimbabwe are
quite thorough and comprehensive across sectors. The principal problem is that data are
collected but not processed in a timely manner due to an underinvestment in computer-
processing capacity and public dissemination.13
Chapter 3
AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
3.1 HISTORICAL CHANGES IN THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
3
The land problem in Zimbabwe fundamentally derives from the patterns which
originated in the colonial era. This chapter briefly examines the history of land administration
from the early 1900s to present and shows that despite the substantial land redistribution that
has already taken place, Zimbabwe's agrarian structure still remains highly skewed. Farms
in the large farm sector have land in the best rainfall zones, while the majority of the rural
population in communal areas farm the most arid lands.
One of the legacies of European settlement in Zimbabwe is a highly unequal land
distribution. The land problem stems from the British South Africa Company's (BSAC) move
into southern Zimbabwe in 1890 for gold and mineral exploration. After prospects for gold
faded, the company, led by Cecil Rhodes, turned to using land as payment to soldiers and
later for sales to white settlers for profit. By 1894, most of the Matabeleland lands with heavy
red and black loamy soils had been granted as concessions to both individuals and companies.
By 1906, one-sixth of the country, including the majority of prime agricultural land, had been
allocated to settlers (World Bank 1986). Native commissioners were entrusted with
demarcating land for the indigenous African inhabitants.
4 But the fertile highlands were
largely reserved for the Europeans.
In 1901, based on very rough estimates, Zimbabwe's total population was 712,600,
including about 700,000 Africans and 12,600 Europeans, Asians, and "coloureds" (CSo
1985).
5 Land set aside for Africans in reserves amounted to about 8.4 million hectares, with
the remaining 32 million hectares being allocated for purchase by Europeans. Africans could
also purchase land, but were generally unable to do so due to high land prices and low
purchasing power. Spurred by settlers' growing demand for land, the company gradually
shifted its focus to land dealings for profit, leading in 1908 to the Colonial Secretary
3. This section draws heavily on the World Bank (1986, pp. 1-12).
4. "Africans" as used during the colonial era shall also be used here to designate indigenous or
"non-European" Zimbabweans, for lack of a more precise and inoffensive alternative. This is in no
way intended to imply that Zimbabweans of European ancestry may not be considered "African" as
well.
5. The term "coloured" came to be used as part of the colonial state's racial classification system
and refers largely to persons having historically bi- or multiracial ancestry.14
approving reserve boundaries, and to the BSAC opening an Estates Department to promote
European settlement.
Growing demand for land for European settlement and the spillover of Africans out
of the reserves into unalienated areas and onto European land eventually led to the
appointment of the Southern Rhodesia Native Reserve Commission by the British government
in 1914. It was not until 1920, however, that the commission's recommendations were
finalized in an Order-in-Council. This order made a "final disposition" allocating about 8.7
million hectares for tribal reserves for the roughly 1.1 million Africans. The settlers by this
time had increased in number and power and the forces that ultimately led to separation had
begun to mount. To help preserve its dwindling power, the BSAC felt compelled in turn to
grant more concessions to meet growing settler demands.
Rhodesia attained self-government in 1923. According to its constitution, all
unalienated land belonged to the state. Authority over the reserves (8.7 million ha) was vested
in the British High Commissioner. The "Cape Clause," which since 1894 had theoretically
permitted Africans to purchase land, continued in effect, albeit to the agitation of the settlers.
By 1925, only 19 farms comprising 19,000 hectares had been sold to Africans. According
to the settlers, this was evidence that Africans preferred living on reserves and were not
inclined to want individualized land rights.
The Morris-Carter Land Commission in 1925 was charged with examining the
desirability of defining separate areas for use and occupation by Africans and Europeans. It
recommended that the "Cape Clause" be repealed, and that specific areas of the colony be
set aside in which Africans alone could purchase and hold freehold title to land. The
commission's recommendations were later embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930,
which partitioned all lands in the colony into European and African reserves. This set aside
6.8 million hectares as reserves for European purchase and some 3.0 million hectares as
African freehold, called native purchase areas (table 3.1), that is, areas where Africans could
purchase freehold farms of between 30 and 300 acres from the crown. Earlier, the "Cape
Clause" in the original Order-in-Council creating Southern Rhodesia in 1898 had recognized
the right of Africans to hold and dispose of land on the same conditions as non-Africans, but
only small amounts had been purchased. Now future land purchases by blacks were placed
on a geographically segregated basis.
This legal segregation within the freehold sector persisted until the Land Tenure
(Amendment) Act of 1977 removed racial restrictions on the ownership of freehold land.
Legally, the two freehold sectors became one at this point in time. Structurally, however, the
dualism remains both in racial patterns of ownership and in the disparate farm sizes. The
underlying motivations for this partitioning are not entirely clear. According to Cheater
(1984), the purchase areas were intended to reserve some land for Africans before all land
was purchased by whites. Weinrich (1975) claims that the apportionment was intended to
prevent progressive and wealthy African farmers from opening up farms in predominantly
European areas, but also that there was a genuine interest in assisting progressive peasants.15
Palmer (1977) argues that the motives were to protect the interests of white settlers with little
regard for Africans or African production.
Regardless of the motive, the act sharply reduced the supply of land for Africans by
depriving them of the right to buy land outside the reserves. Other restrictions limited the
opportunity to buy land within the reserves if inconsistent with European economic interests.
Peasant farmers were further prohibited from subdividing their farms.
TABLE 3.1





Native reserves 8.64 8.34 16.29
Special native areas 1.65
Native purchase areas 2.98 2.26 1.42
Other African land 0.49
Unassigned or undetermined land:
Unassigned land
a 7.12 5.68
Undetermined land 0.03 0.02
State lands:
Wankie Game Preserve 1.19
Forest areas 0.24 0.39
National land 2.73
Total' 38.68 38.49 39.04
Remote and tsetse-infested areas.
Differences in total land area among years reflect more accurate surveys over
time.
c. Data for 1931 and 1953 are reported in World Bank, Zimbabwe Land
Subsector Study, Report no. 5878-Zink (Washington, D.C.: World Bank,
1986); and for 1969 in Sam Moyo, "The Land Question," in Zimbabwe: The
Political Economy in Transition, 1980-1986, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Harare:
Jongwe Press, 1987), p. 168.
As the African population grew, it became more difficult for legislation to control
pressures for movement of Africans into European areas and onto unalienated lands. During
the war years, this movement continued largely uncontrolled; much of the 6.8 million
hectares reserved for European purchase had not been alienated by 1948, and African
squatters resided on a significant percentage of these lands. With the return of soldiers and
a.
b.16
returned. Attempts to resettle squatters, some onto reserves, resulted in unrest and violence.
A special committee appointed in 1948 to examine the African need for additional land
gradually added to the reserves mainly by reallocating land from the unassigned and purchase
areas, as did subsequent committees. The new reserves, called Special Native Reserves, were
no different than the earlier reserves with regard to land rights. With the new reserves plus
purchase areas, the African areas increased from 11.62 million hectares in 1931 to 12.3
million hectares in 1953. State lands grew with the establishment of the Wankie Game
Reserve, decreasing unassigned lands from 7.2 to 5.7 million hectares.
Prior to colonization, land was plentiful and labor was the scarce factor of production.
By the 1940s, however, with the alienation of land to white settlers, the introduction of the
oxen plow, and rapid population growth due to improved medical services, land became the
more limiting factor in communal areas (Mansell and Johnson 1966; Weinrich 1975).
Population data prior to the 1982 census are very imprecise. Based on crude estimates,
population densities in African areas grew steadily from 8.3 persons/km
2 in 1901 (8.4 million
ha), to 12.1 persons/km
2 by 1931 (11.62 million ha), and to 16.6 persons/km
2 (18.2 million
ha) by 1969.
6 "As the African population grew and could obtain no new land outside the .. .
fixed tribal boundaries, shifting cultivation became impossible [and fertility declined]"
(Weinrich 1975, p. 67). Today, most communal areas are heavily populated and experiencing
ecological degradation (Cheater 1984).
Establishing the purchase areas also proved to be difficult. Most land suited for
farming had already been alienated. Approximately 1.6 million hectares were ultimately
designated, but in remote areas of the northern and southern parts of the country which were
poorly suited for agricultural development due to harsh ecological conditions (Weinrich 1975;
Whitlow 1988).
Compared with the overcrowded African reserves, however, the purchase lands were
located in higher rainfall zones, and strict criteria in selecting settlers resulted in a more
progressive farmer. Following World War II, the government adopted increasingly strict
requirements for settler applicants as the demand for freehold in purchase areas intensified.
Weinrich (1975, p. 145) notes that "[u]ntil 1952, only some agricultural knowledge was
required [to obtain freehold in the purchase areas]. In 1953, the master [farmer] certificate
became a prerequisite. By 1957, applicants had to possess, in addition, capital assets in cash
or kind to the value of £300. By the 1960s, a points system was introduced by which .. .
points were given for capital equipment, agricultural experience, [and] proved character of
the applicant." These requirements ensured that settlers in newer purchase areas were more
skilled and better financed than farmers in older purchase areas or in communal areas.
6. According to the Cso (1985, p. 10), the African population was 700.0 thousand in 1901 and
1.41 million in 1931. Since some unknown, but probably small, number of Africans lived in cities
while others lived as permanent workers on European commercial farms, densities based on these
approximates are somewhat overestimated. In 1969, the population of district councils, which consist
of both communal lands and the Sscs, was 3.02 million, based on a land area of 169,556 km
2 and
17.8 persons/km
2 reported by the Cso (1985, p. 47).17
the applicant." These requirements ensured that settlers in newer purchase areas were more
skilled and better financed than farmers in older purchase areas or in communal areas.
Responsibility for managing the native reserves was transferred to the tribal authorities
in the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967, and later reconfirmed in the Land Tenure Act of 1969.
The 1969 Constitution of Rhodesia fixed these tribal trust lands, previously native reserves,
at about 18.2 million hectares, set all European land at 18.1 million hectares, and reserved
2.7 million hectares as national land. Of the 6.3-million-hectare increase in African reserves,
0.8 million hectares were taken from former African purchase areas and 5.5 million hectares
from previously unassigned land.
Numerous laws were passed in the decade before independence. The Tribal Trust Land
Authority was replaced by the Tribal Land Development Corporation in 1970. In 1977, the
1941 Land Apportionment Act was amended once more to allow Africans to purchase land
in the European areas. In 1979, the Tribal Trust Land Act was amended and all reserves
became the responsibility of the president. In the same year, the Rural Land Act provided the
legal basis for resettlement schemes.
3.2 LAND CLASSIFICATION BY FARM CATEGORY AND REGION
After independence in 1980, land categories in the previous land acts have been
redefined: the LSCS contains the lands formerly held by Europeans; the SSCS contains those
lands formerly classified as Native Purchase Areas; the communal areas contain those lands
formerly held by Africans in the reserves; the resettlement areas are those lands acquired and
redistributed to smallholders under state-sponsored resettlement schemes since 1980; and
public lands contain the former parks, preserves, and unassigned lands. Data in table 3.2
indicate landholdings by each of these tenure categories by natural region drawn from various
sources.
The column labeled "other" is the difference between the sum of land areas across
tenure categories and total land area. The total area of other land—1,494.8 thousand
hectares—seems reasonably accurate. It comprises the 198,082 hectares of inactive farms in
the LSCS, approximately 200,000 hectares for urban areas, and another 900,000 hectares for
forest areas (Chavunduka 1982, p. 63), leaving only 196,000 hectares truly unaccounted for
as other. Yet, regional breakdowns illustrate a problem. Despite careful accounting and fairly
strong sources of regional data for the LSCS, SSCS, and communal sectors, total area across
tenure categories exceeds total land availability for NR III by 319.6 thousand hectares. Unlike
provinces, which form a well-defined administrative boundary for data collection, lines for
natural regions are more diffuse and less clearly delineated for data collection in practice.
Weak data on the regional distribution of land in parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and forests
further exacerbate accurate accounting of the land area.TABLE 3.2
Land distribution by farm sector and natural region, 1988
(000 ha)
LARGE-SCALE SMALL-SCALE - - - -
NATURAL COMMUNAL AREAS
' COMMERCIAL COMMERCIAL RESETTLEMENT STATE FARMS` WILDLIFE AREAS PARKS ANDY TOTAL AREA
'
REGION FARMS
' FARMS` AREASd OTHER
(ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) (ha) (%)
I 135.0 0.8 202.2 1.8 7.3 0.6 30.0 0.9 10.0 2.0 50.1 1.0 265.4 17.8 700.0 1.8
II 1,270.0 7.8 3,687.0 32.8 222.2 17.9 590.0 17.9 10.0 2.0 25.0 0.5 55.8 3.7 5,860.0 15.0
III 2,820.0 17.2 2,405.4 21.5 438.3 35.4 1,240.0 37.8 160.0 32.0 545.9 11.0 -319.6 -21.4 7,290.0 18.7
IV 7,340.0 44.9 2,429.1 21.7 473.3 38.2 810.0 24.6 60.0 12.0 2,514.1 50.3 1,153.5 77.2 14,780.0 37.8
V 4,790.0 29.3 2,489.7 22.2 97.6 7.9 620.0 18.8 260.0 52.0 1,843.0 37.2 339.7 22.7 10,440.0 26.7
Total 16,355.0 11,213.4 1,238.7 3,290.0 500.0 4,978.1 1,494.8 39,070.0
a. Adapted from G.L. Chavunduka, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry (Harare: Government Printer,
I982); and 1987 Statistical Yearbook (Harare: Central Statistics Office, 1987).
b. Cso data as of 30 September 1988; excludes I98,082 ha of farms that are inactive.
c. Based on data by natural regions in Dan Weiner et al., "Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe," Journal of
Modern African Studies 23 (I985), p. 259, less areas acquired for resettlement-Vuti (29,856 ha, NR II), Chenjiri (56,871 ha,
NR III), Copper Queen (40,958 ha, NR III; 48,342 ha, NR IV), and Mshawasha (I,38I ha, NR IV). The total area includes
approximately 230,000 ha not yet settled (MLARR).
d. Figures include 2,743.3 ha acquired for resettlement from I979/80 to I988/89 plus 543.7 from former state land (MLARR).
e. ARDA estates held 498,535 ha in I988/89 (ARDA Planning Unit).
f. Adapted from Chavunduka (I982) and Annex A.
g. Difference between sum of land across tenure categories and total land area.
h. From 1987 Statistical Yearbook (p. 14I).
i. Percentages are of column totals.19
3.2.1 COMMUNAL AREAS
Previously referred to as native and special native reserves or as tribal trust lands, the
communal areas in 1988 accounted for 16.4 million hectares or 41.9 percent of the land area
in Zimbabwe. Of this total, 74.2 percent of the land is located in the poorest rainfall zones
of NRs IV and V. The total population in 1988 was roughly 5.1 million persons and
1,020,400 households, representing a population density of about 31.1 persons/km
2.'
The communal areas farming system involves rain-fed and ox-plow cultivation focused
heavily on maize production at—until quite recently—very modest levels of productivity.
Differences in sizes of landholdings are modest within the communal areas, reflecting for the
most part differences in the ability of households to place land under cultivation due to
constraints on ownership of plow oxen and household labor. Roughly half the households
have 1-5 hectares, while another 40 percent have 6-10+ hectares. Estimates of landlessness
range between 6 and 12 percent of households (Cliffe 1986, p. 34; Bratton 1990).
3.2.2 LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Formerly the European areas, this sector comprised 4,660 large commercial farms and
11.2 million hectares (28.7% of the land area) in 1988. Most of these farms are still owned
by Zimbabweans of European ancestry, though ownership is obscured by the high levels of
corporate ownership of farms (61 %) and by the recent influx of black farmers buying land
in the sector (estimated to be between 400 and 450). In 1988, the sector employed 227.6
thousand permanent and casual workers. Based on the population in rural councils of 1,571.3
thousand in 1982 and a 3.0 percent growth rate, 1,876.2 thousand people resided in the sector
in 1988. Owners have full title to the land as governed by the Roman-Dutch law of the Cape
Colony in 1891, as amended. Farmers are represented by the Commercial Farmers Union.
Company ownership represents the most common form of management by area (61.0%),
followed by individual ownership (34.3%) (table 3.3). Government, parastatals, cooperatives,
and the other categories make up the remaining 4.7 percent. Average farm size is 2,406
hectares nationwide; individual farms average 1,402 hectares/farm; companies, 3,835
hectares/farm; and parastatals, 19,611 hectares/farm. Farms in the LsCS are also located on
the best agricultural lands. As indicated in table 3.2, 34.6 percent of land in the sector is
located in NRs I and II, 21.5 percent in NR III, and 43.9 percent in NRs IV and V.
3.2.3 SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
Formerly called the purchase areas, the SSCS encompasses 1,238.7 thousand hectares
scattered over numerous sites, mainly in NRs III (35.4%) and IV (38.2%). However, the lack
of consistent estimates on area and number of farms raises important questions about the
7. The 1988 population is roughly estimated to be 5,102,000 persons, based on population
estimates of 4,272,811 in district councils (communal lands and Sscs) in 1982 and a population
growth rate of 3.0% (Cso 1985, pp. 11, 47). Number of households is calculated as 1988 estimated
population divided by an average family size of 5.0 members per household (Cso 1989).20
reliability of these figures. Census data on number and area of farms were last compiled in
1983. Based on these data, the sector comprised 8,653 farms on an area of 1,074,767
hectares, with an average farm size of 124.2 hectares.8.' Available information on type of
tenure is equally outdated. According to the MLARR, the SSCS comprised 1,428,623 hectares
and 9,129 holders in 1981. Of this total, 564.8 thousand hectares were allocated under
agreements of lease and purchase, and 484.0 thousand hectares, under deeds of grant and
transfers. This leaves 379.8 thousand hectares unallocated. Of this total, 177.4 thousand
hectares had been taken by the government for resettlement through 1985, leaving around
202.4 thousand hectares still vacant and not designated for other purposes.
TABLE 3.3
Ownership of land in the large-scale commercial sector
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP NUMBER OF FARMS TOTAL AREA AVERAGE FARM SIZE
Individual ownership 2,739 3,841,050 1,402
Company 1,784 6,842,259 3,835
Central government 33 54,513 1,652
Local government 4 14,304 3,576
Parastatal 18 353,006 19,611
Cooperatives 10 10,422 1,042
Other 72 97,832 1,359
Total 4,660 11,213,386 2,406
Source: Central Statistics Office.
The farmers who were able to obtain land in the purchase areas were generally well
educated and certified as master farmers. In spite of ecological limitations and disadvantages
in market access, they were relatively productive in the early years. If measured in terms of
percentage of total sales, their productivity rivaled European commercial farming (Duggan
1980, pp. 234-35; Cheater 1984, pp. 35-36). The lackluster performance in recent years is
generally explained in terms of the sector having been "peasantized" by accommodating
extended family members from the communal areas and in terms of unequal access to support
services (Moyo 1987, p. 193). During the unilateral declaration of independence (uDI), the
SSCS was out of favor as an example of blacks' operating freehold farms, and in the early
years after independence, the government focused its attention on communal area farmers,
leading to a drop in credit extended to SSCS farmers. Also cited as contrary considerations are
the poorer soils and rainfall, the advanced age of SSCS farmers, and the fact that many of the
8. From Zimbabwe, Crop Production of Large-Scale Commercial Farms, 1983, p. 77.21




Following independence, the resettlement program became the government's main
policy instrument to redress inequities in land distribution. Initiated in 1980 at the Lancaster
House talks which culminated in Zimbabwe independence, the resettlement program was
initially planned to relocate, over 3 years, 18,000 families on about 1.2 million hectares of
land previously owned by European farmers at a cost of US$60 million. In 1982, however,
the target for number of settlers was raised in the Transitional National Development Plan
to 162,000 families on 10 million hectares of land with capital costs of over $500 million
(Cusworth and Walker 1988; MLRRD 1985, p. 2). The target of 162,000 families still holds
to this day, though the appropriate land area remains a widely debated issue.
The Lancaster House Constitution further required that the government acquire land
for the resettlement program on a willing buyer-willing seller basis, through April 1990 when
the Constitution terminated. The Land Acquisition Act of 1985 both broadened the powers
of government in land acquisition and increased the government's access to information on
land coming to market. The provision of willing buyer-willing seller was maintained in this
act. But the seller of any private rural land is required first to notify the government of
his/her "offer" or asking price, giving the minister the right of first refusal to buy the land.
Provisions were also spelled out giving government more power in price negotiation.
The progress made in land acquisition and resettlement has been substantial.
According to MLARR data, the government acquired 3,248.0 thousand hectares of land at a
total cost of Z$68,903.4 million (table 3.4) between 1980 and 1989. Of this area, 612,534
hectares were taken from state land, and 2,635,484 hectares, through purchases in the LSCS.
Provincial data on number of schemes, area settled, and number of settlers are given in
Annex C. Of the land acquired, 19 percent is in NR I, 18 percent in NR II, 38 percent in
NR III, 25 percent in NR IV, and 19 percent in NR V. All but 230,000 hectares have been
settled. Of the land so far unsettled, 176,000 hectares are located in Matabeleland South,
where the security situation delayed work (data provided by MLARR).
Through the course of the resettlement program, 53,968 families have been settled,
with room for an estimated 7,000 more families. Of those relocated through July 1989,
42,494 families have been settled on family holdings with access to grazing commons (Model
A and accelerated schemes), 6,504 on cooperative production schemes (model B), 508 on
individual holdings associated with core estates run by ARDA, which administers the state
farms, or managed cooperatively (model C), and 4,462 on model D grazing schemes. Per-
person cost differs substantially by scheme type: for model A, it is $140/person including
dependents; for model B, $325/person; and for model C, $410/person (MLARR 1988, p. 7).
9. This section draws heavily on Cusworth and Walker (1988) and Kinsey (1982).22
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Acquisition by province to 1989):
Manicaland 568,719 14,431,177 25.37
Mashonaland Central 402,522 4,256,568 10.57
Mashonaland East 240,530 8,489,930 35.30 n.a.
Mashonaland West 434,619 11,415,985 26.27
Masvingo 408,104 7,309,233 17.91
Matabeleland North 197,409 3,695,535 18.72
Matabeleland South 508,433 9,614,174 18.91
Midlands 487.682 9.311.447 19.09
Total' 3,248,018 68,524,049 21.10
Resettlement allocation:
Model A (normal) 2,453,556 50,122,658 20.43
Model A (accelerated) 190,859 2,999,920 15.72
Model B 182,142 8,815,927 48.40 n.a.
Model C 18,864 4,264,222 226.05
Model D 402.597 2.321.322 5.77
Total' 3,248,018 68,524,049 21.10
Acquisition by year: a
162,555 3,104,380 19.09 20.12 1979/80
1980/81 219,152 3,537,172 16.14 16.14
1981/82 819,155 15,414,248 18.82 16.63
1982/83 807,573 21,524,782 26.66 21.29
1983/84 173,848 4,596,078 26.44 17.16
1984/85 74,848 3,062,930 40.92 22.10
1985/86 86,187 3,444,610 39.97 19.90
1986/87 133,515 3,898,335 29.20 12.71
1987/88 80,554 2,889,328 35.87 13.89
1988/89 78.097 7.431.575 95.16 34.29
Total' 2,635,484 68,903,438 26.14
a. Real prices are calculated as nominal prices divided by the consumer price
index for lower income households in Zimbabwe, Quarterly Digest of
Statistics (Harare: Central Statistics Office, 1989).
b. Difference between area acquired and acquisition/year is due to 504,491 ha
of state land in provincial totals that were acquired at no cost.23
3.2.4.1 Model A scheme
A "typical" model A scheme as originally envisaged by the MLARR would have about
500 families divided into roughly 15 nucleated villages of 25-50 families, with services
including 3-4 schools and a clinic. Land allocations within a scheme replicate on a larger
scale the threefold division in land use found in communal areas (residential, arable,
commons). Each family is given a residential stand of 2,500 square meters, an arable
allocation of 5-6 hectares, and access to communal pasture sufficient to support a herd for
draft power. Land is occupied on the basis of a number of temporary permits. Grazing is
shared communally within village grazing areas, and the number of livestock units (LU)
varies according to agroecological zone. For NRs I and II, 4-5 LU are assumed, which
translates into 20 hectares of communal grazing per family; for NR III, 8 LU and 56
hectares; for NR IV, 10 LU and 80 hectares; and for NR V, 15-20 LU and 150-200 hectares
(Cliffe 1986, p. 48; MLRRD 1985, p. 15). The net income target set by planners was
$400/family/year (ibid.). A typical scheme includes approximately 245-593 settler families
on 21.7 to 25.5 thousand hectares of land, depending on geographic location and resource
base (Annex C). Schemes are provided with access roads linking all villages with a Rural
Service Center, where agricultural extension agents, cooperative and health workers, and
resettlement officers are situated. The scheme would ultimately be expected to have a health
center and primary school established. The majority of resettlement efforts have focused on
the model A scheme, whether measured by population settled (78.7%, Annex C) or area
allocated (81.4%, table 3.4).
Settler selection standards utilized since the first years of the program required that
a settler be "effectively landless," poor, or distressed. Specific criteria include: (a) no land
or too little land, (b) not employed, (c) poor, (d) married or widowed with dependents, (e)
aged 18 to 55 years and physically fit, (g) returned Zimbabwean refugee, or (h) experienced
and master farmer. Settlers must also be prepared to give up all land and grazing rights in
the communal area of origin and wage employment elsewhere (MLRRD 1985, p. 23). Moyo
(1987, p. 193) indicates that slightly over 60 percent of settlers have come from the commu-
nal areas. A master list of qualified applicants is maintained, and when a resettlement scheme
is implemented and the area becomes ready for occupation, the resettlement officer and the
rural district council draw a specific list of settlers for the scheme from the master list of
applicants (MLRRD 1985, p. 23).
The selection criteria have subsequently been criticized on grounds that the landless
lacked the plows and draft oxen necessary to bring their full arable allocations under
cultivation, and that individual selection criteria and the mixing of settlers from different
backgrounds and localities may make it more difficult to develop a sense of community and
establish useful practices such as sharing of draft animals (Kinsey 1982, p. 109; Cliffe 1986,
p. 93; Bratton 1990). The Zimbabwe National Farmers Union (1987, p. 9) has called for a
reordering of priorities to emphasize trained and master farmers, arguing that higher
productivity is being achieved by master farmers in the SSCS and the communal areas than
by resettlement scheme farmers. This call for an emphasis on recruiting experienced farmers24
as settlers has been recently reiterated in a joint declaration by the presidents of the three
farmers' organizations (Joint Presidents' Agricultural Committee 1990, p. 3).
Perhaps the most difficult settler-selection issue facing government now is that of
displaced labor from the large-scale commercial farms which are being taken over, a problem
that will grow as the program increasingly appropriates operating units rather than abandoned
farms. A general sense prevails, based largely on anecdotal evidence, that the displaced
employees are less productive than most settlers, partly because their experience in agriculture
is so different from farming in the model A schemes and partly because they do not have
oxen, plows, and other implements necessary to begin cultivation. On the other hand, they
cannot simply be expelled. They may find the organization of labor in the model B
(cooperative) schemes more familiar, but most will need to be accommodated into the
model A schemes and special attention must be paid to their demands for equipment and
credit.
There are continuing concerns, however, about whether the intensity of land use and
productivity in the model A schemes can justify the replacement of large-scale commercial
farms with this model. The fact that the model is less labor absorptive than much commercial
farming was an early concern of commentators on resettlement such as Kinsey (1982,
pp. 105-06). A denser model A design is one solution. Underutilization of land on the
resettlements early in the program led to suggestions that holding sizes in resettlements in
NRs I and II in particular could be reduced (Cliffe 1986, p. 84). Some commentators
suggested major remodeling such as 2-hectare mechanized holdings in the highland areas
(Bratton 1990). Now the ministry is concerned that 27 percent of families on the model A
schemes are significantly exceeding the recommended rotational fallowing requirements, and
that an estimated 43 percent of the total area is getting between one-half the recommended
fallow and no fallow at all (data provided by MLARR). If holdings are to be reduced in future
models A, it would be from grazing allowances, where underutilization still exists, or from
both arable and pasture areas, if mechanical draft is available.
3.2.4.2 Accelerated model A scheme
Whereas in the normal model A scheme substantial infrastructure is provided prior to
settlement, settlers in the accelerated scheme are provided with only limited installations. The
model is most appropriate in situations: (1) where severe squatting and overpopulation have
already resulted in settlement of land, (2) when resettlement of large numbers of people in
a short time frame is advisable, (3) when budget resources for development are limited, and
(4) where acquired commercial farms are small and geographically dispersed (Kinsey 1982).
Nearly 6 percent of the resettlement program area has been settled under this model (table
3.4). Average scheme size is smaller than the model A schemes (7,235 ha), but varies widely
from an average of 1,620 hectares in Mashonaland to 15,618 hectares in Matabeleland
(Annex C).25
3.2.4.3 Model B scheme
The model B scheme is based on communal living and a cooperative mode of farming.
Livestock may be privately owned, but all other property, including land and equipment, are
owned cooperatively. Profits are shared according to a formula devised by settlers. The model
is intended to enable those with limited resources to participate in viable agricultural
activities. The model B was intended to be the centerpiece of the government's policy of
achieving a socialist transformation of agriculture, while model A schemes were expected
eventually to become collectives (Cusworth and Walker 1988). However, by 1989, less than
6 percent of the land area had been resettled using model B (table 3.4).
The properties selected for this model tend to be single, former commercial, farm
units with well-developed infrastructure, such as irrigation or processing facilities, still intact.
The ministry's target size for the cooperatives has been in the range of 50-200 members. All
adults are full members, including wives and children of 16 years of age. Property,
resources, and equipment plus livestock are held collectively. While in the early days of the
scheme stock in the commercial herd is to be individually owned, stock ownership is
supposed to shift to cooperative ownership once the group becomes established. The livestock
holdings are 20 LU per settler family, including small stock. Cultivation is carried out
collectively and, together with management, purchasing, and marketing, is controlled by
cooperative committees. It is possible for members to be allocated small plots of up to 0.5
hectare for individual cultivation (MLRRD 1985, pp. 15-16, 21).
Cliffe (1986, pp. 51, 53) notes considerable demand, with 200 registered cooperative
societies that have put themselves forward to receive land under the model B scheme.
Memberships appear to have been somewhat smaller than planned. As of July 1989, 6,504
settlers had been resettled on 82 schemes encompassing 182,142 hectares. Actual schemes
averaged 1,163-3,166 ha/scheme and 17-90 settlers/scheme, depending on the province
(Annex C).
The performance of the model B schemes has been disappointing. Cliffe (1986) notes
some exceptional success stories which suggest that productivity growth is possible, but the
general picture is not encouraging. Only a small proportion of the available land has been
cultivated, and the irrigation and other infrastructure have not always been maintained (Cliffe
1986, p. 51). A 1988 evaluation found that overall farm use was less than one-quarter of
potential. Problems have also been experienced with the supply of tractors and inputs and
with members, less than a quarter of whom had management training and even fewer had
relevant agricultural skills (MLARR 1988, p. ii). The indebtedness of the model B cooperatives
is also alarming. At the end of FY 1987/88, outstanding loans through the Agricultural
Finance Corporation (AFC) to model B cooperatives stood at Z$2.25 million, of which $1.5
million was in arrears. The MLARR estimates that up to $1 million may be irrecoverable. The
poor performance has been attributed to several factors, including lack of working capital,
poor technical skills, and problems of organization and management. There have also been
difficulties with obtaining assistance for the cooperatives from major donors, so that most
have had to be supported through a combination of Government of Zimbabwe funding and26
assistance from a variety of NGOS. Many co-ops have not received their establishment grants
in a timely fashion (Moyo 1987, p. 193).
A number of suggestions have been put forward to improve the performance of the
model B schemes. Cliffe (1986, p. 94) saw two choices: either retreat to a limited program,
with a restricted number of schemes and carefully selected members, possibly from former
commercial farm laborers; or resolve to invest much more in inputs and resources and
provide trained management for the cooperatives. The 1988 report by MLARR s Monitoring
and Evaluation Unit (MLARR 1988) has one set of recommendations for established schemes,
another for new ones. For established programs, it suggests that since many are unlikely to
be able to make full use of their land resources in the near future, they should be replanned
in light of the capabilities of the membership, with training and advisors provided as needed.
If the scheme is near a model A scheme, surplus land would be allocated for smallholder use.
If isolated, the land could be subdivided or a surplus made available for a new group to be
properly established. Indebtedness of over a third of these schemes is so high that it is
unrealistic to expect any repayment, and a minimum loss of $1 million is to be expected. For
new schemes, the report recommends that farms be assigned only to cooperatives whose
members have already received the necessary training; that the cooperative not be allowed
to move to the farm until the establishment grant has been received; that memberships be kept
small (around 50 members) to minimize management problems; and that the prepared farm
plan be based on that membership and not on settler projections (MLARR 1988: iii).
Zimbabwe's experience with the cooperative production model has been fairly typical
of experiments carried out in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Mozambique (Bruce 1989, pp. 3-8;
1990b, pp. 3-6). Countries which built their agriculture around this model, such as China,
are now abandoning it for smallholder cultivation, with very positive impacts on productivity
(Bruce and Harrell 1989, pp. 5-9).
3.2.4.4 Model C scheme
The model C scheme is patterned after the "nucleus estate." A core estate provides
production and marketing services, and settlers are outgrowers. As in model A, individuals
are allocated parcels of arable land, and grazing land is communally managed. Profits from
private plots are retained by the occupiers. Estate management is provided by a professional
manager who is responsible for organizing and coordinating production and marketing
activities. Such schemes were introduced to involve smallholders in such enterprises as
tobacco and dairy production which require considerable vertical integration of production
and marketing activities, high capital investment in central processing facilities (e.g., tobacco
barns, dairy parlors), specialized technical knowledge, intensive management, and substantial
economies of scale in processing, input distribution, and output marketing. By 1989, this27
model represented less than 1 percent of the resettlement area. All model C schemes are
located in Manicaland; the average scheme contains 169 settlers on 4,316 hectares of land.
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The core estate is run by a cooperative of the settlers, to which all contribute their
labor, or by the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), which employs its
own labor force but provides essential services such as mechanical draft, inputs, seed
reproduction, and processing and marketing facilities for the settlers. Settlers have small
arable holdings of their own, usually smaller than those in a model A scheme, and residential
land and woodlots are allocated to households. Grazing land is communal. The early versions
of this model all involved ARDA core estates. The scheme, however, was criticized as
creating dependency and control relationships with peasants and engendering "kulakisation"
through restricted tenant farmer selection (Moyo 1987, p. 196).
The core estate, which is cooperatively managed by outgrowers rather than ARDA,
appears for the first time in the 1985 revision of the "Intensive Settlement Policies and
Procedures," and is known as the "Zunde (insimu yabantu) concept." It reflects a vision of
model C as an evolutionary bridge between the individual holdings of model A and the more
fully cooperative paradigm of model B. Most core estates to date are still ARDA-operated, but
even in that case it is envisaged that eventually the core estate (a state farm) will be taken
over and operated by a cooperative of the settlers (MLRRD 1985, pp. 2, 16-17).
Not surprisingly, very little has been written about the performance of the model.
Only 3 schemes, covering 18,864 hectares and commissioning 510 settlers, all at sites in
Manicaland (Annex C), had been established through July 1989. To ARDA personnel, the
nucleus estate must seem a minor modification of the nucleus operations which it has run for
smallholder irrigation schemes. The tenure arrangements present a genuine conflict of
aspirations between the settlers and the conceived model C. ARDA has used leasehold tenure
fashioned from use in older irrigated settlement schemes. This "Memorandum of an
Agreement of Lease" is issued under the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (ch. 137) and
provides spaces for a specific duration and for a rental amount. The provisions for
termination by government are very broad (for no reason, by 3 months' notice; or upon
insolvency, death, or detention of the lessee as mentally defective, without prior notice). No
compensation is payable for improvements. The lessee is little better off in terms of security
of tenure than a model A settler. But SEC. 16 provides that after a certain number of years
(to be specified), if the lessee has complied with the terms and conditions of the lease, s/he
may apply to purchase the leased holding. Nothing is said about the criteria for approval of
the application beyond compliance with the terms of the lease and the expiration of the
specified number of years. If the application is approved, all rental payments are treated as
a part of the purchase price.
10. Tobacco schemes, where the core estate provides the management of centralized production,
processing, and marketing, coordination of smallholder tobacco production, and provision of extension
advice and inputs, represent one possibility for applying this model.28
A number of settlers have sought to take advantage of this provision. On the ARDA
core estate/outgrower scheme in the Lower Sabi, settlers' leases contained options to purchase
their irrigated holdings after two years. A large number of settlers sought in 1984 to exercise
this option. About ten applications were approved by the scheme and forwarded to ARDA
headquarters. The settlers complained in 1990 that no action had yet been taken. Without
title, many proclaimed an unwillingness to invest in their holdings, especially in housing; they
further expressed a sense of insecurity since some had been evicted in the past.
In terms of the future of the model C schemes, the core run by a cooperative of
outgrowers (as opposed to ARDA) has very little potential. The management limitations of
production cooperatives are already clear from a number of other contexts. The core estates
in these cases, ARDA state farms for the most part, are complex operations and well beyond
the management capabilities of a cooperative of outgrowers, even if professional management
is provided. If there is a desire to move away from the state farm core/outgrower model, one
way to do so—short of divestiture and full privatization—is to develop a "responsibility
system" similar to that devised in China for the 1978-84 breakup of its communes. Parts of
the enterprise are assigned to subgroups within the collective which become independent
accounting and profit centers. Minimum performance requirements are set, which, when
exceeded, create profit at open market levels. For instance, outgrowers contract to sell the
cooperative a specified amount (which the co-op must commit to purchasing) at a specified,
below-market price, but production above the contracted level may be sold on the open
market. Similarly, processing and marketing can be set up as independent cost centers, which
has some security but must also bear to some extent the costs of mismanagement (Bruce and
Harrell 1989, pp. 3-6).
3.2.4.5 Model D scheme
The model D scheme attempts to integrate acquired grazing land into a land use plan
for adjoining communities in the communal areas. It has been tried in only one case, yet
encompasses 402.6 thousand hectares or 12.4 percent of the total resettlement area. The pilot
program, established by AGRITEX at Doddieburn-Manyoli, near Gwanda in Matabeleland
South, is based on a pocket of freehold land acquired by government and is located in the
midst of four communal area communities. The communities are to share the grazing in
annual rotations, each utilizing the area for one year in four. The year in which relief is
provided to the communities is seen as an opportunity for "internal resettlement" within the
territories of those communities, which are to paddock their own pasture areas. While the
model was designed with arid NRs IV and V in mind, the ministry intends to replicate it
more broadly through DERUDE (MLRRD 1985, pp. 2, 18-19). However, its performance is
difficult to assess because model D consists of only one pilot scheme—and this in an area
where security problems in the past have hindered development. This scheme comprises
26,000 hectares and 4,462 settlers.
The legal arrangements for the existing model D pilot are unclear. Ideally, such a
rotational scheme involving several communities calls for a contractual arrangement among
the communities, creating mutual rights and responsibilities. The acquired land might be29
leased on a long-term basis to the four communities and eventually deeded to them jointly.
Where a single communal area community is involved, the acquired grazing land would best
be simply merged into the community's land, becoming communal land. The minister has the
authority to do this under SEC. 6 of the Communal Lands Act.
3.2.5 THE STATE FARM SECTOR
This sector has its origins in the colonial period, the first state farms having been
established as growth points in relatively arid areas, usually involving irrigation. ARDA, a
parastatal under the MLARR, administers the state farms. It has absorbed a number of
smallholder irrigation schemes, such as those in the Sabi Valley, and has more recently
become responsible for the management of model C resettlement schemes. The number of
ARDA schemes has grown from 9 in 1980, to 18 in 1985, and to 28 in 1989. Some schemes
are pure state farms; others, nucleus estates with tenant producers; and still others, agro-
industrial estates. The estates are heavily mechanized, capital-intensive operations which
produce a wide variety of commercial crops, largely for export, among which tea, wheat, and
cotton dominate. ARDA has fixed assets of over Z$50 million, an annual revenue of $45
million, and earned $20 million in foreign exchange in 1989. It employs a permanent staff
of 4,000, of whom 169 work in the headquarters, and 17,000, as casual laborers. It
administers about 5,000 hectares of land, of which about 5 percent was cropped in 1988/89,
roughly the same figure as the LsCS. If estates with livestock production are excluded, the
portion of land cropped rises to 30 percent (figures provided by MLARR).
ARDA has been criticized for being too profit-oriented, resisting the application of a
new minimum wage, relying too heavily on seasonal labor (rather than providing more
meaningful full-time employment opportunities), and providing poor living conditions for its
labor (Moyo 1987, p. 196). Nonetheless, ARDA is losing money at an alarming rate. The
authority's deficits increased from $916,000 in 1984, to over $2 million in 1987, and then
to over $2.5 million in 1988. In the 1986-88 period, 7-8 of the estates suffered losses each
year, though, interestingly, they were not the same farms each year. The ministry attributes
the losses to undercapitalization, inflated staffs, and social functions which ARDA is expected
to undertake. Two very different options have been considered for dealing with this problem:
(1) a streamlining, involving layoff of part of the labor force and the turning over of some
of the unprofitable schemes for resettlement; and (2) expanding operations and land managed,
allowing ARDA to absorb currently large overhead costs.
Opinion in the ministry seems to favor the second option because of the difficulty of
laying off staff in conditions of growing unemployment and the desire to maintain this state
farm sector as a safe backup for the LSCS, which is considered potentially unreliable. There
is also a general sense that there should be state participation in the agricultural industry. It
is difficult to believe that overhead costs would not continue to rise with the expansion of this
sector, and that government would only end up with larger deficits from a larger state sector.
It would seem preferable, where possible, to deal with the deficits through new infusions of
capital from the private sector. Government should give serious consideration to establishing
joint ventures with private business to renovate these schemes.30
3.3 SUMMARY
Since 1979, 2,635.5 thousand hectares, or more than 18 percent of the 1979 land area
in the LsCS, have been acquired for resettlement. The original owners received compensation.
Many unemployed, squatting, landless, and communal area farmers received land allocations.
Since much of the land procured in early stages of the program consisted of abandoned farms,
output from resettlement areas has had a net positive impact on national output.
The land acquisition process based on a willing buyer-willing seller approach has also
brought about the securing of higher quality land—57 percent is located in NRs I, II, and III,
equivalent in percentage terms to the LSCS and greatly in excess of the 26 percent figure for
communal areas. While the acquisition of high quality land needs to be greater to redress the
land problem, the achievements of land accumulation on a willing buyer-willing seller basis
should not be discounted. Land acquisition, however, has slowed in recent years. Nearly 83
percent of the land was obtained in the initial five years of the program, 1979 to 1983, and
only 17 percent, in the last five years.
Before turning to problems underlying land acquisition, some attention needs to be
given to the criteria used by the government in obtaining land. According to Kinsey (1982)
and personal communications with MLARR officials, land is sought that is: (a) capable of
exploitation for agriculture and is near or adjacent to communal areas, particularly those with
high population pressure; (b) not actively farmed and preferably already offered to the
government; (c) in a block large enough to permit economic development of services and
infrastructure; (d) in an area already adequately served with basic infrastructure (e.g., roads
and water); (e) in a region where basic planning information is available to facilitate
implementation; and (f) priced to reflect "fair" market value. Problems of declining levels of
land acquisition have been attributed to various factors, including overly high land prices,
inadequate government funds for procurement and development, insufficient allotments from
NRs I and II coming onto the market, and meager sizes of blocks offered for resettlement.
All these issues are intertwined with the legal provisions (ch. 4) and the operation of the land
market in the LSCS (ch. 5).31
Chapter 4
EVOLUTION OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL LAND LAW
4.1 FREEHOLD TENURE IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTORS
4.1.1 LEGAL ASPECTS
At independence, Zimbabwe inherited both a colonial statute law and a body of
common law, court-made, based not on the precedents in English judiciary but on the
decisions interpreting Roman-Dutch law, which the Dutch had introduced into South Africa.
The basic law for colonial Zimbabwe was, by the High Commissioner's Proclamation of 10
June 1891, also applicable to the Colony of Good Hope in South Africa up to that date,
subject to subsequent legislative acts. There was no statutory restatement of the law of
ownership of land, and so the Roman-Dutch common law governs the basic rights of
property. That law of ownership is in most respects very similar to ownership under English
law. Some of its particularities, such as quit-rent tenure, have been removed by statutes in
Zimbabwe. In other cases, the difference is a matter more of Roman-Dutch terminology than
of substance, as in the use of the term "hypotec" rather than "mortgage." The Roman-Dutch
law of ownership is, in fact, simpler than that of England, the former utilizing a simple
concept of allodial ownership, uncomplicated by the feudal influences which encumber
English land law. Ownership under Roman-Dutch law implies a perpetual and heritable right
to use and alienate land. The land could be left by will by both blacks and whites. In cases
of intestacy, inheritance in the case of whites is handled under the Intestate Estates Act, but
in the case of blacks is governed by the customary law of the deceased.
Recording and proving title to freehold property are handled under the Deed Registries
Act (CAP 139). All titles granted from crown land were registered at the time of grant, and
the law requires the registration of all subsequent transactions, subdivisions, and inheritances.
All freehold land is thus registered, as are leases for ten years or more or for the life of one
of the parties and mortgage deeds. Contrary to the English rule in deed registration, the fact
of registration is virtually conclusive evidence of good title, and a chain of title need not be
traced. The Survey Act required a fixed (rather than general) boundaries system and a high
degree of accuracy in cadastral survey for freehold land. There is a busy private surveying
profession—the registry in Harare handles 150-250 registrations a day, and the one in
Bulawayo, 100-120 per day.
Freehold's unfettered transferability has made it attractive collateral for loans, and,
in fact, freehold land has served extensively as security in the LSCS and SSCS sectors. The
AFC makes long-term (20-30-year) loans only against collateral, and commercial banks lend
to the agricultural sector almost exclusively against such a guarantee. Availability of collateral32
helps explain why 4,660 large-scale farming units still receive two-thirds of total agricultural
credit. The banks depend heavily on foreclosure, barring rights to redeem land easily and
regularly. The same is true of the AFC, which under SEC. 40 of the AFC Act (CAP 101) need
not even go to the High Court to get a foreclosure order. A highly developed land market
makes it easy to dispose of the collateral.
Freehold has been the classically secure tenure and, as such, has been reported to
provide the greatest incentives for long-term investment in land. Tenure security was
preserved by the Lancaster House Constitution. But freehold, and the security with which it
is held, is regarded by policymakers with considerable reservation. MLARR
 s draft
"Communal Lands Development Plan" (MLARR 1986, p. 46) suggests that "freehold tenure
has resulted in generally acknowledged high standards of land conservation, land improve-
ment and agricultural productivity but at the expense of high land concentration and income
inequalities among the rural population and at the cost of partial underutilization of the land."
While indicating that no drastic changes are needed, it notes that the Land Acquisition Act
provides government with new controls over freehold and suggests that a further adjustment
would involve conversion of the freehold title over land into long-term leasehold title from
the state for a period of 99 years, with the landholders or their heirs given the first option for
renewal of the leasehold contract.
4.1.2 GENDER BIASES IN LAND RIGHTS
From a production standpoint, women's land rights are less important for the LSCS
than for the SSCS. In the LSCS, women do not act as field managers to any important extent.
In the SSCS, women may be performing this role to the extent that it has become "peasant-
ized," but are doing so under a legal structure quite different from that in the communal
areas.
A freeholder has been able to pass land to a daughter by will, though in cases of
intestacy, customary rules would have excluded a daughter from the heirs. Under
Roman-Dutch law, it has been possible to marry in or out of community property. But there
are many obvious nonlegal impediments, and, in fact, very few women own freehold land.
Cheater's 1981 (cited in Gaidzanwa 1988, p. 8) study of small-scale commercial farmers
found that only 4 out of 301 landowners were women. In a more recent investigation,
Chimedza (1988, p. 60) found no female nor joint husband/wife registrations on the large-
and small-scale commercial farms studied.
While women have long been able to own freehold land and to be registered as the
owner, they were treated in legal terms as minors and only very recently have been able
actually to "deal in it." The Legal Age of Majority Act, No. 15 of 1982, gave African
women requisite legal capacity for the first time. However, in spite of the act, it appears that
SEC. 15 of the Deeds Registry Act still limits the ability of women to deal with land in their
own right. This section requires that a married woman have her deed attested by a registrar
or a legal practitioner, disclose that she is indeed married, and state the name of her husband.
She must be assisted by her husband in executing any deed or document required or permitted33
to be registered in the deeds registry, unless proof is produced to satisfy the registrar that she
has the legal capacity to execute it without the assistance of her husband. Maboreke (1990,
pp. 13-14) argues convincingly that this provision was implicitly repealed by the Legal Age
of Majority Act, since it apparently reflects earlier law that women were perpetual minors
and, after marriage, had their husbands as their guardians. Apparently this is not the position
of the Deeds Registry Office, which regards the Deeds Registry Act requirement as still in
force.
In situations of divorce and widowhood, the wives of African freeholders face many
of the same problems as women in the communal areas. If there is a will and it provides for
them, all is well. If not, the law of intestacy will generally be the customary rules, and wives
do not figure as heirs under those precepts. A marriage in community of property under
Roman-Dutch law provides a solution in that on divorce, the matrimonial property is
partitioned and a surviving spouse inherits the matrimonial property on the death of the
spouse. Such community of property can be created by a stipulation in an ante-nuptial
contract. But Roman-Dutch community of property is a very unsatisfactory solution for other
reasons. During the marriage, the matrimonial property belongs to both spouses in undivided
shares, and the husband is the administrator of the property. He can do whatever he wants
with the matrimonial property without reference to the wife. He need not give her an account
of how he has spent the money, and he can actually sell the property over her objection. Only
three of the ante-nuptial contracts have been registered since 1929 (Maboreke 1990,
pp. 15-16).
4.2 COMMUNAL TENURE
4.2.1 CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE
Despite considerable diversity in rainfall, soil quality, and population density, the
communal areas share a system of land tenure which is described as "communal," with land
rights originating in indigenous practice. The system is generally characterized as one in
which the community, represented by the chief, "owns" the land but allocates households'
heritable rights to cultivable and permits them to graze their livestock on unallocated
community lands as a commons (Holleman 1952). It has been suggested that the system
embodies socialist values (community control of land, relatively egalitarian distribution) which
render it a valuable source of norms for modem Zimbabwe (Ushewokunze 1990, pp. 1, 3).
There is considerable debate over the origins and essential character of the tenure
system in communal areas. Recent work by Scoones and Wilson (1989), Cheater (1988), and
Ranger (1985, 1988) is summarized in Cousins (1990a, pp. 12-14). They question whether
the system is accurately described as "traditional." The system of land allocation to
communities originated in disposition by the colonial government, as it rearranged the
population to accommodate European settlement. Also, the early twentieth century saw a
major shift in African land-use patterns from intensive, continuous, hoe cultivation of limited
vlei areas to a much more extensive shifting cultivation made possible by introduction of the34
ox-plow. Evidence of self-selection of land rather than chiefly allocation in the early colonial
period, of significant inequalities in landholdings, of the early emergence of individual
entrepreneurships in farming, and of native readiness to buy land in the freehold areas suggest
that the "communal" nature of the tenure system has been overstated.
These authors further suggest that communal tenure is largely a colonial construct, a
part of the pattern of inflation or wholesale creation of powers for chiefs and headmen to
construct an effective basis for indirect rule and control of land resources through the chiefs.
The intensity of colonial interventions in rural society in Zimbabwe makes this thesis tenable,
though comparable patterns of evolution took place in other areas of Africa without similar
direct intervention. Community control of access to farmland, relatively loose when a
resource is plentiful, tends to tighten as the resource becomes scarce, then fall away (or be
transformed into a more exclusively dispute-settlement role) once there is no more arable land
left to be allocated (Bruce 1986). The sudden crowding onto the reserves may have been a
critical factor in producing (for a time) more active community control of land use. It would
appear that colonial policy has been more effective (or damaging) in Zimbabwe relative to
other attempts by colonial and postindependence governments to alter tenure on the continent,
which have largely "bounced off" customary tenure systems. By the same token, a stage may
now have been reached where little arable land remains available for allocation, and
community control of arable land would, in the natural course of things, be directed more
toward dispute settlement.
Recent legislation has enshrined the concept of communal tenure. The Communal
Land Act 1982 vests ownership of communal land in the president (SEC. 4) and assigns its
administration to district councils rather than chiefs and headmen (SEC. 8). The act regulates
access to land according to the "customary law relating to the allocation, occupation and use
of land" (SEC. 8), but does not attempt to restate the customary rules. The evolving nature
of customary law is recognized. By virtue of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act 1990
(SEC. 2), "customary law" means the "customary law of the people of Zimbabwe, or of any
section or community of such people, before the 10th of June 1891, as modified and
developed since that date." A district council may make bylaws relating to its duties and
functions (SEC. 13), and the minister may publish model bylaws which district councils may
adopt by reference (SEC. 14). The ministry has enacted Communal Land (Model) (Land Use
and Conservation) Bylaws, 1985 (S.I. 166/85), which provide for the preparation of land use
plans for all land within a council area, any ward or combination of wards on communal
land, any part of a ward or wards on communal land, or any village development committee
area or areas on communal land (SEC. 4). Such plans may in detail regulate landholdings and
use of both pasture and arable land (SEC. 6). An ability to alter custom and a degree of
control is theoretically available, to which, in all probability, no chief would have aspired.
The act may be seen as an extension of the colonial drive toward state control via community
control, "subordinating custom to state control" and ignoring the significant individualistic
elements within the tenure system (Cheater 1990, p. 22).
The revisionist viewpoint on "communal" tenure in Zimbabwe put forward by scholars
in recent years is of more than historical interest. If tenure in the communal areas is more35
individualistic than communal tenure models suggest, policymakers should not plan rural
transformations which rely upon an inherent communal dynamic in rural society. These
individualistic elements do not represent a sudden departure from custom, but an extension
of tendencies evident for some time. It is difficult to say how far or how rapidly this process
is moving. In particular, not enough is known to assess the nature or implications of the
emerging market in land rights, and how far full alienability of land rights is gaining
acceptability.
4.2.2 A CRITIQUE OF CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE: INVESTMENT, CREDIT, AND
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS
The conventional critique of land tenure arrangements in the communal areas needs
to be examined with the above rethinking in mind. The critique has tended to focus on a lack
of individual security of tenure implied from communal control of landholdings, which, it is
suggested, weakens incentives to invest in agriculture. Similarly, because under customary
tenure land cannot be sold and thus cannot be mortgaged, those tenure rules have been cited
as a constraint on the ability of communal area farmers to obtain credit for investment. A
further critique often heard elsewhere, that the absence of a land market freezes land in less
productive hands, has been raised less frequently in policy discussions in Zimbabwe.
Because land use differs dramatically between the commercial sector and the
communal areas, there has been an understandable tendency to attribute the difference to land
tenure. Simple correlations between tenure and phenomena such as low productivity and
erosion are assumed to reflect a causal connection (Whitlow 1988, pp. 21-24). This is the
case in spite of the relatively obvious differences between these tenure areas and other critical
factors such as rainfall, soil quality, low levels of technology, market access, and crowding.
MLARR s draft "Communal Lands Development Plan" (MLARR 1986, pp. 44-46) speaks in
these terms. It cites an inadequate land tenure system as the key to problems of the communal
areas, concluding that it is "quite clear that the traditional communal tenure shows strong
comparative advantages with respect to equity but a number of serious disadvantages with
respect to growth stimulation." The opinion is based largely on deductive reasoning and
makes no reference to empirical evidence. Three distinct questions arise: Are all or some
characteristics of the customary tenure system potential constraints on the behavior desired
of farmers? Are these constraints binding now, or only potentially might become binding at
some time in the future? Do we have alternatives which are cost-effective to put in place?
Bratton (1990) notes that there is no consensus on these points.
The lack of a consensus in Zimbabwe mirrors the situation in the literature on land
tenure in Africa. Conventional wisdom has long held that communal tenure is an obstacle to
development. Security of tenure is a difficult concept with which to work because it concerns
a matter of attitude, only imperfectly related to actual probabilities of loss of the holding.
Students of African land tenure have become increasingly skeptical about assertions of
insecurity under customary tenure and its consequences, though insecurity clearly exists in
some specific cases (Bruce 1986, 1989). Recent World Bank research in four African
countries (Place, Hazell, and Lau 1990) suggests that customary land tenure systems tend to36
evolve toward fuller and more secure individual tenure rights in response to growing
population pressure and commercialization of agriculture. This raises questions about the
priority which should be accorded to expensive interventions intended to force the pace of
tenure change, such as land titling programs.
Have customary tenure arrangements limited growth of production by discouraging
investment in agriculture, by limiting access to land for those who wish to expand cultivation
in response to market opportunities, or by constraining access to credit because of inability
to mortgage? There are a few serious economic studies addressing this question in Zimbabwe
which were carried out in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Framed to contrast African
freeholders in the native purchase areas with communal area farmers, they suggest that tenure
is a factor determining higher levels of productivity in the purchase areas (Massell and
Johnson 1966; Johnson 1968; Weinrich 1975; and Cheater 1978, 1982, 1984). However,
none of the studies employed a sufficiently rigorous econometric approach to allow any
conclusive disaggregation of tenure impacts from effects of other factors such as farm size
and/or greater access to capital through off-farm income enjoyed by purchase area farmers.
In more recent policy writing on the topic, these earlier studies tend to be ignored and
more impressionistic criteria used. Cliffe (1986, pp. 26-27) concludes that the evident
willingness to make investments (e.g., tree planting or fence building) suggests that adequate
security of tenure exists, and that there is no demonstrated need for formal title in either
freehold or leasehold. The World Bank (1986, pp. 8, 32-33) conjectures that concerns in
Zimbabwe about security of tenure under the customary tenure system are based on
misapprehensions about the nature of communal tenure systems. Cusworth and Walker (1988,
p. 90) reach the same conclusion.
Evidence of successes in peasant production in response to the lifting of other
constraints suggests that tenure has not been a binding restriction. In the years following
independence, communal area farmers showed a remarkable ability to respond to new
opportunities. The successes in maize and, to a lesser extent, cotton production were due to
(1) the lifting in 1980 of marketing disincentives in peasant areas, including abolition of the
10 percent marketing levy, raising the net price received by sellers, and increasing the
number of Grain Marketing Board collection points in and near the communal areas; (2)
communal area farmers' receiving the same price as that in the L.SCS from the Grain
Marketing Board, at or above international parity levels; (3) better access to high-yielding
varieties and fertilizers; (4) major expansion of extension services; and (5) greatly increased
access to credit (Amin and Chipika 1990, pp. 7-11). Of the 5.3 percent (9.0%) increase in
maize production experienced over the 1970-80 period (1979 to 1989), 2.0 percent (2.2%)
came from area expansion, and 3.3 percent (6.7%), from growth in crop yields. Of the -1.1
percent decline (26.5%) in cotton production over the same period, area expansion
represented 1.6 percent (25.0%), and change in yields, -2.6 percent (1.3%) (Annex 1). These
increases in production appear to have come about through both expansion and intensification
of cultivation, with wide variation among crops and years. The response to these market
opportunities was unevenly distributed both regionally and locally. Areas that already were
important maize producers because of rainfall and better access to institutional support37
benefited the most. Within communities, established large producers with ox-power sought
and obtained additional land, and credit was skewed to larger producers (Rohrbach 1988,
1989).
The fact that very substantial credit resources were directed to the sector without land
collateral might at first glance appear to support the adequacy of the customary tenure system.
But, due to low repayment rates, that credit has turned out to be a very expensive proposition
for the AFC. The AFC normally insists on collateral for long-term credit. Long-term loans
(6-30 years) for purchase of land, erection of buildings, and installation of improvements are
made only against solid collateral—in the case of land, freehold title. The land used as
collateral may be farmland, urban holdings, or other property. The AFC depends heavily on
foreclosure in such cases. The Agricultural Finance Corporation Act (CAP 101, by SEC. 40)
makes foreclosure a relatively simple process—it is not necessary for the AFC to go to the
High Court to get a closing order—and a highly developed land market makes it easy to
dispose of the security. (The MLARR must, however, give its certificate of no objection before
the sale.) Medium-term loans (2-6 years) are made against security in movable property such
as farm machinery or livestock. Short-term (seasonal) credit is given unsecured, but AFC is
to some extent protected by the Farmers Stop Order Act (CAP 110), which allows it to
encumber the farmers' payments from the Grain Marketing Board with their indebtedness.
Lending by the AFC to the communal sector grew from almost nothing to a substantial
amount in the years immediately following independence. The number of communal area
farmers receiving its credit increased from near zero in 1979/80 to a peak of 77,500 in
1986/87. The AFC's recovery experience with loans to communal farmers has, however, been
poor and is getting worse in terms of both numbers repaying and amounts refunded. While
the AFC can recover its loans from those larger farmers who regularly produce a surplus and
who are registered with the Grain Marketing Board, the producers of small, occasional
surpluses sell through "approved buyers" (local traders) and can escape the net. AFC has had
to begin to target loans more carefully, reducing its exposure. In the 3 years following
1986/87, the number of communal area borrowers fell by 26 percent, and this trend continued
into the first half of the 1989/90 season, when the number of loans declined 13 percent over
the same 6 months of the previous year (Ushewokunze 1990, p. 12). This trend reflects not
just a tightening of AFC creditworthiness criteria, but also a reduction in applications for
credit from the communal areas.
This record does not mean that credit has successfully been made available to
communal farmers without recourse to collateral in land. Availability of such collateral might
have kept costs of AFC credit lower and broadened access to it. On the other hand, one can
wonder whether foreclosure commensurate with the broad defaults would have been feasible.
There is little experience from elsewhere in Africa to suggest that had these smallholders had
titles available, commercial lenders would have responded by increasing credit supply. There
is some impressive evidence to this effect from Thailand (Feder et al. 1988), but no
comparable cases from Africa, where administrative costs of lending tend to be much higher.
In the late 1980s, the AFC began a group-lending pilot project to encourage savings. As of
1989, it had loaned 34 groups about $0.5 million at 10 percent interest, which the groups38
were then supposed to lend to members at 13 percent. There is too little experience to assess
this experiment, but it offers a risk-reduction strategy which potentially could compensate for
unavailability of title as collateral.
4.2.3 THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE TENURE REFORM
If one concludes that customary tenure arrangements confer limited and ambiguous
rights, under certain circumstances, what possible interventions might be considered for
enhancing tenure security in the communal areas? The current position under the Communal
Land Act is that the state owns all communal land, a sufficient legal basis for varying the
tenure system. The administration of land is conferred on the district councils, now the rural
district councils, which are enjoined to follow customary law. But these councils are given
the authority to enact bylaws which can alter those rules substantially, as indicated by the
model bylaws published by the MLARR.
But who actually administers the land? The current legal position is the latest of
several swings of the pendulum. An attempt by government to assume control of land
administration from traditional authorities under the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951
failed, with de facto control shifting back to the chiefs and headmen by the early 1960s and
full legal control of land restored to them by the Land Tenure Act of 1970. There is a paucity
of information about how the new attempt at state control represented by the Communal Land
Act is faring. The creation of effective local land-administration institutions is a precondition
for serious planning for changes in land regulation in the communal areas.
At what level could such an institutional capability be created? The districts are too
far removed from farmers and their needs to make decisions on the use and allocation of
farmland (Cliffe 1986, p. 36). The structure of local government for the wards into which
districts are divided and the villages of which wards consist was specified in a "Statement of
Policy and a Directive by the Prime Minister" issued in 1984. Further details are given in an
undated paper prepared by the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning, titled
"Structure of Village Development Committees, Ward Development Committees and
Extension Services." These describe village development committees (VIDCOS), each with six
members, at least four of whom are elected by adults from a hundred households, the other
two representing youth and women's mass organizations. Six IDCOS are to constitute a ward,
and each ward, with its approximately six-hundred households, would have a ward
development committee (WADCO). Each WADCO consists of the chairperson and secretary of
each constituent VlDCO, one representative each from youth and women's mass organizations,
and the councillor (rural district council member) for the ward, who chairs the WADCO. The
district council is made up of one elected councillor for each ward of the district council area
and councilors appointed by the minister to represent special interests, not to exceed
one-quarter of the councilors. The Rural District Councils Act 1988 makes reference to the
WADCOS and IDCOS (ART. 60) but only to specify their membership.
While it appears that the land allocation functions of the district councils may
sometimes be carried out by ward development committees or village development39
committees, formal delegations have not generally been made. It is only these more local
units of government that can hope to take hold of local land administration. In practice, to
an extent which is unclear, chiefs and headmen continue to make dispositions concerning land
(World Bank 1986, pp. 11, 32). Headmen are sometimes elected to positions in the village
or ward development committees, and it is not always clear upon which source of legitimacy
they are drawing in making land administration decisions. The lack of solid information on
this point is critical. If there is no effective implementation ability in these new, lower-level
institutions, it will do little good for central ministries to indulge in an plethora of planning.
This applies to both tenure change and land-use design. In the absence of convincing evidence
of an ability to implement policy at the local level, the experience in other African countries
suggests that heavy skepticism is in order.
Should an attempt then be made to increase security of tenure, to clarify and enhance
individual rights in land? In light of the above discussion, it is difficult to make a strong case
for an expensive or ambitious program of tenure reform. Cliffe (1986, pp. 77-79) lists three
options: community control and allocation, individual titling in freehold, or conditional
leasehold under state ownership. The primary policy document in this area, the "Communal
Lands Development Plan" (MLARR 1986, p. 46), takes the third option and recommends that
all communal land, for residential, arable, and grazing purposes, be owned and allocated by
the state, subject to cadastral survey, proper land-use planning, and demarcation according
to minimum farm sizes. Allocations could be granted on the basis of family, group, or
cooperative/collective farm. Arable and grazing land would be allocated on heritable, 99-year
leaseholds, with size minimums, which could be subdivided or sold without government
permission. The 1987 National Symposium on Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe endorsed this
approach, arguing that tenure within the communal (and resettlement) areas should be on "an
individual permit basis . . . the permits shall guarantee succession, prevention of sub-division,
abidance by environmental regulations and acceptable land and animal husbandry practices"
(MLGRUD 1987, recommendation 3.11, p. 29).
There are a number of problems with the state-leasehold approach. Cliffe (1986,
p. 79) points out that the lease conditions usually prove difficult to police and enforce. If
extension agents are charged with this function, it can destroy their rapport with farmers.
Because cancellation or reallocation of the lease is the sanction, tenure insecurity is increased,
and tenure can become a matter of favoritism and bribery. There is considerable evidence
from elsewhere in Africa to substantiate Cliffe's concerns (Bruce 1989, pp. 8-18).
Leasehold tenure can, if made very long-term, unconditional, and heritable, be almost
as strong as freehold, but it is usually adopted rather than freehold tenure precisely because
of a desire to build controls of land use into the lease and to make tenure conditional on their
observance. Such conditions are part of the "command cultivation" mindset, which often
seeks to make farmers behave in ways for which they lack positive economic incentive rather
than trying to ensure that motivations are adequate. The approach is ill-conceived, because
such planning is based largely on land potential. While land potential is relatively constant,
the best use of land depends at least as much on technological change and varying market40
conditions. Farmers respond to these changes far more effectively than any bureaucracy and
need to be able to do so without worrying about a "development plan" attached to their lease.
Moreover, enforcement of lease conditions generally tends to be sporadic and
arbitrary, given shortages of trained staff, vehicles, and petrol and the difficulty of putting
into practice such phrases as "sound husbandry." Often attention is focused on a farmer's
performance for the wrong reasons—membership in the "wrong" political party, a personal
disagreement with an official, or someone else coveting the farm. Tenure security is
undermined, unnecessarily, because use of freehold land can be regulated adequately, if in
less detail, and at lower costs through zoning or other rules enforced by fines.
Is freehold then the answer? The creation of a full private-ownership system (or even
a leasehold system) implies that the state or its local agents effectively substitute themselves
for traditional authorities as the guarantors for titles. This requires the creation of a new
institutional memory of rights, one based not on knowledge passed down by word of mouth
and learned in life in a local community, but on registers and cadastral maps. The investment
needed to create such a system is considerable. The "Communal Lands Development Plan"
(MLARR 1986, p. 46) calls for demarcation and cadastral survey of allocations, and the "Land
Subsector Study" (World Bank 1986, p. 33) makes the same suggestion. It is difficult to
reconcile the recommendation with the World Bank's "rule of thumb that the cost of
surveying, mapping and documenting a parcel of land should be about 2 percent of the value
of the land, and should rarely exceed more than 5 percent" (ibid., p. 38). Such costs vary
widely, with average parcel size, topography, and extent of tenure conversion figuring in the
process. In recent projects, costs for registering smallholdings have ranged from $25/hectare
in Thailand (Feder et al. 1988) up to $150/hectare in St. Lucia (Barnes 1990) in the
Caribbean. Much of the land in the communal areas is marginal, and it is clear that only very
modest portions would be worth registering under that rule of thumb.
Of course, not all holdings need to be brought within the new system. There are
economies of scale in doing all holdings at the same time, but they may not be economies at
all if only a few farmers positioned for expansion and commercialization of their production
can make productive use of an individual title (Carter et al. 1990). The Joint Presidents'
Agricultural Committee (presidents of Commercial Farmers Union, National Farmers
Association of Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union) (1990, p. 10) proposes
that titles (leasehold or freehold is not specified) be granted selectively "to communal farmers
who have proved that their operations are on a sustainably productive basis." Such a selective
approach is reemerging as a viable policy on titling for rain-fed agricultural areas in most
areas of Africa, after having, for many years, been considered less satisfactory than
systematic titling of all holdings (LTC 1990, pp. 21-22). There is a precedent for such an
approach based in the recent announcement that titles may now be available for commercial
premises located at growth points in the communal areas. Under such a system the person
seeking the title generally bears a significant part of the costs of demarcation and survey,
whereas more generalized titling—because everyone must get a title—is usually done at the
expense of the state to ensure compliance.41
While a selective approach to establishing freehold or leasehold rights in the
communal areas is feasible, the question remains how the vast majority of communal lands,
which remain unregistered, could be administered. Botswana's land boards, established under
its Tribal Lands Act 1968, provide a promising model. The land boards are comprised of
local land-administration institutions which are representative of local interests but are linked
into the bottom of the hierarchy of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. They
administer most land according to customary rules, which have been altered in important
particulars. For instance, boards may allocate land to a "non-tribesman," that is, any citizen
of Botswana. They also allocate land on long-term leases for commercial purposes, for
large-scale ranching, and, where requested, for residences. The system is worth examining
because of the seriousness with which it has been implemented and the substantial investments
which have gone into support services and the training of board members and staff. The
boards have an executive secretary and a vehicle provided by the ministry. Chiefs, who in
Botswana decide land and other disputes under customary laws, need to work closely with
the boards, often serving as members." There is a growing tendency in Botswana to
recognize that the boards must use the headmen as sources of information and executing
agents if they wish to be effective. Proposals have been made to compensate them for this
work (Riddell and Dickerman et al. 1986, pp. 10-17; Bruce 1989, p. 23). The strength of
the Botswana program has been its clear focus on the need to create effective local
institutional arrangements for dealing with land. The time may have come for Zimbabwe to
fill the legal lacuna which exists with respect to ward- and village-level institutions.
An approach which emphasizes institution-building and plans for incremental change
in tenure seems appropriate given Zimbabwe's experience with the Native Land Husbandry
Act 1951 (NLHA). The act transferred the authority of the chiefs to allocate land to the
Department of Native Affairs. Numerous rights to both arable and grazing lands were
distributed to individuals. Transactions in these rights were allowed. Holleman notes that by
1963, over 700 arable rights and 19,600 grazing rights had been sold to new individual
owners (cited in Cheater 1984, p. 11). The "Land Subsector Study" (World Bank 1986)
indicates that the act irrevocably introduced the concept of the right to transfer land to the
communal areas. By the end of 1960, 1,155 family rights had changed hands at an average
price of £5.9s.7d./acre. In addition, 13,511 grazing rights had been transferred at an average
price of £4.7s.5d. per animal unit. It is asserted that the land market is still functioning today
(ibid., p. 9), but it is unclear what today's land transactions owe to NLHA. Cousins (1987,
p. 34), for instance, found no evidence in his three years of research on grazing associations
of transactions in grazing rights.
The NLHA's implementation collapsed in the face of widespread opposition in 1962,
and the Tribal Trust Land Act 1967 returned the authority to allocate land to the chiefs. The
Communal Lands Act 1982 again shifts the authority away from chiefs and to district
councils. This vacillation may reflect a reaction to abuses which occur whenever central
11. In Zimbabwe, land disputes are excluded from the jurisdiction of the chiefs' local courts by
SEC. 15(1)(d) of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act 1990.42
government or traditional authorities have full control, suggesting a need for a new system
of checks and balances; the Botswana model merits further study in this regard.
Beyond this basic institutional development, are there any substantive changes in
customary tenure which should be legislated? The most serious candidate for such treatment
would appear to be transactions in land under customary tenure. There are some indications
that land transactions are gaining increasing acceptance. A forthcoming study by Cousins of
two communities in Masvingo Province indicates that the number of such transactions varies
greatly among communities. Most of the transactions to date represent a buying into the
traditional tenure system or, as Cousins put it, "a negotiated entry into the collectivity of the
'community' or the village which brings with it the property rights and obligations held by
the other members of that collectivity" (Cousins, personal communication). This is a limited
form of commoditization, but the fact remains that land is being transferred by individuals
rather than the community. If land transactions are emerging in some communities on a
significant scale, as appears to be the case, the time has come to think through a legal
framework for them. An amendment to the Communal Lands Act would appear to be the
most appropriate legal approach.
4.2.4 WOMEN
'S RIGHTS
Women farmers provide most of the labor for communal area agriculture (Cliff 1986).
However, studies of the role of women in agriculture in Zimbabwe show that the male head
of household, even if only occasionally resident, will insist upon making the basic farm-
management decisions. Often he will also claim control of any cash earnings from the
woman's work on the farm or even off-farm (UNICEF 1984).
Gaidzanwa (1988, p. 3) describes the traditional position of women under customary
land tenure in the communal areas:
In Shona and Ndebele custom, women obtained land use rights through their
membership in particular patrilineages. Male lineage heads obtained land from chiefs
and headmen and then allocated this land within their subsistence units. The internal
allocation of land use rights within households was very important. Women were
allocated land use rights in their capacities as wives and daughters in patrilineages.
Married women were allocated land use rights by husbands. This land was tseu
(woman's portion) to which every married woman was entitled amongst the Shona.
There was also a family field to which the husband, wife and children contributed
labour. The produce of this family field was used to entertain visitors, pay tribute or
for consumption when the woman's food from her portion ran out.
As daughters, women obtained land from their patrilineages. In their fields,
daughters grew crops for food which could be exchanged for other property in
readiness for marriage. Divorced daughters could also look after themselves by
working the land assigned to them by their agnatic patrilineages. Women's land rights
were mediated through the men who headed their agnatic and affinal patrilineages.43
There do not appear to be significant differences between Ndebele and Shona
customary laws in these matters (Chimedza 1988, p. 47). Females have no rights of
inheritance from their parents. While this application of customary law under the Communal
Land Act 1982 may appear discriminatory, neither SEC. 23 of the Constitution nor the
Prevention of Discrimination Act prevent such discrimination where it is enjoined in law
(Maboreke 1990, p. 16).
While women are entitled to acquire rights to land from their husbands upon marriage,
not all wives actually have plots. In a recent study, one-third of the married women in a
sample did not have parcels. Often this was a voluntary decision on the part of women, if
they had an alternative source of cash. Those women who had plots did not expect to get
them every year. Sometimes there was a rotation system among wives. Asked if they would
be interested in greater formal rights in land, the women explained that the real issue was
control over the proceeds of the land (Chimedza 1988, p. 41). Another study found that in
only 23 percent of a sample of 123 households were wives allotted land for their exclusive
use (usually under 0.8 ha) and concludes that the practice of separate allocations for wives
may be on the decline (Sunga et al. 1990).
When divorce takes place, a woman traditionally has no rights in her husband's land.
It has been suggested that the problem has become acute because of the ease of divorce and
the erosion of social control as men have entered the wage market (Pankhurst and Jacobs
1988, p. 211). The Matrimonial Causes Act (No. 33/85) provides for a more equitable
division of matrimonial property on dissolution of marriages by divorce, but it is not clear
that the late husband's land from his patrilineage is part of the matrimonial property. Sunga
et al. (1990) concluded that it will not be so treated. This seems to be the message of a recent
High Court decision (George Khoza and Thembeka Muriel Khoza, HC-B-106/87) indicating
that after divorce, the wife has no right to live on her husband's communal lands, not even
in a home she built and furnished during the marriage (Maboreke 1990, p. 2). Any impact
of the Matrimonial Causes Act would in any case be limited because most divorces are
conducted with no legal formalities (Pankhurst and Jacobs 1988, p. 211).
Widows are without even the theoretical protection provided to divorcees by the
Matrimonial Causes Act.
12 According to custom, the widow has rights against the heir. The
heir succeeds to the deceased husband's obligation to her (Chinowa v. Margwende SC 84/87),
and the heir can only insist on his right to succeed if he makes more than just a show of
complying with his customary obligations (Masango v. Masango HC-H-107/87). Widows
have been identified as one of the more needy groups in the communal areas and have been
given preference in selection of participants in the resettlement schemes (Cliffe 1986, p. 37).
What impact do women's very limited rights in land have upon their incentives to
produce? Chimedza (1988, pp. 47, 51) found no evidence of an adverse effect on production.
The issue, as she describes it, is part and parcel of the larger question of power structures
12. The proposed legislation on successions before Parliament in 1988 has not been enacted.44
and decision-making within the household. Discrete land rights will achieve little if
unaccompanied by an understanding that the land's produce is at the woman's disposal
(Pankhurst and Jacobs 1988, p. 204; Chimedza 1988, p. 47; Gaidzanwa 1988, p. 18).
Access to credit for women may be constrained by their inability to produce collateral,
but this is the position of all communal area farmers. Credit and marketing of cash crops are
often linked, as when the Grain Marketing Board deducts short- and medium-term loans by
AFC from the crop sales of communal area farmers. This is the communal farmers' major
solution to their lack of collateral. Since men traditionally market these crops, women have
no had independent access to credit. Indeed, until the Legal Age of Majority Act (Act No.
15/82) gave women the ability to enter into contracts, women could not incur debts. Now that
this is possible for females over the age of 18, the AFC has made some loans to women but
has still not created an adequate legal framework for its lending (Chimedza 1988, pp. 47-48).
A case in point has been brought by a husband against the AFC for allegedly breaching
customary law by entering into a loan agreement with his two wives without his knowledge
or approval (Maboreke 1990, p. 1). Group lending may have special importance for women,
who can form groups and obtain credit in this way. Chiefs have sometimes given plots to
women's groups, providing access to land outside the family holding, where women can grow
marketable crops and divide the proceeds among themselves (Chimedza 1988, p. 47).
Certain reforms in women's land rights were attempted under the ill-fated Native Land
Husbandry Act 1951. A detailed description of the provisions is provided by Gaidzanwa
(1988, pp. 4-7), and Pankhurst and Jacobs (1988, p. 204) summarize its impact:
Changes in men's rights, which guaranteed individual tenure and inheritance, occurred
in the absence of any definition of women's rights of access to land. Married women,
particularly, had no legal recourse to prevent men's restriction of their access to land
they had previously cultivated. Widows and divorcees, on the other hand, were, in
theory, formally entitled to a plot half the size of those allocated to male heads of
families. Nevertheless, they could not inherit land or pass it to their children.
There is no consensus among researchers on tenure reform to redress gender biases.
Financial autonomy is seen as the real issue, and it is still an open question to what extent
that objective can be attained through greater tenure rights for women (Chimedza 1988,
pp. 47, 60). The experience of the NLHA has made commentators leery of individualization
scenarios generally and has led some to a more favorable evaluation of customary rules
(Gaidzanwa 1988, pp. 16, 17). Others support freehold tenure specifically for women as the
only reform dramatic enough to provide women with real financial autonomy (Pankhurst and
Jacobs 1988, p. 222), while still others consider that both private ownership for women and
joint ownership with husbands deserve consideration (Maboreke 1990, p. 24). Cliffe (1986,
pp. 38, 78) endorses equal rights for women but in the form of joint rights for the household,
husband, and wife together. His preference is grounded in his concern that ". . . today
kinship is still one of the most crucial bases for community solidarity at the grass roots level,
a solidarity rooted in the status women have as the 'cement' between families and kinship
groups."45
4.2.5 LAND USE PLANNING AND COMMONS MANAGEMENT
Beginning in 1926, "centralization" was introduced on the reserves by the Department
of Native Agriculture. The core strategy was the demarcation of separate grazing and crop
cultivation areas. By 1946, over 3.8 million hectares had been centralized. Contour plowing
and grass-stripping were encouraged (Whitlow 1988, p. 9). As human and livestock
populations continued to grow, the initial efforts based on persuasion gave way to compulsion
following enactment of the Natural Resources Act in 1946. Communal tenure arrangements
were blamed for resource degradation and, in 1951, the NLHA removed land administration
from native authorities.
An ambitious land-use planning program was implemented. The NLHA prescribed
standard land areas for crop production and grazing to be granted to an individual, the
farming practices that could be ordered, and the number of animal units that could be
browsed on a given area. It is estimated that two-fifths of adult males in the reserves lost
their farming rights because they had not, as the act required, farmed the land in the season
immediately before the act came into effect. Some 20 percent of farmers and their families
had been removed from their villages to other areas in order to comply with the standard size
of holdings that the act prescribed. In addition, some 113,000 residents of the reserves were
evicted because there was too little arable land to accommodate all the occupants at the
specified sizes. After collapse of the NLHA, chiefs allocated 71,000 hectares to their people
in 1962 and 1963, largely from the grazing areas (World Bank 1986, pp. 8-9).
The legal framework put in place since independence recreates possibilities for similar
compulsions. There is a tradition of highly paternalistic conservationism in Southern and
Central Africa, one which can be revitalized through government attempts to superimpose a
"communal" tenure system on peasant rationality (Murombedzi 1990, p. 16). The draft
"Communal Lands Development Plan" (MLARR 1986, pp. 52-53) calls for a program of
"village consolidation," which would involve delineation of village boundaries, consolidation
of residential areas, incorporation of arable lands into one contiguous block, combination of
grazing lands for eventual cooperative grazing, and merging of the remaining "reserved"
lands. The VIDCOS (village development committees) would play a key role in this process,
and the need for peasant participation is stressed. Once village boundaries are demarcated,
each VIDCO would have to spearhead its own consolidation plan. The report notes a number
of potential problems, such as a lack of legal basis for the VIDCOs in enforcing the village
boundaries delineated.
The mention of participation is well advised, but effective entry will need a solid legal
basis and will, in any case, be hard to achieve. Old habits of "educating" the peasants die
hard. VIDCOs should not only spearhead their own consolidation plans, but should be able to
implement elements selectively (for instance, consolidation of grazing areas only) or decide
to do no such planning at all. This emphasis on the need for local input is especially advisable
because some elements in the planning process seem questionable. "Villagization," in
particular, has had a poor record elsewhere. While it is recognized that these plans are not
nearly as radical as those in Tanzania, that is, they ask only that houses be moved together,46
the need even for this must be assessed critically. Delivery of services can be facilitated by
villagization, but there is every reason to provide the services first and then allow farm
households to move near them, rather than pressing for consolidation of villages in advance
of the delivery. There are also potential costs, in terms of productivity, in moving farmers
off their holdings, particularly in less efficient use of labor and animal traction. Farmers
should be given the chance to weigh these costs and benefits themselves.
Consolidation of farmland is intended to avoid some of these potential inefficiencies
in labor and animal use, but it, too, has a down side. Farmers pursue opportunistic strategies
by farming little pockets of land where there are better soils and moisture. By operating a
fragmented holding, they sometimes get access to different soils, retard the spread of pests
and crop diseases, and, in mountainous areas, get access to different microclimates.
Fragmentation of arable holdings can be a risk-avoidance strategy at both the household and
the village level (Bruce 1986, pp. 43-45). It is not at all clear, as a general proposition, that
consolidating arable land in a block will increase productivity per hectare or efficiency in
input use.
Consolidation of pastureland is a precondition for gaining control over land use for
livestock grazing. One can be skeptical about the accuracy of current carrying capacity
estimates, as is Cousins (1990b, pp. 16-19), but in the long run such control is essential.
Consolidation, however, will be a long-term investment. It is a very long way from the
designation of discrete grazing areas to effective control over their use through enforcement
of a paddock system or stock limitations. Support for a grazing association and a consolidated
pasture may help reduce the labor demands of livestock management and "secure preferred
access to pasture in circumstances of land inequality" among communities, but not necessarily
result in better pasture management (Scoones and Wilson 1989, pp. 105-07). Common
property management requires effective local institutions. Because there do not appear to have
been traditions of communal management of grazing in Zimbabwe, but rather the
"free-for-all" situation usually described as "open access" grazing, this task of institutional
innovation is likely to be difficult. Cousins (1990b) very correctly directs attention to
"co-management" models rather than paradigms that stress the role of either government or
community to the exclusion of the other. However, co-management is an idea whose time has
come, not a model for which there are many working examples. It requires significant
autonomy for the grazing associations, but there is little sign of real empowerment in the few
grazing-committee constitutions or bylaws available. Gutu District in Masvingo Province has
adopted the pattern bylaws. The conditions for the Makumbe Vela Management Scheme there
state some specific rules, but for the most part rely on plans to be developed by AGRITEX
(part 4): (1) the grazing capacity of the scheme will be determined annually; (2) the grazing
system to be used in the scheme will be devised; and (3) the community should strictly adhere
to the grazing regime scheduled.
Two other grazing-scheme bylaws are reproduced by Cousins (1987, pp. 93-96). They
do not defer quite so broadly to AGRITEX and yet still do not convey a solid sense of the
rights of the grazing associations or their governing committees. Cousins (ibid.) found that
written bylaws did exist for a large majority of the mature schemes which he studied. On the47
other hand, alternate sets of popular rules had often developed parallel to the official bylaws.
Cousins (ibid., p. 81) concludes that this institutional framework of elected committees, a set
of agreed-upon bylaws, and a fair degree of authority in the hands of local government
committees embodies considerable ambiguity and stands in need of clarification.
Cousins (1990b), in a paper on communal area grazing, draws attention to two
important points, inter alia: (1) the creation and management of grazing commons is not
primarily a technical planning exercise but is social engineering, that is, the creation of
patterns of behavior through new rules and institutions to enforce them; and (2) the
constructive development of institutions must proceed on the basis of technical facts about
which those interested can come to agreement, and there are still real doubts about the
adequacy of our notions of carrying capacity.
If an adequate institutional basis for commons management could be instituted, are
fundamental changes in legal assumptions needed? Cliffe (1986) suggests that people with
good jobs should be excluded from running livestock on the communal pasture, and the
National Symposium on Agrarian Reform (MLGRUD 1987, p. 29) made a similar recommen-
dation with respect to those who do not cultivate. These are often the largest stock owners,
men of influence in the community. It would need to be clear what was to happen to their
livestock if they were excluded from communal grazing. A very strong and democratic
institutional structure would need to be developed to stand a chance of enforcing such a policy
in the face of outright opposition and the fairly obvious subterfuges which would be utilized
(e.g., token cultivation, lending of stock to relatives).
If commons management is such a difficult business, why is this approach being taken
at all? Why not individualize pasture? In areas of high rainfall, the National Symposium on
Agrarian Reform (MLGRUD 1987, p. 24) recommended its consideration. As Cousins (1990b)
suggests, the issue is whether it is possible to have the feed resources for each family to have
its draft power and still have room for all the families. The preconditions for a positive
answer would appear to be: (1) intensive fodder cropping; and (2) an operation profitable
enough to justify investment in a water source, which probably suggests a mixed farming
operation with a dairy component. Individualization is not a relevant solution in the more arid
areas, where a return which would justify the water source investment on an individual
holding basis would require large-scale ranching similar to Botswana's Tribal Grazing Land
Policy. The exclusion of large numbers of traditional users would be too high a cost to pay,
and in any case the commercial ranch model should be approached cautiously until a better
sense is gained of why it has not performed well in Botswana.
The above analysis is a more skeptical assessment of land use planning and consoli-
dation than that of the World Bank (1986, p. 31), which argued that a nationwide land-use
planning program which deals with large contiguous areas was needed, on the grounds that
"as long as grazing schemes are isolated experiments surrounded by the much larger and
universally accepted communal grazing system, there is no way to prevent non-members from
encroaching on the grazing scheme and the members from reverting to the traditional grazing
system outside the scheme," especially in times of stress. An argument that government must48
control all land to control any land is an contention for reassessing our objectives. Even in
countries where very considerable donor resources have been placed behind similar programs,
as with the regional development areas (RDA) program in Swaziland, production and
commercialization results appear to have been negligible. There the land consolidation
element was dropped out of the program in its later stages (Funnell 1982).
These problems suggest a very cautious approach to land use planning. The proposal
by the National Symposium on Agrarian Reform (MLGRUD 1987) is sound: authority for
regulation of land use would be devolved to the VIDCO level. The IDCOS would be
reconstituted by kraalhead (sabhuku) areas and given appropriate legal powers. The
management of the commons, including grazing land, would be undertaken by the IDCOS .
VIDCOs should be free to decide how they wish to administer their commons. Simple
illustrative legal forms and extension materials should be made available, but the IDCOs
should be free to modify the models. A VIDCO should be able to decide which categories of
land should be consolidated, if any. Once VIDCO areas are demarcated, a very useful first
step, each community must be encouraged to take charge of its own resources. The role of
local government should be to provide effective enforcement of VIDCO decisions where
necessary. Communal areas should not remain vested in the state but be controlled by the
communities themselves. This is perhaps the only way forcefully to establish local community
responsibilities for land resources.
In addition to basic legislation to define the roles of WADCOS and IDCOS, the present
legal framework for bylaws would need to be modified substantially. Rural district councils
can adopt the model bylaws or make regulations of their own for the preservation and
conservation of natural resources, the protection of common property, and the location and
situation of structures (Rural District Councils Act 1988, Schedule II). Government has
enacted the Communal Land (Model) (Land Use and Conservation) By-Laws 1985, which
provide a framework within which the district council adopting them can prepare a plan for
all the communal land within the council area, or any ward or combination of wards or any
part of a ward or wards, or any village development committee area or areas. The council
is to prepare a plan for an area under a VIDCO when requested by the VIDCOs. Consultation
with local residents is enjoined by SEC. 4 of the bylaws, but the plan can be approved over
community objection, if necessary. There is provision for a review of approved plans by the
provincial administration in all cases, whether or not an objection was made—but with a note
of objection where one has been made—but no provision for an appeal.
The model bylaws set out powers to plan and control land use which are very
extensive. There is no specific provision for the delegation of these powers from rural district
councils to WADCOS or IDCOS, not in the model bylaws, the Communal Land Act, or the
Rural District Councils Act. Once a district adopts the model bylaws promulgated by the
ministry, they are in force throughout the district without further action at ward or village
level (Rural District Councils Act 1988, SEC. 92). The legal approach requires reconsidera-
tion.49
4.3 LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF LAND ACQUISITION
4.3.1 THE LANCASTER HOUSE CONSTITUTION, 1981
One of the factors limiting land acquisition for resettlement has been legal. The
Lancaster House Constitution, Zimbabwe's 1981 independence constitution, contained an
entrenched provision (not susceptible to amendment or repeal for a period of 10 years) which
sought to protect European landowners against confiscation of their lands. That provision,
SEC. 16, stipulates in sub-section (4) that no property may be acquired compulsorily except
under a law which requires: (1) adequate notice; (2) public necessity, which specifically
includes settlement for agricultural purposes, in the case of land which is underutilized; and
(3) prompt and adequate compensation. There is also a requirement that the owner have the
freedom to remit overseas the whole of any compensation [SEC. 16(5)]. It is stipulated that
these provisions are not intended to interfere with acquisition by government of derelict land
[SEC. 16(7)].
Before the constitution expired in April 1990, this provision was often cited as the
principal limitation of the government's program of land acquisition for resettlement on a
willing buyer-willing seller basis. It does not explicitly do so, but has had that effect because
it limits compulsory acquisition to underutilized land and requires that there be a law on such
acquisitions which complies with the constitutional restrictions. That law, the Land
Acquisition Act, was not enacted until four years later, in 1985. In the interim, government
had no choice but to proceed with land acquisition on a willing buyer-willing seller basis.
This basis limited government to what land was offered to it with a (perceived) consequence
that the land which was offered in the early years was largely situated in the arid NRs IV
and V.
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4.3.2 THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1985
This act was the government's response to the constitutional requirement of the law
on compulsory acquisition which meets the constitutional criteria. It provides for compulsory
acquisition of underutilized land, but contains other provisions which have in practice been
more important. The president may acquire: (1) any land compulsorily for settlement for
agricultural purposes, where the land in question is underutilized; and (2) land which has been
declared derelict (SEC. 3). Underutilization is defined as failure to substantially put the land
to appropriate agricultural use for a continuous period of three years, taking into account the
extent of the development of the area and disregarding any interruptions of use due to public
disorder or disaster (SEC. 14). Derelict land is land which has been abandoned by the owner,
a determination made taking into account factors such as nonoccupation, noncultivation,
inability to locate owner, lack of control by owner, nonpayment of local rates, and so forth
(SEC. 16). An owner may demand the acquisition of the whole of a property, where
13. The reality, as documented in ch. 5, is that the government was offered higher quality land but
refused many offers because farm sizes were deemed to small and/or prices too high.50
government seeks to take a portion of it for underutilization and the taking would render the
remainder unsuitable for use (SEC. 12).
A requirement of prompt, adequate compensation is stated in principle for both
underutilized and derelict land (SEC. 19), but after relatively straightforward statements,
which seem to imply market value as the standard, wording is used in relation to judicial
review of the adequacy of compensation which confuses matters considerably. The court is
to endeavor to arrive at compensation which is "fair and reasonable, having regard to: (i) the
right of the claimant to be paid compensation for the land, materials, interest and right in the
land concerned, as the case may be; and (ii) the general public interest in the acquisition of
the land, materials, interest or right in the land concerned, as the case may be . . ."
(SEC. 22). The provision appears to allow for a reduction of compensation where the
acquisition is based on a strong public interest. There have been no court decisions construing
this provision and a lack of practice to indicate how the government interprets it.
Through 1989, the provisions on underutilization had not yet been used to acquire
land, though small amounts of derelict land had been seized. The reasons appear to be
primarily: (1) the difficulty of judgments concerning underutilization; (2) the fact that the act
defines underutilization very broadly (as no substantial, appropriate agricultural use),
seriously limiting its utility for acquiring land; and (3) the difficulty which government would
have in meeting the constitutional requirement (not mentioned in the act but still very much
in force) of freedom to remit compensation overseas. As a result, almost all land acquisition
for resettlement has continued to be on a willing buyer-willing seller basis. That basis, it
should be noted, has the major advantages of not requiring the government to identify or
prove underutilization and not requiring overseas remittance of compensation.
The most important provision of the Land Acquisition Act from a practical standpoint
has been a provision which facilitates acquisition of land by giving the MLARR the right of
first refusal over any land (in the LSCS) which comes on the market. The owner of any rural
land may not sell the land unless he first offers it to the ministry and the ministry issues a
"certificate of no present interest" or fails to respond with an acceptance or a counteroffer
within 30 days (SEC. 6, 7). If a price cannot be agreed upon, the ministry must, within 14
days after the failure of the negotiations, either issue a certificate of no present interest or
proceed to acquire the land compulsorily, if it is underutilized, or if a provision in the
owner's title deed gives the government the right to resume ownership of the land.
The act also reaffirms the right of the state to take advantage of any provision in a
deed of grant of land which entitles the state as grantor to resume ownership in certain
circumstances (SEC. 4). The provision has not been widely used and seems unlikely to
become a quantitatively important means of acquiring land.51
4.4 LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RESETTLEMENT
4.4.1 MODEL A
The land tenure system in model A schemes is based on three permits issued by the
plan for land use: a permit to reside, a permit to cultivate, and a permit to depasture stock.
The permits are issued under the legal authority of SEC. 6 of the Rural Land Act (CAP 155),
which confers broad authority on government to lease or alienate state land. An alternative
basis would have been SEC. 11 of the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (CAP 137), which in
many ways seems the more logical provision for government to have relied upon, but it may
have been avoided because some of the statutory provisions on leaseholds are rather specific
and would have reduced government's area of discretion in framing tenure arrangements.
The above permits confer broad rights to the MLARR but remarkably few rights to the
permit holder. In each case, the use of the land is strictly limited to the purpose for which
the permit is granted, and the permit holder renounces any right to build upon, cultivate, or
depasture livestock on the grazing commons. In the permits to reside and cultivate, the
ministry may at any time and without notice replace the permit, may terminate the permit for
failure to observe its terms, and may terminate for any reason if compensation (as the
minister may determine) is paid. In the permit to depasture stock, it is specified that the
minister is the sole judge of reasons for termination. In the permit to reside, it is specified
that on expiry or revocation there will be no compensation for improvements, though they
may be removed. (No period is stated in the permit, so it is difficult to see how it would
"expire.") In the permit to cultivate, compensation claims for improvements are avoided by
prohibiting the holder from constructing any building or other structure on the arable land.
None of the permits states how long it remains valid and there is no blank in which to enter
the duration. One suspects that they are technically terminable at the will of the government
unless the contrary is specified. Cusworth and Walker's evaluation (1988, p. 85) suggests,
however, that these permits were initially granted for a five-year period and that in many
cases a second set of permits has been issued.
It would be difficult to imagine a less secure form of tenure: uncertain duration, broad
powers of termination on the part of the MLARR, and few rights to compensation for
investments. On the other hand, the permits are not highly prescriptive. They do not specify
a plan of operation with which the holder must comply, but rather refer to general
responsibilities and duties under specified laws. There is no sense of a command cultivation
system enforced through the permits. But the very vagueness of the requirements render it
administratively difficult to assess whether or not they have been met, and potentially exposes
the settler to arbitrariness.
How far has insecurity of tenure affected settler commitment and investment? Kinsey
(1982, p. 108) expressed concern on this point early on, as has Cheater (1990, p. 15) more
recently. Cliffe (1986, p. 92) notes some evidence that settlers have a sense of insecurity
under the permit system. The ministry has sometimes tended to dismiss these concerns: "It
is now clear that settlers are psychologically secure in their holdings in spite of the52
theoretically short-term nature of the permit system" (MLRRD 1985, p. 13). But a year later,
the "Communal Lands Development Plan" noted "an anxiety on the part of the settlers on
whether they will stay on the schemes permanently," a problem which the report attributes
to "the implementation and interpretation of the permit system" (MLARR 1986, p. 64). The
Cusworth and Walker (1988, p. 90) evaluation of the resettlement program two years later
indicated adequate security of tenure, citing the building of houses and the planting of fruit
trees by the settlers. At present there does not appear to be substantial fear on the part of the
settlers that they will be dispossessed, an understandable perception as there have been
virtually no evictions.
Has credit been constrained by lack of a marketable title? Short-term seasonal loans
and medium-term loans (up to 5 years) have been available for purchases such as Scotch--
carts, draft oxen, fencing, and implements (MLRRD 1985, p. 26). Cliffe (1986, p. 50) reports
60 percent of settlers receiving AFC loans (as opposed to 10 percent of communal area
farmers), with the average loan being Z$480. Loans for buildings and other long-term
improvements on the land do not appear to be available from AFC, however, and lack of
mortgageable titles is one reason—among others—why commercial banks will not meet this
credit need. Availability of land security for loans would potentially make it less expensive
for government to extend credit for these purposes.
The scant evidence on these issues has not prevented commentators from suggesting
directions the system should take in the long run. There does appear to be a consensus,
shared by the MLARR, that the permits are not an adequate long-term solution, and that the
fragile tenure associated with them carries with it the potential for abuse by administrators,
whether or not such abuse has so far occurred. The "Communal Area Development Plan"
(MLARR 1986, pp. 47-48) recommended that permits should be granted initially for 5 years,
then converted to a lease for 25 years with an option to extend to 99 years. The leases are
intended to be mortgageable interests. A similar proposal for leasehold has been made by the
union of communal area farmers (National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe 1989, p. 10).
Cliffe (1986, pp. 92-93) recommends a system of community rather than state control of
land, urging that it can allow for reallocations of land over time to cope with new households
and for reallocations which may be required in attempts to intensify land use. Bratton (1990)
recommends either an ownership which prevents owners from subletting or selling to anyone
but another smallholder, or a 99-year lease which is transferable within the family. A recent
joint memorandum from the presidents of the three farmers unions (Joint Presidents'
Agricultural Committee 1990, p. 3) makes the strong recommendation that "future
resettlement must provide absolute security of tenure to the farmer, by way of a lease
convertible to title." Further, it makes a striking suggestion that some of the direct costs of
farm development be recovered from the beneficiaries over 40 years.
In the absence of good information on what settlers want in Zimbabwe, there is some
virtue in examining the experience of other African countries. Historically, settlement
schemes in Africa have generated strong demands for inheritability as the initial generation
of settlers has aged (Bruce 1986, pp. 98-100). There is every reason to anticipate that this
will be the issue raised first and most strongly in Zimbabwe. In addition, recent World Bank53
studies in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Rwanda, exploring the impact on investment and
productivity of increments in tenure security, have found that the most significant effect
occurs with the establishment of inheritability, rather than with the later establishment of
alienability (Place, Hazell, and Lau 1990, pp. 32-33).
The objective should be to ensure that settlers enjoy the same intergenerational
security of tenure as do holders of communal land. This means an indefinite term, perpetually
granted and largely free of provisions for termination by the state. Should subdivision of these
holdings among heirs be permitted? While it is tempting to seek to limit subdivision, the
practical difficulty of enforcing such a provision, as experience in other countries, makes this
a moot question.
Should leasing and borrowing be permitted? As in the communal areas, provisions
need to be made to provide an orderly basis for such transactions. They serve a very
legitimate function in case of illness or as households age. However, it is important that sales
of holdings be strictly limited for some substantial time, perhaps 20 years. Otherwise, some
will apply for land in the resettlement schemes with the intention of shortly taking a profit
by selling the land.
Women's access to land, via the permits, is an important issue. It is possible for a
female head of household to have permits issued in her name. Settler selection criteria gave
priority to widows and other female heads of household as beneficiaries because of their
poverty and the disadvantages under which they cultivate in the communal land sector.
Ministry policy specifically affirms that in resettlements, women should have the land
assigned to them in their own right (MLA 1985, p. 23). However, a 1988 study (Chimedza
1988, p. 53) found that only 7 percent of permits had been issued to such women, and model
schemes are reported to have proportionately more male heads of household than those in
communal areas (Gaidzanwa 1988, p. 12). This last observation is not surprising, since male
heads of household (on resettlement schemes) are prohibited from taking employment
elsewhere. In the case where there is a male head of household, the permits are issued in his
name. If the household head contravenes the regulations and loses his holding, so do his wife
and family.
As in the communal areas, the clearest need is to establish firmly the rights of widows
and divorcees. Presently, if a settler dies, the widow is usually allowed to maintain the
holding, not as a matter of right but as a matter of administrative discretion on the part of the
scheme administrators. A divorcee usually leaves the scheme and rejoins her father's people
(Gaidzanwa 1988, p. 12).
There have been proposals for the issuance of the permit jointly to husband and wife
(Chimedza 1988, p. 10), but this appears to contravene SEC. 8 of the Rural Land Act (CAP
155), which prohibits leasing or alienating land to two or more individuals jointly without the
consent of the minister (Maboreke 1990, p. 11). The standards for such a consent are not
clear, but one supposes that a blanket consent for all husbands and wives would be legally
feasible if a case could be made for it. There have also been proposals for separate allocations54
for husband and wife, but, given the instability of marriages, there has been concern that this
would in the end result in too many substandard holdings (Pankhurst and Jacob 1988, pp.
211, 222). Given instability of marriages and the tendency toward subdivision, the same
problem can be raised with a joint permit, but it has less force in that case.
4.4.2 MODEL B
The legal instruments for assignment of land in a model B scheme differ from those
in model A. A permit to occupy is issued to the cooperative. It is for an unspecified period
and is revokable in the minister's sole discretion if he concludes that the cooperative has
failed to make proper, beneficial use of the holding; if the cooperative ceases to be registered
as a cooperative society; if the financial affairs of the cooperative are such that it is no longer
able to pursue its objectives; or if its membership falls below fifty. As in the case of
individual holders in model A schemes, there is an obligation to comply with a number of
laws relating to husbandry and conservation. The cooperative cannot without the consent of
the minister erect any building; carry on or allow any person to carry on a trading,
commercial, or industrial operation on the holding; or cut or remove indigenous trees from
the holding. In case of expiry or revocation of the permit, the cooperative is entitled to no
compensation for improvements, though the improvements may be removed. The bylaws of
the cooperative cannot be changed without the written approval of the minister.
A second legal instrument is a temporary permit to cultivate, which appears to be for
the 0.5-hectare individual plots permitted to cooperative members. It resembles very closely
the "permit to cultivate" held by model A settlers, except that it limits the right to cultivate
to one year and makes no mention of renewal. It also contains a prohibition of subdivision
which, strangely, has no parallel in the model A permit to cultivate. There are no permits
which correspond to the model A permits to reside or depasture stock (MLRRD 1985,
pp. 71-76).
It is difficult to believe that the very fragile tenure provided in the cooperative's
permit to occupy does not have some disincentive effect. This is particularly true given that
the state of land utilization and financial position of many cooperatives leave them quite
vulnerable to termination at the discretion of the minister. Cliffe (1986, p. 53) notes that
tenure insecurity may be an inhibiting factor to cooperators committing themselves to
long-term improvement. As in the case of local communities in the communal areas, the
soundest approach may be to empower these cooperatives by granting them freehold title over
the land they have been assigned.
Cliffe (1988) suggests that the reform needed is not just a matter of defining more
clearly the rights of the cooperative entity, but of delineating the rights of the cooperators as
they join and leave the cooperative. He suggests a review of the law on cooperatives. A
statute intended for multipurpose cooperatives on the Western model does not meet the needs
of a production cooperative. That law should protect the interests of individual cooperative
members, as Cliffe suggests, but should also confer on them collectively a large degree of
freedom to change their bylaws, to determine the extent to which they desire to cooperate,55
and to permit them, if they wish, to dissolve the cooperative and divide its assets among
themselves.
Model B schemes present a distinctly different set of issues concerning women's
access to resources. In the cooperatives, women participate as members in their own right.
Indeed, the issues have little to do with tenure, and, on the critical issue, how women fare
in decision-making about resources in the household, there seems to be little or no
information.
4.5 LAND TAXATION
A system of land taxation over freehold land has been in force for some time, that is,
the system of land development levies which has been used to meet the costs of district
administration. The legal basis for the system of rates and land development levies has
recently been renewed in the Rural District Councils Act, No. 8 of 1988. This rating system
applies not only to freehold land, but to certain specified classes of communal land: land
which under SEC. 10 of the Communal Land Act 1982 has been set aside by the Minister of
Local Government and Town Planning by notice published in the Gazette for purposes such
as a township, business center, village, industrial area, or irrigation scheme (SEC. 95 of the
Rural District Councils Act).
For urban property, the act provides for imposing a supplementary charge to cover
the expenses incurred by the council in the maintenance and administration of the area. The
council may issue bylaws to this effect and base the charge upon any unit of land or,
alternatively, a unit of residential or business accommodation. The council can vary the
charges according to the tenure under which the property is held, the value of the property
based on the value of the land and/or improvements, the area of the property, and the use to
which the property is put (SEC. 89).
For rural property, a council may impose a land development levy on all owners of
rural land (freehold land or communal land set aside by the minister) in accordance with the
Third Schedule to the act, or, as a rate, in the same manner as urban land; or may in a
communal or resettlement ward impose a development levy on household heads, assessed on
a per-capita basis (SEC. 96). It may also, with the approval of the minister or at the direction
of the minister, impose a special land development levy or a special development levy to
recover expenses of a development project or service, or to meet expenses of an unusual
nature, or which arise from unusual circumstances or from an unequal demand on services
provided by the council. Rules on assessment for the special levies are the same as those for
the regular levies (SEC. 97).
A majority of rural district councils (39 of 42) base their land development levies on
the unit taxes provided for in the Third Schedule to the act (rather than a rate system). The
scales for the land development levy are set out in SEC. 2 of the schedule to the act. That
provision permits a council in any given year to choose from two scales. One scale is a flat56
rate applied on total farm area. Farms pay 1 tax unit for every 405 hectares of land, or part
thereof. The second scale is a progressive rate: between 0 and 20 hectares, 0.5 tax unit; and
20-1,619 hectares, 1 unit. Beyond 1,619 hectares, additional taxes are levied progressively:
for the next 809 hectares, 1.2 units; next 2,024 hectares, 1.5 units; next 2,024 hectares, 1.0
unit; next 4,047 hectares, 1.0 unit; next 4,047 hectares, 2.0 units; next 8,094 hectares, 12
units; next 16,188 hectares, 32 units, and beyond 40,470 hectares, 1.0 unit for each 405
hectares. The value of the unit is decided upon by the respective councils, but has to be
approved by the Ministry of Local Government. Tax rates levied by rural councils in 1989
are shown in table 4.1. Rates average Z$220-to-Z$258 in higher rainfall zones of
Mashonaland, and Z$58 in Masvingo (mostly NR V).
TABLE 4.1
Tax rates levied by province, 1989
PROVINCE TOTAL NO. TAX UNITS RATE PER TAX UNIT (Z$)
Manicaland 163 7,759
Mashonaland Central 258 4,355
Mashonaland East 230 5,929
Mashonaland West 220 7,753
Matabeleland North 58 9,133
Matabeleland South 80 2,448
Masvingo 58 4,276
Midlands 67 4,427
A council may elect to utilize a rate basis for rural land rather than the scales under
the Third Schedule. Three councils do so (Chipinge, Chiredzi, and Kwekwe). A rate is levied
on the assessed value of the land, which should reflect its agricultural potential, including the
possibility of irrigation. The rate charged is a percentage of the assessed value of the land.
In Chiredzi, the rate is (on average) 0.5 percent of the value. To adjust for the differences
in the degree to which different parts of the community draw on the resources of the council,
the rate varies from 0.25 percent to 0.9 percent. The 1986 Commission of Inquiry into
Taxation concluded that the rating system distributes the burden more evenly, especially
where there are important variations in the potential of land. It also permits revenues to be
increased substantially without hurting the owners of land with low potential. The cost of the
evaluation exercise in Chiredzi was said to have been recouped in one year (Zimbabwe
Commission of Inquiry into Taxation 1986, p. 229).57
Chapter 5
LAND MARKET AND CHANGES IN AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
5.1 RATIONALE FOR A LAND MARKET-BASED REFORM
The very large farm size of the LSCS was a product of the size of the original grants
of land to European settlers. Cliffe (1986, p. 43) is worth quoting at length on scale of these
large farms:
The presumption is that they are "economic units" whose size of operation embodies
certain economies of scale. In fact, historically, their size came about in a very
haphazard way, partly derived from Afrikaner custom in 19th century South Africa,
in part so as to deny land to Africans even if not used. The only economic "logic" to
any of them is in the case of those farms that have come into existence as a result of
sub-division (or the refusal of subdivision, for permission has always had to be sought
from government). The criterion for sub-division, as also seemed to have been the
case with new allocations post-World War II, is on the basis of guaranteeing a certain
income level to the owner/manager. Thus if their existing scale of operation has any
rationale, it is an underlying socio-political judgement about what income large
farmers deserve rather than one based on the economics of production. In fact, a
common practice is for farms in areas with good arable potential to have a portion
intensively farmed and the rest used for only light grazing. There may be several
reasons for this ("part-time" farming, speculation, etc.) but the World Bank review
was probably right in suggesting a "management constraint"—that the present average
cropped area in the Lscs sector, 130 hectares, is probably close to the optimum farm
size in terms of cropped hectares that can be successfully managed by a farmer and
his family (with existing mechanical equipment), when considering the particular crops
grown—part of them irrigated—and also taking into account that many of the farms
run livestock as well.
The illusion survives among Zimbabwean policymakers that mechanized and
modernized agriculture is possible only under large-scale or cooperative farming systems. The
myth of large-scale efficiency was central to the ideology of colonial agriculture in the settler
colonies and may have been reenforced by the Marxist faith in efficiencies of scale. It is
obvious that settler agriculture in Zimbabwe achieved levels of productivity which were
impressively higher in at least limited areas of the large-scale operations. But it is equally
obvious that for historical reasons, large scale went together with access to improved
technologies, extension services, markets, and subsidies. The impact of these factors is
commonly confounded with those of scale itself.
Empirical research which attempts to isolate scale as a factor has reached very
different conclusions. An inverse relationship between scale and productivity per hectare for
most crops has been documented by Berry and Cline (1979). While most of the evidence58
comes from Asia, the available African data suggest that the relationship may hold there as
well (Levi and Haviden 1982). Greater investments of household labor and the efficiency
advantage of that labor over wage labor appear to more than compensate for potential
economies of scale, which in practice are usually unrealized (Carter 1984). Even where yields
per hectare are not greater on smaller holdings, the costly inputs required for large-scale
production may mean that economic efficiency in terms of domestic resource costs may be
greater on the smaller operations, as was recently found in Kenya and Malawi (Lele and
Agarwal 1989).
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There are exceptions to this inverse relationship. While many traditional plantation
crops such as coffee can be grown by contract farmers for a central processing facility,
economies of scale in both processing and marketing for some plantation crops such as
bananas are transmitted to the scale of farms via the necessity of tight coordination between
harvesting and processing (Binswanger and Elgin 1988). Characteristics such as skilled
management for commercial production in Zimbabwe are historically associated with large
scale and confused with efficiencies of scale. The confusion is perhaps understandable given
that the historical association is a reality which is not easily altered, and the scarce
management skill can, for a variety of political and economic reasons, be lost with a
reduction of scale.
What then is the efficient scale? An efficient scale for maize is likely to be quite
different from that for horticulture, and will vary not only by crop but by land capability and
capital and labor endowments of the firm. Market economies recognize that efficient size will
vary with a multitude of factors and that any attempt to stipulate it will necessarily involve
substantial inefficiencies. Farm size or scale is thus allowed to adjust through the operation
of the land market.
5.2 LAND MARKET RESTRICTIONS SUBDIVISION
There has been little opportunity for the land market to promote size efficiency in
Zimbabwe. Dating from the colonial period, the Town and Country Planning Act (CAP 213)
placed limits on subdivision. This is still the case under today's Regional, Town and Country
Planning Act, No. 22 of 1976. A permit is required for any subdivision and for anything
which might be an attempt to accomplish what amounts to a subdivision: an agreement for
a change in ownership of any portion of a property; for a lease of any part for ten years or
more or for a lifetime; for a right to occupy for those periods; or for a renewal of a lease or
right to occupy which would take the period over ten years (SEC. 40). A permit may be
applied for from the local planning authority, which is the rural district council (SEC. 10).
If the permit is not granted within four months, it is deemed to have been refused. Appeals
may be taken to a planning appeals board appointed by the Minister of Local Government
(SEC. 61), and appeals on points of law, taken from the board to the Appellate Division.
14. The analysis of domestic resource costs in Zimbabwe is covered in ch. 7.59
Within the Appellate Division, those appeals go to the administrative court established by the
Administrative Court Act, No. 39 of 1979, from which appeals can be taken to the Supreme
Court. About five subdivision cases a year on average come before the administrative court,
and these usually concern urban properties.
An MLARR committee advises the Ministry of Planning regarding the viability of
proposed subdivisions. AGRITEX participates and provides technical criteria. The committee
has recently been reviewing its criteria, which have been relatively informal, in order to be
able to demonstrate consistency. In general, the committee has not been willing to permit
subdivision simply on the ground that the land would sell more easily and for higher prices
per hectare in smaller units. There is a reluctance to allow parcels to be fragmented just for
"speculative" purposes. There should be a purchaser, with capital and a viable project. The
MLARR (in personal conversations) has suggested that there are not large numbers of potential
black purchasers who would benefit from a relaxation of the subdivision criteria. Most of
those interested would be businessmen who lack farming expertise and are involved with
smallholdings not productive enough to warrant managers, unless tobacco is grown.
Further controls with respect to subdivision are built into the Rural Land Act
(CAP. 137). Co-ownership is discouraged because of its potential for subdivision (each
co-owner has the right to request "partition," subdivision of the co-owned land). The act
provides that land may not be sold or leased to two or more individuals jointly without the
consent of the minister. A sale to a corporate body, which as a single legal personality does
not raise the specter of subdivision in the same way, is allowed (SEC. 8). Sharecropping is
prohibited except with the approval of the minister (SEC. 10). The sharecropping provision
appears to have been intended to prevent de facto subdivision of large holdings among
sharecropping black tenants. A similar prohibition exists in South African law. Criminal
penalties, including imprisonment for a period up to two years, are prescribed for contraven-
tion of these provisions (SEC. 11).
In time it is likely that a relatively free land market would break up many of the larger
holdings in the LSCS, as has been the case in the former white highlands of Kenya. The
persistence of land concentration owes a good deal to the limitations which have been placed
upon its marketability through restrictions on subdivision. The same applies to underutiliza-
tion of land. While underutilization of freehold land is sometimes blamed on the relative
absoluteness of freehold tenure (one need not use it to avoid losing it), operation of a land
market is the mechanism by which a freehold system attempts to ensure that underutilized
land moves into hands which will use it better. Land markets rarely perform these tasks
perfectly. Market imperfections abound in developing countries. But the land market, as the
dynamic factor in a freehold tenure system, is critical to maintaining efficient scale and
utilization. And the operation of a land market and its potential for redressing the highly
unequal land distribution have been largely negated by public policy in Zimbabwe.
Beyond provisions on subdivision and underutilization, one further legal provision
regarding the rules of inheritance restricts land markets in the SSCS sector. The 1933 African
Wills Act specified that in the absence of a will, the senior male heir at customary law would60
inherit the entire land in his individual capacity (rather than as a representative for a larger
group of heirs). While customary rules imposed a duty to try to accommodate siblings and
their descendants who stood in need of land in order to subsist, a study in the 1970s found
that the number of siblings and their offspring in the SSCS sector was small and decreasing
with time. In fact, heirs of these farms have required the approval of the state even after the
title has been granted. In the past, successive native land boards have invalidated the
provisions of black landowners' wills which attempted to bequeath the land to more than one
heir, individually or collectively. This particular restriction was removed by the Africans
Wills (Amendment) Act 1976, but in practice little seems to have changed. Local
administrators still attempt to ensure that SSCS farms are inherited by single heirs (Cheater
1982, pp. 77, 86). Where subdivision on the record is restrained, it takes place anyway but
off the record, leading to patterns of use and perceived rights which have little to do with
what can be proved under the Deed Registries Act. If this is the case to the extent suspected,
a program of resurvey, title adjudication, and re-registration may be necessary. If a more
focused inquiry found extensive confusion of titles in the smallholder areas, enactment of a
land adjudication act of the type used in African countries with title registration systems
would be appropriate as a basis for restoring the integrity of the title deed system in these
areas. Such a statute would also be needed if a systematic extension of the title deed system
to parts of the communal lands were desired.
5.3 LAND TRANSFERS
The performance and operation of land markets in the communal areas is difficult to
assess due to the paucity of data. According to MLARR officials (personal conversations), land
transfers in the LSCS have been rather modest. While some speculative buying has been
occurring in peri-urban areas in recent years, most of the transactions are between fathers and
sons. Thus far, there are no signs of the emergence of the land-buying companies which
played such a major role in the transfer of white settler land to black farmers in Kenya. In
terms of racial balance, new large-scale operators seeking to buy land in the LSCS run two
black purchasers to each white. There is not much market action in the SSCS, and what there
is does not seem to involve scaling-up. There is little leasehold market activity because those
who want land on lease want smaller units, for which the Rural Land Act requires the owner
to get a subdivision permit. With appeals, obtaining the permit can take several years.
From independence until April 1990, the government acquired land from the LSCS on
a willing buyer-willing seller basis. The Land Acquisition Act, enacted in 1985, designated
government as the buyer of first resort, thereby requiring sellers first to "offer" land to the
government at the sale price. These processes for land purchases have been criticized by
government on three grounds: the land market provides too few transfers and too little land
for resettlement; land prices are excessively high and speculative; and farm sizes are too
small for resettlement.61
5.3.1 LAND PURCHASES AND OFFERS (LSCS )
The argument that the land market is not sufficiently robust to bring about redistri-
bution of land, or to facilitate the redistribution of the highest quality land, appears to be
overstated given available data. The land market based on voluntary sales has been quite
effective in redistributing land since independence. Between 1979 and 1988, land acquisition
has reduced the total number of farmers in the LSCS from 6,113 to 4,660, and total land area,
from 15.1 to 11.2 million hectares (table 5.1). The percentages of farm numbers and areas
by farm size category remained fairly constant between 1979 and 1988, indicating that the
land market did not discriminate against farm size or natural region. Land acquisition through
the land market has enabled the government to get high quality land; over 57 percent of the
land acquired was located in NRs I, II, and III, equivalent in percentage terms to the
proportions held by farms in the LSCS .
Also, between April 1986, when the government first started compiling records on
"offer-of-sales," and September 1989, 1,691.0 million hectares had been proffered to the
government on a willing seller-willing buyer basis, excluding farms < 100 hectares in size.
Of this total, 541,128 hectares were ultimately purchased by the state (MLARR ). For those
offers rejected, data are provided in table 5.2 on the characteristics of two separate samples:
(1) parcels greater than 100 hectares offered to the government between April 1986 and
September 1989; and (2) farms greater than 300 hectares offered to the government during
the same time period.
Three salient points are striking. First, a large number of farms have been offered to
the government. While the total figure is not known, data from sample 1 indicate that at least
1,856 offers were made. Second, nearly 53 percent of these offers were for parcels located
in the high rainfall areas of NRs I and II. If NR III is included as well, total area offered but
rejected was in excess of 67 percent. Third, the land market indicated by offers continued to
remain robust through September 1989 (sample 2).
If land is coming to market, why has the government not participated more strongly
as a buyer? In the past, a number of reasons have been given by the Land Identification and
Selection Committee: (1) land in NRs I and II is too expensive; (2) land is not offered in
large enough blocks to justify scheme development; (3) land in NR IV is not suitable for
human settlement because of low or erratic rainfall; and (4) land in NR V is suitable only for
livestock and game ranching (personal conversations, MLARR). Of these, factors (1) and (2)
are considered to be the most important.
5.3.2 LAND PRICES
The price of real estate is a function of many factors, including location; access to
markets; land characteristics (soil fertility, slope, rainfall, access to water, and fixed capital
improvements); general price inflation in the economy; and use value or profitability of land
in agricultural production. Land prices may exceed the implicit value of land in agricultural62
TABLE 5.1
Structural change in the large-scale commercial sector, 1979-1988
1979 1984 1988
SIZE CATEGORY Number Area Number Area Number Area
(ha) (#) (
ha) (#) (ha) (#) (
ha)
< 200 1,324 104,674 1,410 105,202 947 75,136
200-399 445 125,805 435 124,197 367 104,000
400-599 446 220,176 415 206,161 392 192,344
600-799 425 294,387 363 249,640 356 246,837
800-999 423 374,916 346 307,438 348 309,067
1000-1999 1,372 1,931,189 1,156 1,624,882 1,063 1,491,043
2000-3999 905 2,503,591 748 2,056,633 673 1,853,162
4000-5999 289 1,425,735 222 1,089,370 182 893,705
6000-7999 142 974,229 126 866,023 99 687,039
8000-9999 100 888,225 264  5,843,440  233  5,361,053 
z 10,000 242 6,223,289
Total 6,113 15,064,216 5,485 12,472,986 4,660 11,213,386
Comparable percentages of land area
< 200 21.7 0.7 25.7 0.8 20.3 0.7
200-399 7.3 0.8 7.9 1.0 7.9 0.9
400-599 7.3 1.5 7.6 1.7 8.4 1.7
600-799 7.0 2.0 6.6 2.0 7.6 2.2
800-999 6.9 2.5 6.3 2.5 7.5 2.8
1000-1999 22.4 12.8 21.1 13.0 22.8 13.3
2000-3999 14.8 16.6 13.6 16.5 14.4 16.5
4000-5999 4.7 9.5 4.1 8.7 3.9 8.0
6000-7999 2.3 6.5 2.3 6.9 2.1 6.1
8000-9999 1.6 5.9 4.8 46.9 5.0 47.8
z 10,000 4.0 41.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a. More than 8000 ha.
Source: For 1979 and 1984, Zimbabwe, Crop Production of Large Scale Commercial
Farms (Harare: Central Statistics Office); and for 1985, Central Statistics Office.63
TABLE 5.2
Sample of land offers refused by the government
TOTAL AREA AVERAGE AVERAGE
NO. OF OFFERED FARM SIZE ASKING PRICE
OFFERS (ha) (ha/farm) (Z$/ha)
1. Total number of offers, parcels° > 100 ha
NR I 28 373
NR II 955 446
NR III 266 46
NR IV 560 52
NR V 47 20
2. Random sample of offers, parcels > 300 ha
1986:
NR I 3 5,696 1,899 99
NR II 14 12,042 860 140
NR III 10 21,780 1,278 64
NR IV 8 12,496 1,562 39
NR V 4 9,646 2,412 28
1987:
NR I 3 1,115 372 174
NR II 26 30,702 1,180 180
NR III 11 19,621 1,784 118
NR IV 13 26,963 2,074 33
NR V 3 21,819 7,273 30
1988:
NR I 3 1,312 437 374
NR II 28 65,344 2,334 129
NR III 14 18,298 1,307 100
NR IV 11 17,456 1,587 45
NR V 10 67,678 6,768 21
1989":
NR I 2 2,271 1,136 139
NR II 23 21,379 930 446
NR III 5 10,570 2,114 45
NR IV 9 11,775 1,308 52
NR V 3 11,199 3,733 18
a. Random sample from the period April 1986 to September 1989 (MLARR data).
b. Data through September only.64
production for resettlement if: the urban (or infrastructure) land value exceeds the agricultural
value; general price appreciation from inflation exceeds the nominal interest rate on interest-
bearing deposits; or general price inflation is greater than the growth in agricultural profit.
When it is stated that the land price is "too high," the implicit meaning is: these nonfarm
factors that influence land prices are not acceptable determinants of rural land prices;
commercial farmers are colluding to charge inflated land prices; the government is
underestimating the value of land in agriculture; or budget constraints and ability to pay are
imposing negative perceptions about the level of nominal land prices.
During inflationary times, individuals tend to shift to durable assets because inflation
erodes the returns of fixed-income securities. Over the period 1980-85, inflation measured
by the GDP deflator averaged 12.7 percent per annum; inflation in 1986 hit 13.7 percent
before dropping to 9.6 percent in 1987 (World Bank 1989). Over the same period, 12-month
certificates of deposit averaged 10.3 percent (Zimbabwe, Quarterly Digest of Statistics).
Passbook savings would have yielded even less. While these aggregate data mask significant
underlying variations, the aggregate figures indicate that the real value of liquid assets would
have declined 2.4 percent if held as certificates of deposit or by even more if held in
passbook savings due to high inflation and low fixed interest rates.
Average land prices paid by the government (table 5.2) indicate that nominal prices
paid increased from Z$19/hectare in 1979 to Z$95/hectare in 1988. Analysis of these prices
is difficult because of the confounding influences of price variation by natural region, with
the proportion of land acquired by natural regions varying from year to year. Also, these
prices show only land acquired by the government, and not land turned down by the
government because prices were too high. After adjusting for inflation, real prices varied
between Z$12.7 and Z$22.1 over much of the decade; real prices in 1986 and 1987 were the
lowest in the time period. Only in 1988 did real prices spike upward to Z$34.3/hectare for
unknown reasons. From the government's perspective, when faced with tight budgets, the
rapid escalation in prices poses a severe problem in land acquisition. But it would be difficult
to conclude from these data alone that collusion or excessive speculation has been occurring.
Land in NRs I and II is worth more than in NRs III and IV because of its higher yield
potential. Nonetheless, questions remain whether absolute land prices are too high, and
whether a price premium of 100 to 200 percent is justified for land in NRs I and II. These
questions are difficult to answer without detailed analysis of individual parcel-level data. Yet,






implicit value of agricultural land (Z$/ha);
net returns per hectare of land (Z$/ha);
opportunity cost of capital, e.g., returns on 12-month certifi-
cates of deposit; and
risk premium.65
Equation 5.1 compares the returns of an investment of V dollars in agricultural land
with the returns those same dollars could earn elsewhere, for example, certificates of deposit
(12%). Since returns in agriculture are inherently more risky than bank deposits, the value
of land is less to the investor as the size of the risk premium grows larger. In NR II, where
rainfall is high and reliable, the risk premium is probably quite low (2-3%). However, in
NRs III and IV, where rainfall is lower and more erratic, the riskiness of crop production
increases, but there is also a shift to livestock production in farm plans. For sake of
simplicity, a risk premium of 3 percent is assumed for all regions. Net returns per hectare
of various crop and livestock rotations, based on AGRITEX recommendations, are given in
table 5.3 (Chaonwa 1989), calculated as 1988 prices times theoretical yields, less fixed and
variable costs.
TABLE 5.3
AGRITEX estimates of net crop returns, 1988
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TA = tobacco, MZ = maize, GS = grass, CT = cotton, SB = soyabeans, GN =
groundnuts in rotation.
a. From W. Chaonwa, "Summary of Recommendations in Respect of Agrarian
Reform and Subdivision Criteria" (Harare: AGRITEX, Agricultural Manage-
ment Services Branch, July 1989).
Given the above assumptions, implicit land values are estimated from equation 5.1 and
shown in table 5.3. The value of land in a tobacco rotation is worth Z$593/hectare in NR II,
falling to Z$293/hectare under a cotton rotation, Z$233/hectare under a groundnut rotation,66
and Z$40-53/hectare under a beef rotation. In NR III, the value of land in a cotton rotation
is Z$ 273/hectare, and Z$347/hectare in dairy production. Land suitable for extensive grazing
production in NR IV is worth only Z$33/hectare, and Z$20/hectare in NR V. These estimates
are quite close to the average asking price reported in table 5.2 for the period 1986-89,
though calculations are quite sensitive to changes in the interest rate (t) and the risk premium
(r). The implicit land value would decline if net profits fall (e.g., because subsidies are
removed or taxes are increased), a higher discount rate or opportunity cost of capital is used,
or the riskiness of agriculture is underestimated.
There are three main problems with the above calculations:
► not all arable or grazing land may be utilized to its full potential;
► farms contain some portion of wasteland with no value that is included in the
offer price; and
► some farms have substantial investment in irrigation, tobacco barns, and other
fixed-place assets that, while located on a very small portion of farm area, add
substantially to total farm value.
Under current statutes prohibiting subdivision of land, factors (1) to (3) artificially
increase the value of underutilized or idle land. As farms are normally sold "lock-stock-and-
barrel," the price of land is some weighted average of the value of utilized farmland,
unutilized farmland, wasteland, land with high-cost fixed-place investment, and natural region
location. By removing restrictions on subdivision, the price of underutilized land should
theoretically fall as long as land is abundant and underutilized in the aggregate. (The extent
of underutilized land is examined in ch. 7.) Even if this argument holds, however, and land
prices of unutilized land drop significantly with subdivision permitted, criteria that land be
acquired in large blocks would still be a constraint to land acquisition.
Nonetheless, the limited available evidence from 1988 would suggest that the land
price offered (Z$374 in NR I, Z$129 in NR II, Z$100 in NR III, Z$45 in NR IV, and Z$21
in NR V) is not excessive given the implicit value of the land in agriculture at that time and
the 1988 nominal prices.
5.3.3 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
Changes in the structure of the LSCS in table 5.1 reflect the outcome of transactions
and sales to the government that have taken place through the land market. The number and
area of farms by farm size category are shown for three periods-1979, 1984, and 1988.
Regional breakdowns are provided in Annex B. A number of conclusions can be drawn from
the data.
First, there has been a dramatic reduction in number of farms and area in the LSCS .
Total number of farms declined from 6,113 in 1979 to 4,660 by 1988. Area of farms declined
from 15.1 million hectares to 11.2 million hectares over the same time period. In terms of
land quantity, the land market has clearly been effective in redistributing land.67
Second, this downsizing has been uniform in terms of both number of farms and area,
indicated by the uniform percentages of land in each size category across years. In the less
than 200-hectares category, for example, number of farms (area in parentheses) represented
21.7 (0.7) percent of total farms in 1979 and 20.3 (0.7) percent by 1988, despite a large
absolute decline in area. At the opposite end of the scale, in the above 8,000-hectares
category, number of farms (area in parentheses) represented 5.6 (47.1) percent in 1979 and
5.0 (47.8) percent by 1988. Similar trends are apparent for other farm size categories in
between.
Third, aside from differences in land quality among regions (examined shortly), land
distribution still remains highly skewed among farms within the LSCS. In 1988, for example,
51.7 percent of the farms less than 1,000 hectares in size controlled only 8.3 percent of total
land area. Nearly 75 percent of the farms less than 2,000 hectares in size controlled only 21.6
percent of the land area. However, in the largest farm category—above 8,000 hectares—5.0
percent of the farms own 47.8 percent of the land area. Most of these farms, however, are
located in drier regions, that is, Masvingo, Matabeleland, and Midlands.
5.3.4 BLOCKS OF LAND FOR RESETTLEMENT
The government has generally tried to acquire land in large blocks of upward of 6,000
hectares to achieve economies of scale in resettlement. As indicated earlier in table 5.2, a
sizable number of offers in excess of 1,000 hectares/farm has been rejected partially on
grounds that the price was too high, but also because the farm size was too small. According
to resettlement criteria, land sizes must be sufficiently large to spread the costs of
infrastructure development—access roads, dip tanks, boreholes, staff housing, clinics, and
schools—over a greater number of settlers. Three interrelated issues emerge.
First, can the government afford to maintain the large-block criterion and continue to
pass by parcels that fail to meet size criteria in higher rainfall zones? Land was more
abundant in the early 1980s, in part due to the large area of abandoned farms. But these areas
have already been absorbed. In the higher rainfall zones [e.g., provinces of Manicaland;
Mashonaland Central, East, and West (Annex B)], only 1.3 million hectares remain on farms
in excess of 4,000 hectares in size. If blocks only greater than 6,000 hectares are considered,
only 855.7 thousand hectares remain. Since some fraction of this land is currently utilized
[about 50% (ch. 8)], acquisition for resettlement would involve the redistribution of some
land out of high-yielding commercial production to low-yielding resettlement production. The
result would be a net negative loss in aggregate production in at least the intermediate run
(see ch. 6 and ch. 7).
Second, smaller farms could be acquired and then pooled. But it would be highly
unnatural for contiguous parcels in a large area to be put up for sale on the market at the
same time. Holding parcels for a prolonged period of time would entail significant
opportunity and holding costs for the government.68
Third, the resettlement models employed by the government involve significant
economies of scale, but only if infrastructure is provided and only if settlers are considered.
Current programs, however, ignore the population of farm laborers on commercial farms.
The argument is usually made that the establishment of schools and clinics requires a large
number of settlers to spread construction and development costs. Yet, by establishing facilities
only for resettlement populations, planning disregards potential economies of choosing size
and location of public schools and clinics on the basis of settlers and farm workers alike, or
the possible diseconomies in planning for each separately. Large commercial farms currently
provide schools (government provides the teachers), but the quality of facilities is highly
variable. If, alternatively, the government centrally locates schools and clinics for populations
of both farm laborers and settlers, which ultimately it must do in the long run, economies to
scale are decoupled from issues of land availability for resettlement, allowing for smaller
parcels to be acquired and settled.
5.4 SUMMARY
The history of land administration from the early 1900s to the present shows that,
despite the redistribution of 3.2 million hectares of land from the LsCS to the resettlement
sector, Zimbabwe's agrarian structure still remains highly skewed. Farms in the large farm
sector have access to land in the best rainfall zones, while the majority of the rural population
in communal areas farm the most arid lands. The analysis also reveals that the land market
in the LsCS has been quite dynamic. It has provided small-scale settlers access to higher
quality lands and has brought about a gradual but stable shrinkage of the sector.
Nominal land prices and parcel size were cited as the major factors curtailing
government acquisition of land. However land prices appear to have been driven largely by
general inflation in the economy, by the profitability of agriculture, and by the scarce supply
of land in higher rainfall zones. These conclusions are based on limited and very aggregate
data on land transactions and prices and on gross estimates of the opportunity cost of capital
to estimate implicit land values. Nonetheless, it would be difficult to conclude, based on these
macro data, that land prices are either excessively high or speculative. An analysis of agrarian
structure further shows that the criterion of large block size is beginning to impose a
constraint on land acquisition because of the limited number of large farms remaining in NRs
I and II.
The analysis further raises important issues related to land reform: (1) What is the
extent of underutilization in the LSCS and, thus, the production implications of land reform?
(2) What is the relative efficiency of LsCS, SSCS, communal, and resettlement sectors? (3)
How has land use been affected by market and institutional forces? (4) What form should the
resettlement process take? (5) What are the efficiency and equity implications of various
options—land ceilings, restrictions on land prices, designated areas, and the like—for land
redistribution? These issues are dealt with in subsequent chapters.69
Chapter 6
CHANGES IN LAND USE PATTERNS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Besides the changes in agrarian structure that have occurred over the decade, dramatic
changes have also been experienced in land use patterns and in the way factors of production
(land, labor, and capital inputs) have been combined in farming. In the LSCS , two general
shifts have been apparent: a gradual shift away from maize production to industrial and
specialty crops, and the substitution of capital in the form of machinery for labor. The
"miracle" of increased smallholder production in communal areas has mainly been a function
of increased farmers' access to both commercial markets through government expansion of
grain depots and to new cultivars and fertilizer from government investment in input
distribution systems. Both sets of trends are closely examined in this chapter to study the
implications of future resettlement activity on output and balance of trade. Implications of
changes in land use patterns for the efficiency of land utilization in the LSCS is examined in
chapter 8.
6.2 LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
6.2.1 CHANGES IN CROPPING PATTERNS
Since 1975, total crop area in the CS has declined over 15 percent, from 590.6 to
500.6 thousand hectares by 1988 (table 6.1). Total land in the LSCS shrank by 26 percent (see
table 5.1, p. 62), indicating that a large part of the decline in crop area was due to structural
change. However, the decline in crop area masks two important underlying trends in land
use, indicated by percentage changes in the crop mix (table 6.1). First, farms have tended to
decrease their reliance on cereal crops, principally maize (Annex E.1), from 48.5 percent of
total crop area in 1975-77, to only 39.5 percent by 1987/88. Second, farms have shifted
toward a greater concentration of industrial crops in the crop mix over time. In 1973-75,
industrial crops including mainly tobacco and cotton averaged 34.6 percent of total crop area.
By 1987/88, industrial crops averaged 46.6 percent of total crop area. Fodder crops, as a
percentage of crop area, have tended to remain stable over time at around 2-3 percent. Tree
crops declined from around 0.9 percent of crop area in 1975 to 0.6 percent by the mid-1980s,
before increasing sharply in recent years (1.1 percent in 1988).TABLE 6.1
Changes in crop area, large-scale commercial sector




` TOTAL CROP AREA
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (000 ha)
1975 48.3 35.3 2.7 0.9 12.9 590.6
1976 47.9 33.8 3.3 0.9 14.1 566.4
1977 49.9 34.7 2.6 0.8 12.0 574.8
1978 46.7 38.3 2.3 0.8 12.0 563.5
1979 45.4 40.0 2.3 0.9 11.6 542.2
1980 47.3 39.4 2.0 0.6 10.7 574.8
1981 57.7 30.3 1.8 0.7 9.5 599.9
1982 54.8 33.8 2.0 0.6 8.8 585.0
1983 48.2 39.1 2.5 0.7 9.5 548.4
1984 44.0 42.5 2.6 0.8 10.2 531.9
1985 47.9 39.3 2.4 0.6 9.9 541.1
1986
1987 38.5 47.5 2.9 0.8 10.2 484.8
1988 40.5 45.6 2.4 1.1 10.3 500.6
a. Includes maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, munga, rapoko, and other grains.
b. Includes tobacco, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, soyabeans, sunflower, sugarcane, tea, and other industrial crops not
specified.
c. Includes lucerne, other legume hays, and silage.
d. Includes citrus fruits (orange, grapefruit, mangoes), deciduous fruits, strawberries, tropical fruits (banana), avocado,
and tree nuts.
e. Includes edible drybeans, sunhemp, nyimo, sweet potatoes, potatoes, onions, peas, tomatoes, other unspecified vegetables,
garden flowers, shrubs, seedlings, and planted pastures.
Source: Zimbabwe, 1987 Statistical Yearbook (Harare: Central Statistics Office), for 1978 to 1983; and Central Statistics
Office, for 1984 to 1988.71
A 15-year time series of area, production, and yield was compiled for this study for
the period 1973 to 1988.
15 The resulting crop data for 8 provinces is voluminous, precluding
detailed presentation in this report. Averages of area, production, and yield are provided
instead for the periods 1973-75, 1979-81, and 1987/88 (Annex D). Growth rates in area,
production, and yields are further estimated for two separate time series: a 9-year period from
1973 to 1980, representing the preindependence period; and an 8-year period from 1979 to
1988 (data for 1986 are missing), representing the postindependence era. Although years do
not exactly correspond to pre- and post-independence, some adjustment was necessary to
achieve a sufficient number of observations for the statistical estimation of growth rates.
Maize. The crop of maize in 1988 was 151.0 thousand hectares or 30.2 percent of
total cropped area in the LSCS. Of this total, 84.7 percent was grown in NR II, and 12.8
percent in NR III (table 6.2). Cropped area has declined sharply over time. Starting from a
base of 282.2 thousand hectares in 1973, cultivated area has declined at an average annual
rate of 4.3 percent per annum over the period 1973-80, and 5.5 percent over the period
1979-88. A number of factors have contributed to this decline: (1) the official policy of the
Commercial Farmers Union promoting crop diversification; (2) economic considerations
discussed shortly; and (3) the imposition of production controls for a limited period in 1986
(Joint Farmers' Unions 1990). Production nationally also declined at a rate of 5.3 percent per
annum between 1979 and 1988, mostly due to the decline in area. Yields, nationwide, have
grown at a fairly modest and constant rate of 0.3 percent over the last two decades, indicating
a very slow rate of technological change. The modest improvement that has taken place is as
much a function of poorer land being taken out of production as technological improvement.
Only in Mashonaland did yields increase appreciably over the decade (1.8); Masvingo
experienced the greatest annual rate of decline in yields (-6.1).
Wheat. The area planted in wheat has expanded rapidly over time. Starting from 21.3
thousand hectares in 1973, total wheat area nationally reached 41.8 thousand hectares in
1988, roughly 8.4 percent of total crop area in the LSCS. Nearly 75 percent of wheat is grown
in NR II, followed by NR V (17.3) and NR III (6.5). Over the decade 1973-80, wheat area
expanded at an average annual rate of 6.9 percent per annum, and production, at 10.2 percent
per annum, due to rapid growth in productivity per hectare (3.1 %). However, growth has
slowed in the 1980s. Over the period 1979-88, wheat area nationwide grew less than 1
percent per annum; production, 2.1 percent; and yields, 1.2 percent. New cultivars and
improved management have been chiefly responsible for this increase in productivity (Joint
Farmers' Unions 1990). However, while area and yields have remained stable or increased
in Manicaland and Mashonaland, wheat area since 1979 has declined sharply in Masvingo
(-20.2), Matabeleland (-11.1), and Midlands (-14.9).
15. From Zimbabwe, Crop Production of Large Scale Commercial Farms, for 1973 to 1985; and
from Cso, for 1987 and 1988.72
TABLE 6.2














Maize 0.4 84.7 12.8 2.1 0.1 150,989
Sorghum 0.7 70.6 13.5 12.5 2.7 3,773
Wheat 0.0 74.9 6.5 1.4 17.3 41,846
Barley 0.0 51.5 43.6 4.9 0.0 5,374
Other cereals 13.0 74.3 5.4 7.3 0.1 794
Tobacco 0.7 95.6 3.3 0.0 0.4 54,842
Coffee (productive) 59.0 35.7 1.7 0.6 3.0 6,539
Cotton 0.1 73.1 8.9 0.3 17.7 60,095
Groundnuts 0.3 87.6 10.8 1.1 0.2 5,201
Soyabeans 0.1 93.0 6.9 0.0 0.1 51,594
Sunflowers 0.1 39.7 56.5 2.6 1.1 10,092
Sugarcane 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 99.7 31,853
Tea (productive) 62.4 37.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 4,691
Other industrial crops 52.5 34.7 3.8 0.9 8.0 3,502
Fodder 2.3 82.9 9.4 5.1 0.3 54,279
Fruit 10.4 69.1 7.8 2.4 10.4 5,710
Other 0.6 73.1 6.6 10.5 9.2 9,380
Total crops 2.3 75.8 9.7 1.8 10.5 500,554
Source: Central Statistics Office.
Sorghum. Sorghum area in the LSCS in 1988 covered 3,773 hectares, only 0.8 percent
of total crop area. About 15.2 percent of sorghum area is planted in the drought-prone zones
of NRs IV and V; the majority (70.6) is still grown in NR II. Breweries in Zimbabwe require
20-30,000 tons of red sorghum annually for beer production; white sorghum is an effective
supplement to wheat in bread. Like maize, sorghum's importance in the crop mix has
declined over time. Since 1973, sorghum area nationwide has declined at a rate of 3.7 to 5.0
percent per annum. Yields grew rapidly in the 1970s (9.7%). Since 1980, yields have
continued to rise at an annual rate of nearly 2 percent.
Barley. Barley is produced for the National Breweries on contract. Historically, the
requirement has been 30,000 tons annually, roughly half for beer, the other half exported.
Export demand has recently increased, resulting in new production targets of 45,000 tons per
annum (Joint Farmers' Unions 1990). Barley was cultivated on 5,374 hectares in 1988,
representing 1.1 percent of total cropped area. Because of its drought-resistant qualities,73
nearly 49 percent is cultivated in the more arid and drought-prone areas of NRs III and IV,
though the majority is still grown in NR II (51.5). Unlike maize and sorghum, barley area
has been growing modestly over time (0.2-0.8%). However, these trends mask important
regional differences. Since 1980, barley area has expanded rapidly in Midlands (15.9), while
declining sharply in Manicaland (-32.6) and Mashonaland (-4.4). During the 1970s,
impressive growth in barley yields was achieved due to varietal improvements. But since
1980, growth in yields has flattened while the introduction of new technology has stagnated.
Cotton. Cotton was cultivated on 60.1 thousand hectares in 1988, representing 12.0
percent of total crop area in the LSCS. Of this total, 73.1 percent was grown in NR II, 17.7
percent in NR V, and 8.9 percent in NR III. Cotton area grew slightly in the 1970s, but has
tended to decline in the 1980s (-1.6), though substantially less so than the overall rate of
decline in total land area in the LSCS. Important regional differences are again masked by the
national trend. While cotton area in Manicaland and Matabeleland has grown 3.8 and 9.4
percent per annum, respectively, since 1979, cotton area in Mashonaland has fallen 1.0
percent, and in Masvingo, 11.2 percent. Cotton yields have shown moderate but consistent
growth over time due primarily to the introduction of new cultivars and improved
management, research, and extension. From 1973 to 1980, cotton yields nationally grew 2.7
percent, and by 1.9 percent from 1979 to 1988. Growth in productivity has been widespread,
indicating high rates of technology diffusion. Yields in Manicaland have grown 0.9 percent
per annum, 2.6 percent in Mashonaland, 0.4 percent in Midlands, and 0.1 percent in
Matabeleland.
Tobacco. Tobacco was grown on 54.3 thousand hectares in 1988, representing 10.9
percent of total cultivated area in the LSCS. Nearly all tobacco production in Zimbabwe is
concentrated in three provinces—Mashonaland West (43.6% of area cultivated), Mashonaland
Central (26.7%), and Mashonaland East (22.1 %)—all on lands located primarily in NR II
(95.6%). Unlike maize, tobacco area has remained fairly stable over time. Over the period
1973-80, tobacco area grew at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent; since 1980, area has
stagnated (0.0% growth). Like cotton, however, this stagnation, combined with the decline
in total land area in the LSCS, has resulted in a higher proportion of tobacco in the cropping
system. Production, on the other hand, grew 7.3 percent between 1973 and 1980, and 2.0
percent between 1979 and 1988 due mainly to growth in yields (4.9% and 2.0%, respective-
ly). Heavy investment in research and extension have contributed to sustained yield improve-
ments. The Tobacco Research Board was responsible for the development of white mold-
resistant varieties in the late 1960s and the introduction of suckerides in the late 1970s, which
dramatically increased yields. Concomitantly, the Tobacco Training Institute has served to
extend new production methods to growers of flue-cured tobacco.
Soyabeans. Soyabeans are grown mainly on heavy soils in rotation with maize, cotton,
and winter wheat. At present, soyabeans provide about 40 percent of Zimbabwe's vegetable
oil demand. About 51.6 thousand hectares of soyabeans were cultivated in the LSCS in 1988,
representing 10.3 percent of total crop area. Of this total, 93.0 percent was cultivated in NR
II, and 96.0 percent in the three provinces of Mashonaland. Soyabeans experienced explosive
growth in the 1970s. Starting from a base of only 8.2 thousand hectares in 1973, area74
expanded at an average annual rate of over 26 percent from 1973 to 1980, and 4.2 percent
from 1979 to 1988. Yields also grew rapidly (7.4%) in the 1970s, though yields have been
stagnant since 1980 (-0.2% and -0.5% percent, respectively, for Zimbabwe and Mashona-
land).
Groundnuts. Groundnuts are grown by farmers mainly in the communal farming
areas and the SSCS. Commercial production is principally long-season varieties grown under
irrigation in rotation with tobacco. Groundnut area in 1988 was 5.2 thousand hectares, only
1 percent of total cropped area. As with soyabeans, most are grown in NR II (87.6%),
primarily in the three provinces of Mashonaland (88.9%). Since 1979, groundnut area has
grown 0.6 percent annually, and production, 1.4 percent. Yields have increased modestly
(0.9%) in part due to irrigation.
Coffee. Coffee was cultivated on 8.6 thousand hectares (6.5 ha productive) in 1988,
or 1.7 percent of the total cropped area in LSCS. The majority is grown in the Central
Highlands of Manicaland (76.7%), primarily on soils in NR I (59.0%) and NR II (35.7%).
Growth expanded rapidly in the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1980, area grew at an annual rate
of 6.0 percent; production, 20.3 percent; and yields, 13.5 percent. Although growth has
moderated in the 1980s, area still grew at an average annual rate of 4.4 percent between 1979
and 1988; production, 6.9 percent; and yields, 2.3 percent. These trends are very similar to
those estimated for Manicaland. Systems of coffee production in Zimbabwe have changed
dramatically since coffee was first introduced in 1962. Nearly all coffee grown in Zimbabwe
today is irrigated, a factor largely responsible for increased yields. Considerable investment
in research and extension by the Department of Research and Specialist Services, the Coffee
Research Station at Chipinge, and the Coffee Growers Association has also contributed to the
high and sustained growth in productivity.
Horticulture. Until recently, horticultural crops have involved only a few large-scale
farms concentrated around the main urban markets. Specific climatic requirements of citrus
and deciduous fruit have also led to pockets of producers in outlying areas. Over 69.1 percent
of all fruit-tree production is located in NR II, and another 10.4 percent in NR I. Total
production of tree crops was 5,710 hectares in 1989, or 1.1 percent of total crop area. The
area of tree crops declined at a rate of 7.3 percent in the 1970s, but since 1979, area has
expanded at an annual rate of 2.4 percent nationwide.
6.2.2 CHANGES IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
Regional and national numbers of beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs are
given in table 6.3 for five two-year periods between 1980 and 1989. Numbers of pigs have
remained fairly constant throughout the decade. Numbers of goats and sheep have generally
declined nationally, from 156.7 thousand in 1982/83 to 133.3 thousand by 1988/89. Most of
this decline occurred in Mashonaland (83.4 to 71.7), Matabeleland (30.9 to 24.3), and
Midlands (20.2 to 16.4). The most important changes in the livestock sector, however,
involved changes in the beef and dairy herds.75
TABLE 6.3
Changes in livestock numbers, large-scale commercial sector, 1980-1989
1980/81 1982/83 1984/85 1986/87 1988/89
(000 head) (000 head) (000 head) (000 head) (000 head)
National:
Beef 2,093.5 2,075.2 1,851.4 1,731.3 1,653.9
Dairy 104.7 103.3 111.5 115.8 122.3
Sheep and goats 156.7 153.2 133.3
Pigs
Manicaland:
92.6 103.7 77.6 95.5
Beef 80.9 93.9 99.6 89.6 85.5
Dairy 6.5 7.2 6.8 8.3 8.1
Sheep and goats 11.5 12.8 11.6
Pigs
Mashonaland:
5.5 6.0 6.1 4.6
Beef 834.8 855.4 885.7 757.7 726.6
Dairy 59.4 58.7 63.6 67.2 70.4
Sheep and goats 83.4 82.7 71.7
Pigs
Matabeleland:
69.0 78.7 55.9 70.0
Beef 563.0 531.5 399.0 391.5 297.6
Dairy 13.4 12.7 11.0 12.0 12.6
Sheep and goats 30.9 25.8 24.3
Pigs
Midlands:
11.7 12.4 11.4 13.9
Beef 408.3 355.3 292.7 289.1 277.4
Dairy 23.1 22.0 24.9 25.1 28.4
Sheep and goats 20.2 19.5 16.4
Pigs
Masvingo:
3.3 3.4 2.8 - 3.3
Beef 206.6 239.1 173.5 203.4 216.8
Dairy 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.8
Sheep and goats 8.9 11.8 9.3
Pigs 3.2 3.2 2.3 - 3.9
Source: Zimbabwe, Department of Veterinary Services, census data. Not all
provincial totals sum to national totals due to discrepancies in the reported data. All
discrepancies fall within a margin of error of 2%.
Beef cattle. The 1980s were a difficult decade for beef producers. Following a fairly
steep decline in cattle numbers in the 1970s, more remunerative prices resulted in herd size
stabilizing around 2,093.5 to 2,075.2 thousand head (2-year averages) in the early 1980s. The
debilitating drought from 1982 to 1984 again resulted in herd reductions. By 1984/85,76
average herd size had been reduced to 1,851.4 thousand head. The drought of 1986/87
combined with a difficult price-policy environment resulted in further herd reductions to
1,731.3 thousand head in 1986/87. Price increases in the late 1980s helped to restore
profitability, but an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in April 1989 resulted in the
suspension of beef exports to Europe and the loss of the 30C/kilogram export bonus paid to
producers. Countrywide restrictions on cattle movement were imposed. By 1988/89, average
herd size was 1,653.9 thousand head nationwide, 21 percent lower than a decade earlier.
Some part of this decline can be attributed to the downsizing of the sector. Some provinces
fared worse than others. Between 1980/81 and 1988/89, beef cattle numbers fell 47.1 percent
in Matabeleland, 32.1 percent in Midlands, and 13.0 percent in Mashonaland. Manicaland
and Masvingo, on the other hand, had a slight increase in herd size, but changes are
negligible compared with the massive declines experienced elsewhere.
Dairy cattle. Zimbabwe's dairy industry has shown slow but steady progress
throughout the decade. Increases in real disposable income after independence led to a
dramatic rise in the demand for liquid milk products. Dairibord, the nation's milk marketing
organization, had to reduce or stop production of certain processed products (cheese, butter,
skim milk powder), increase imports of some of these products, and halt exports. Government
also responded with remunerative pricing to expand milk supply. Milk prices paid to farmers
were raised fairly substantially between 1979 and 1982 (Annex F), and then more gradually
for several years thereafter. Dairy cattle numbers increased from 104.7 thousand head in
1980/81 to 111.5 thousand head by 1984/85. Producer prices remained constant between 1985
and 1987, resulting in an erosion of real prices. However, herd sizes continued to grow to
115.8 thousand head by 1986/87 due to improved management and breeding techniques. The
high capital investment required for dairying results in considerable asset fixity. Once
investments are made, producers continue to produce in the short run as long as variable costs
are recovered, though erosion of the capital base affects long-term viability.
6.3 COMMUNAL SECTOR
6.3.1 CHANGES IN CROPPING PATTERNS
As mentioned in chapter 1, data for the communal areas are not broken down by
natural region in official statistics. The MLARR (Masters 1990) has disaggregated cropped
area using district maps, but this approach was unsuitable for disaggregating production and
yield data at the time of this study in 1990. A household survey was being conducted by CSO
to improve time-series data, but these are published only for provinces, and only three years
had been compiled as of 1990. The most complete source of time-series data on area,
production, and yields is estimates of the Crop Forecasting Committee. These data are
provided for principal crops for the period 1970 to 1989 in Annex G (table G.1). Cropping
patterns by province, based on data from the "National Household Survey of Communal
Areas," are presented in table G.2, and cropping patterns by natural regions, estimated by
the MLARR, are given in table G.3. Note that land acquired from the LSCS was absorbed by77
either the resettlement sector or the state sector, not by communal areas. Thus changes in
crop area in this section are on based on constant total land area.
While the LSCS shows a diversified mix of crop enterprises, cropping patterns in
communal areas show a high reliance on grain production. Based on MLARR data, maize was
cultivated on 45.3 percent of the cropped area in 1986-1989, followed by millet (15.0%),
sorghum (10.3%), cotton (7.2%), groundnuts (4.7%), sunflower (3.7%), and rapoko (2.8%).
In NRs I and II, maize tends to predominate, averaging in excess of 65 percent of total crop
area
16 Conversely, in NRs IV and V, millet and sorghum are prevalent, together averaging
60 percent or more of cropped area. Groundnuts and sunflower vary only marginally across
natural regions. Cotton, on the other hand, is quite important in NR IIB extending into
NR III, occupying nearly a third of the total area.
Growth rates were estimated from the time-series data in table G.1 to measure how
cropping patterns and production have changed over time. Results are provided for the most
important crops in table G.4 for area, table G.5 for production, and table G.6 for yields.
Maize. Farmers in communal areas grew 920 thousand hectares of maize in 1988,
representing 87 percent of total maize planted nationwide (including the LSCS). Production
was 1,062 thousand tons, or 61 percent of total maize production in all sectors. Ever since
the early 1970s, maize area has been gradually expanding at a rate of 2 percent per annum,
slightly less than population growth (3.0%). Production, however, increased at an annual rate
of over 5 percent in the 1970s and 9 percent in the 1980s due mainly to growth in yields-6.7
percent annually between 1979 and 1989. Factors contributing to this improvement include:
► Hybrid seed deliveries increased from 3,000 tons in 1975/76 to 10,000 tons
by 1979-1981, to 23,133 tons by 1987-1989.
► Total fertilizer utilization by the SSCS (including the small number of
small-scale commercial farms) increased nearly fivefold in the 1970s, rising
from 21.1 thousand tons in 1974-1976 to 94.5 thousand tons by 1980-1982.
Growth in fertilizer use has slowed in the 1980s, rising from 94.5 thousand
tons in 1979-1981 to 110.7 thousand tons by 1987-1989 (Windmill 1990).
► Grain depots in communal areas have expanded from four in 1982 to sixteen
in 1989. Concomitantly, Grain Marketing Board (GMB) procurements of grain
from the SSCS and communal sector (communal areas not listed separately)
increased from 124.5 thousand metric tons in 1979/80 to 437.8 thousand tons
by 1986-1988. Approximately 73 percent of communal deliveries was
procured from prime agricultural areas such as Guruve and Chiweshe in NR
II. Improved market opportunities have increased cash incomes, improved
16. Provincial data in table G.2 suggest that maize occupies a greater area than this, and that millet
and sorghum are less prevalent in the crop mix (see data for Masvingo, Matabeleland North and
South).78
purchasing power, and reduced marketing costs. Together these factors have
increased producer incentives to invest in both nontraditional and traditional
(labor, manure, etc.) inputs in agriculture.
► Communal farmers experienced an emerging comparative advantage in maize
production compared with the LSCS (see "Domestic resource costs" analysis in
ch. 7, pp. 96-99).
Rapoko and mhunga. About 120,000 hectares of rapoko and 237,000 hectares of
mhunga were grown in communal areas in 1988 compared with only 179 hectares in the
LSCS. Production in 1988 was 84 and 184 thousand tons, respectively. Cropped area of both
rapoko and mhunga expanded rapidly in the 1970s, 13.0 and 5.8 percent per annum
respectively, reflecting a dramatic push of cultivation onto marginal lands in NRs IV and V.
Since 1980, areas of both crops have declined around 3 percent per annum. Reasons for the
decline are not entirely clear, but possible explanations include:
► Substantial build-up of stocks combined with limited disposability has led to
a curtailment of procurements by the GMB. In 1985, the GMB purchased 31.8
thousand tons of mhunga and 10.9 thousand tons of rapoko nationwide. By
1988, GMB procurements had declined to 12.3 and 2.1 thousand tons,
respectively.
► Crop substitution of cotton and sunflower for millet in NRs III and IV has
been occurring.
► Low profitability (see "Domestic resource costs" analysis in ch. 7, pp. 96-99).
Cotton. Cotton has experienced explosive growth in area and output. Since 1980, area
has expanded at an average annual rate of 25 percent; production, 26.5 percent; and yields,
1.3 percent. Productivity has grown roughly in line with that of the LSCS. The number of
registered cotton growers in communal areas has been increasing steadily, from a negligible
number in the 1960s to 111.0 thousand in 1987-1988 (AMA 1985). The Cotton Marketing
Board (CMB) has played an important role in encouraging cotton cultivation by expanding
market opportunities, increasing seed-cotton purchases from 52.3 thousand tons in 1980-1982
to 160.4 thousand tons in 1987-1989. Emphasis on extension and training by such agencies
as the Cotton Training Centre at Kadoma have also benefited communal farmers.
Groundnuts. Communal area farmers grew 197,000 hectares of groundnuts in 1988,
about 97 percent of total groundnuts planted nationwide. Despite production of 106,000 tons,
deliveries to the GMB averaged less than 3,500 tons between 1987-1989, compared with
deliveries of 15-20,000 tons by the LSCS. An unknown but sizable quantity is sold on the
private market. Despite their importance, groundnuts have been declining in significance.
Since 1980, area nationwide has declined 3.9 percent, and production, 1.3 percent, while
yields have increased 2.7 percent.79
6.3.2 CHANGES IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
Changes in numbers of livestock during the 1980s are shown in table 6.4. Average
numbers of cattle, sheep and goats, and pigs are given for four two-year periods from 1981
through 1988.
TABLE 6.4
Changes in livestock numbers, communal sector
1981/82 1983/84 1985/86 1987/88
(000 head) (000 head) (000 head) (000 head)
National:
Cattle 3,108.2 3,045.9 3,341.9 3,555.2
Sheep and goats 1,265.2 1,415.6 2,057.3 2,455.7
Pigs
Manicaland:
102.9 83.9 103.6 118.6
Cattle 399.0 475.7 564.0 566.2




Cattle 676.1 749.6 766.8 909.8
Sheep and goats 151.9 221.2 353.3
Pigs
Matabeleland:
- 35.8 45.8 62.3
Cattle 817.5 681.3 815.4 777.3




Cattle 592.8 571.3 578.9 664.7




Cattle 622.9 567.9 615.9 638.3
Sheep and goats 251.7 427.9 412.4
Pigs 22.5 18.4 15.0
Source: Zimbabwe, Department of Veterinary Services, census data. Not all
provincial totals sum to national totals due to discrepancies in the reported data. All
discrepancies fall within a margin of error of 2 percent.
Beef cattle. Cattle numbers nationwide have grown steadily through the decade, from
3,108.2 thousand animals in 1981/82 to 3,555.2 thousand in 1987/88. On average this80
represents a growth of about 2 percent per annum, roughly in line with the growth rate in
maize. These results are particularly surprising in light of the severe droughts experienced
in 1982-1984 and again in 1986/87. The increase in cattle numbers has been greatest in
Manicaland (6%), Mashonaland (5%), and Midlands (2%). Cattle numbers in Masvingo and
Matabeleland fell sharply in 1983/84 due to the drought. Herds were rebuilt by 1985/86, but
numbers have stagnated or declined slightly since.
Goats and sheep. The number of goats and sheep in the communal sector has
exhibited phenomenal growth. Total number of animals nationwide nearly doubled, increasing
from 1,265.4 thousand head in 1981/82 to 2,455.7 thousand by 1987/88, an annual growth
rate of 10 percent." Goats, being natural browsers, thrive in scrubland not used for other
farming enterprises. But the fact that the growth in numbers has been widespread across all
regions suggests that the growth reflects more than just the expansion of communal areas onto
marginal lands. It is agreed by all that goats are a valuable source of meat and mohair, and
sheep, a valuable source of meat and wool, but a more rigorous analysis is needed of the
economics of livestock production to understand fully why these changes are occurring.
6.4 PRIMARY FACTORS INFLUENCING LAND USE PATTERNS
Changes in land use patterns in the LSCS and communal sectors can be attributed to
five principal factors: (1) reduction of total land area in the LSCS due to resettlement; (2)
commodity price shifts; (3) technological improvement; (4) employment markets; and (5)
market access. Land use in the LSCS commercial sector has been driven primarily by factors
(1) through (4). Changes in land use in the communal areas has been determined largely by
factor (5).
6.4.1 LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR: COMMODITY PRICES AND
TECHNOLOGY
Net crop returns over time are influenced by three fundamental factors: changing
output prices; rate of technological change determining growth in crop yields and average
costs per unit of area; and changing input prices affecting total costs. For maize, which has
experienced the greatest decline in area in the LSCS, two negative factors have affected
profitability. Real maize prices have declined over 34 percent between 1981 and 1988,
roughly a 7 percent decline per annum on average (table 6.5). Yields, however, have
increased only 0.3 percent per annum over the decade, resulting in a real net decline in
revenue after accounting for inflation. Wheat also witnessed a 15 percent decline in real
output prices between 1980 and 1988, equivalent to a decline of roughly 2 percent per annum.
Wheat yields, however, grew about 1.2 percent over the decade, slightly offsetting the decline
in real output prices. Overall, cropped area of these two crops has been either stagnant in the
17. Goats comprise 80% of the total.81
case of wheat or sharply declining in the case of maize, explaining in large part the decline
of cereal production in the sector.
TABLE 6.5













1979 63.5 120.8 362.5 154.2 145.7 151.2
1980 89.0 134.7 363.0 795.0 159.6 168.2 175.1
1981 105.3 153.3 336.0 1,615.4 149.9 186.0 190.8
1982 95.5 149.2 397.0 1,339.5 159.0 226.5 220.9
1983 77.6 142.6 320.0 1,223.9 166.7 186.4 199.2
1984 82.1 134.5 297.0 1,115.6 154.4 173.1 188.3
1985 89.1 141.2 321.6 1,336.0 158.8 161.6 194.3
1986 77.5 130.1 314.3 1,364.0 146.5 164.2 173.4
1987 69.5 127.5 286.5 843.6 148.2 192.4 154.1
1988 69.6 130.5 284.0 1,418.0 150.1 173.0 141.4
The story for industrial crops is mixed. Soyabeans, the only major crop that has
maintained a fairly constant real price over the decade, also experienced rapid growth in
productivity per hectare, over 4 percent per annum, a major reason for its expansion in terms
of area. Tobacco prices have declined in real terms by 12 percent between 1981 and 1988,
or slightly over 1.5 percent per annum. But growth in yields of 2 percent annually over the
decade has enabled producers to more or less maintain cultivated
area. The opposite is true for cotton. Its price has declined more than 21 percent from 1981
to 1988, roughly 2.5 percent annually, while yields have increased on average only 1.9
percent. As a result, cotton area decreased at an annual rate of 1.6 percent during the 1980s.
Real cattle prices have fallen about 24 percent since 1982, the last year that prices
were considered remunerative by large-scale commercial producers. Real milk prices have
also declined by about 36.0 percent since 1982. While the dairy industry has demonstrated
dramatic technological improvements over the decade, milk productivity would have had to
increase at a rate of over 5 percent per annum to offset this magnitude of price decline.
Two important points need stressing. For crops that have experienced slow rates of
technological change and declining real prices, for example, for maize in the LSCS, profits
and area cultivated have sharply declined. Technological improvement in other crops such as82
wheat, tobacco, and cotton were sufficient to offset declining real prices, with the result that
cropping areas have remained stable. For soyabeans, which have experienced not only
remunerative prices but also rapid improvement in yields, area has been expanding rapidly.
Conversely, dairy stock numbers have increased slightly despite rapidly declining real milk
prices due to high-fixed capital investment and limited opportunities to diversify. A more
careful analysis is made shortly of crop profitability and comparative advantage between the
LSCS and the communal sectors.
6.4.2 COMMUNAL SECTOR: MARKET ACCESS
If, as data suggest, net returns to maize in the LSCS have been gradually eroding over
time and led to a decline in maize production, why has maize production in the communal
sector increased so strongly? There are a number of contributing factors. First, and most
obvious, is the increased investment in rural infrastructure—in input and marketing services
and in extension—in communal areas following independence. These investments have
increased communal farmers' access to inputs, lowered their marketing costs, increased farm-
gate prices, and generally resulted in higher levels of commercialization. Second, communal
areas are able to value their labor at private opportunity costs, while LSCS farms are required
by law to pay a minimum agricultural wage rate. Incentives have shifted in the LSCS toward
crops with higher marginal productivity of labor, mainly industrial and specialty crops. In
sectors such as maize, which have experienced very slow rates of technological change
(LSCS), evidence suggests that smallholders now hold a comparative advantage in its
production (see ch. 7).
A number of points stand out from this analysis. First, price policy and technology
have gradually resulted in a shift of resources away from relatively stagnant sectors with low
profitability to sectors that have had steady growth in real prices and/or in productivity.
Second, growth in maize and cotton in the communal sector is primarily a function of
increased market access. The rapid technological growth experienced by the LSCS in the 1970s
became available to communal farmers in the 1980s through technology diffusion and
increased market opportunities. Finally, comparisons of growth in the LSCS and communal
sectors reveals that the latter is dynamic, largely due to the relative state of neglect that
existed at independence. National growth rates in yields since 1980 are as follows: maize
(LSCS 0.3, communal area 6.7); sorghum (LSCS 1.9, communal area 1.1); cotton (LSCS 1.9,
communal area 1.3); and groundnuts (LSCS 0.9, communal area 2.7).
6.5 EMPLOYMENT IN THE LSCS
The demand for agricultural labor in the LSCS is driven by three fundamental economic
forces: (1) the profitability of agriculture, that is, as profitability increases, labor demand
increases particularly for such labor-intensive industries as tobacco, cotton, horticultural
crops, and vegetables; (2) the cost of labor, determined by the wage rate, as well as
legislation affecting hiring and firing practices; and (3) substitution possibilities that permit
the use of labor-saving technology, mainly mechanization, for skilled and unskilled labor.83
Over the past two decades, the LSCS has witnessed both a decline in employment of
total labor and a gradual shift toward more seasonal employment. Some analysts (Chavunduka
1982) have noted that declining rates of employment in commercial agriculture are an
inevitable outcome of a developing economy, for declining rates of employment are the
expected course of evolution as mechanization increases labor productivity. Agricultural
employment does tend to decline when opportunities for labor employment in the off-farm
sector increase substantially. As off-farm employment opportunities rise and nonfarm wages
increase, economic pressures build for substituting unskilled labor with mechanization.
It is debatable, however, whether Zimbabwe has reached a point of high labor demand
in the nonfarm sector. High levels of unemployment in the economy suggest that opportunity
costs of labor in nonfarm occupations are low, and that the siphoning effect of labor out of
agriculture is weak. Under these circumstances, predictions of the decline of the LSCS and its
inability to absorb labor are premature. An alternative argument reasons that the LSCS has
significant potential for labor absorption, but that market policies have dampened labor
demand and hiring. Given existing problems of unemployment, increasing labor demand
deserves high priority. Yet, if indeed commercial farms are being indirectly taxed, a second
set of important issues arises. By improving the viability of the sector, land utilization
increases and land prices rise, exacerbating government attempts to acquire land for
resettlement.
The history of labor employment in Zimbabwe identifies three unique periods in recent
times. The preindependence period of 1975 to 1979 was marked by war and the general
effects of the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). While the fight for independence,
on the one hand, resulted in a general decline of agricultural activity and a reduction in labor
demand and supply, UDI, on the other hand, resulted in trade sanctions that restricted
Zimbabwe's ability to import capital equipment. UDI also brought about a period of rapid
economic growth in the manufacturing sector, with a shift in resources toward industries
aimed at import substitution. Over the 1973-80 period, total cropped area in the LSCS
declined from 605.4 to 574.8 thousand hectares (Annex E), and the total number of farm and
forest employees, from 301.5 to 271.3 thousand workers (table 6.6). Total land in the LSCS
changed very little between 1969 and 1979 (table 3.1, p. 15, and table 5.1, p. 62), indicating
that these reductions were a function of an economic decline in agriculture rather than a
shrinkage in total landholdings in the sector. Despite these uncertainties, however, cropped
area per worker remained relatively constant at 1.9-2.0 hectares; the ratio of seasonal to
permanent employees stayed in the fairly narrow range of 0.22 to 0.33; and real agricultural
wages rose at a relatively gradual and modest rate, from Z$31.4 to Z$35.8.84
TABLE 6.6
Employment indicators, large-scale commercial sector
TOTAL FARM CROPPED° RATIO OF
b NOMINAL AG. WAGE RATE REAL AG. WAGE RATE
"
YEAR AND FOREST AREA PER SEASONAL TO
Actual







(Z$/mth) (Z$/mth) (Z$/mth) (Z$/mth)
I989 247,154 .8I I16 -
I988 227,626 2.20 .66 100 - 36.2
I987 2I9,987 2.20 .60 85 - 32.9
I986 - - - 85 - 37.0
1985 2I4,24I 2.53 .45 75 - 37.3
I984 2I6,905 2.45 .34 98.1 65 53.0 28.6
I983 2I6,0I3 2.54 .40 88.4 55 57.4 35.7
I982 220,228 2.66 .35 76.6 50 6I.2 39.9
I98I 242,I49 2.48 - 62.0 30 54.8 26.5
I980 27I,291 2.I2 - 38.0 30 38.0 30.0
I979 286,825 I.89 .24 34.3 - 35.8
1978 283,731 1.99 .22 29.3 - 34.6
I977 295,139 I.95 .24 26.8 - 34.8
I976 307,225 I.84 .31 24.2 - 35.2
1975 303,903 1.94 .33 2I.3 - 34.5
1974 3II,9I3 I.97 .33 I8.3 - 32.6
I973 30I,512 2.0I .32 16.5 - 31.4
a. Cropped area from Annex E.
b. Ratio of seasonal to permanent employees is calculated from data in Annex
H.
c. Total earnings per annum divided by total employees in agriculture, forestry,
and fishing sector [Zimbabwe, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (Harare: Central
Statistics Office, v.d.) converted to a monthly basis.]
d. Nominal wages adjusted for inflation using the low-income consumer-price
index (Quarterly Digest of Statistics).
The second period, starting in 1980, marked a period of the new socialist govern-
ment's coming to power. Trade sanctions were eliminated. From 1980 to 1984, the economy
was extremely buoyant. This period of reconciliation, following years of war, should have
increased labor-use intensity in the LSCS, resulting in higher levels of labor absorption. But
two major acts of labor legislation-the Minimum Wages Act and the Employment Act of
1980-imposed countervailing forces to increased labor utilization. The Minimum Wages Act
instituted higher minimum wage rates for all sectors in the economy. The Employment Act85
of 1980 provided for minimum wages, collective bargaining, and greater rights of workers
in the workplace. Further, any employer wishing to fire an employee is required to apply to
the Minister of Labor for exemption. "The inability to fire means the inability to hire" is a
common theme proclaimed by commercial farmers and the business community alike
(personal conversations). Cropped area declined from 574.8 thousand hectares in 1980 to
541.1 thousand hectares in 1984. Total farm and forest employees in the LSCS declined from
271.9 to 214.2 thousand workers over the same period.
At least part of the decline in cropped area and labor force during this second period
can be attributed to the downsizing of the LSCS due to the resettlement program. Of the total
2,743.3 million hectares acquired for resettlement through 1988/89, only 2,365.0 thousand
hectares were acquired prior to 1985/86. However, since a large portion of this land is
purported to have been abandoned or underutilized, this downsizing should have resulted in
minor labor displacement. Also, the increase in the ratio of cropped area per worker, from
2.1 in 1980 to 2.5 by 1985, suggests that mechanization played an important role in
expanding the productivity of workers (by increasing the numerator) and/or in substituting
for labor (decreasing the denominator). Finally, nominal wages in agriculture increased 67
percent between 1980 and 1982. The effect of higher real wages is examined shortly. But it
is worthwhile noting that while real wages paid increased 61 percent between 1980 and 1982,
the real minimum wage increased only 33 percent, suggesting that rapid growth in real wages
of more highly paid skilled and unskilled workers in the agricultural economy was also
occurring. Whether this was due to increasing labor productivity or rising opportunity costs
in the nonfarm sector is difficult to ascertain.
The third period, 1986 to 1990, can be characterized by acute foreign exchange
shortages, rising unemployment, and the unknown but significant increase of Mozambican
refugees entering the agricultural work force. The impact of the latter on displacing
Zimbabweans is difficult to gauge due to poor data, but two impacts can be theorized from
the influx of migrants: (a) an increased proportion of seasonal to permanent employees; and
(b) an increase in total labor utilization on farms. The results in table 6.6 are consistent with
these hypotheses. From 1985 to 1988, cropped area per worker declined from 2.5 to 2.2
hectares per worker, indicating more intensive use of labor. The ratio of seasonal to
permanent employees increased from 0.45 to 0.81. The difficulty of acquiring spare parts and
machinery, due to tight allocations of foreign exchange to agriculture, would also have tended
to increase total labor employment, other things being equal, but should have had little effect
on the mix of permanent and seasonal laborers. Thus, the shift toward seasonal workers
seems to reflect in part the higher use of Mozambican migrants and in part the lagged
consequences of employment legislation enacted in 1980 (i.e., inability to fire). Since 1985,
real minimum agricultural wage rates have tended to stagnate or decline slightly.
The interplay between the political and economic forces engendered in the employment
issue has important implications for land utilization. The shift toward a higher mix of seasonal
to permanent labor has important implications for workers' income security. The following
general model was estimated with OLS regression, assuming a linear functional form, to
examine the relationship between employment legislation and labor employment:86
(6.1) L = (w/p, I, M, X 1 or GDP, Pd
where w/p = real agricultural wages calculated as nominal wages actually
paid in the Lscs, adjusted for inflation using the consumer
price index for lower-income urban families (Quarterly Digest
of Statistics); time series, 1973 to 1988 (Z$/year/worker);
I = dummy variable indicating enactment of employment legisla-
tion, I = 1 for 1980,... 1988, 0 otherwise;
M = value of farm machinery imports adjusted for inflation using
the consumer price index for lower-income urban families
(Quarterly Digest ofStatistics) (Z$);
X i area of the J~ crop, including cereals, industrial crops, tree
crops, and vegetables in 000 hectares;
GDP = gross domestic product in agriculture, adjusted for inflation
using the consumer price index for lower-income urban
families (Quarterly Digest ofStatistics) (000,000 Z$); and
Pk dummy variable: 1 for Manicaland, Mashonaland, Matabele-
land, and Midlands; 0 for Masvingo.
Equation 6.1 estimates the relationship between total demand for labor in the LSCS and
real wage rates (w/p), the effect of employment legislation since its enactment in 1980 (I),
real value of machinery imports (M), gross domestic product in agriculture (GDP), and
cropped area (X i). Crop area serves two functions in the model: it captures labor-generating
activities and the effect of crop production on the derived demand for labor, and it controls
for the downsizing of total land area in the LSCS.'
8 Four different models were estimated, the
results of which are included in Table 6.7.
Model A is intended to examine the substitution effects between on-farm machinery
demand and employment. Unfortunately, data only on machinery imports were immediately
available for this study, and then only for the years 1978 to 1987 (1986 missing). Regression
results are thus based on a nine-year time series. Statistical results are not significant, but
signs seem intuitively correct. For every marginal (1 ha) increase in total crop area, total
labor demand increases by 0.2 workers. The impact of minimum wage legislation has been
minimal due to the erosion of real wage rates over time (employment declines by 110 workers
18. If the shrinkage of land area in the Lscs involved mainly the acquisition of abandoned farms
or idle lands, then crop area would remain unaffected and resettlement would have minimal effect on
farm labor employment. Conversely, if downsizing involved a substantial loss of crop area (which
does not appear to have been the case from Annex E.1), then Xi would control for that effect in
estimating the impact of labor legislation on farm employment.87
for every dollar increase in the real wage rate). However, employment legislation enacted in
1980 is shown to have had a profound impact on employment, reducing labor employment
by 32,987 workers nationwide. Results for machinery show a negligible effect on labor
demand.
TABLE 6.7
Relationship between labor demand and employment policy, large-scale sector
MODEL A MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D
Constant 217,607' 259,317' 329,316
" 20,228
'
Total crop area .198
Machinery imports .0094
Agriculture GDP 58.9
Cereal crop area .034 .377*
Industrial crops area -.365 0.223"
Horticulture crops area 15.3` 6.48*
Vegetable crops area -4.70 3.78'
Real wage rate -109.6 12.6 -36.0
1980 labor legislation







Number of observations 9 13 13 71
R2 .937 .917 .917 .965
Significant at the 1% confidence level.
Significant at the 5% confidence level.
In model B, gross domestic product in agriculture is included to examine the effect
of economic activity in agriculture on employment in the LSCS. The GDP times series, from
1975 to 1988, was deflated by the GPI for lower-income urban households. The variable for
real wages in agriculture has a positive sign but does not significantly affect labor
employment. For every 1 million increase in real GDP, labor employment in the LSCS
increases by 59 workers, but results are insignificant. However, the dummy variable for
*
**88
employment legislation is shown to have reduced employment by 73,686 workers, significant
at the 1 percent level.
Using aggregate GDP as an indicator of economic activity has the problem that GDP
includes all economic activity in agriculture across sectors (LSCS, SSCS, communal, and
resettlement). Model C uses cropped area planted in the LSCS as a proxy for economic activity
to capture the derived demand for labor in agriculture. The time series includes data from
1973 to 1988 (1986 missing). As crop area expands, more labor is demanded in the sector.
Results indicate that for every 1-hectare increase in cereals area, labor demand increases by
0.03 persons, and tree crops, by 15.3 workers. Results for vegetables and industrial crops
show a reduction of total labor of 4.7 and 0.4 workers, respectively, for each hectare planted.
These results are surprising since vegetables, cotton, and tobacco are labor intensive, but
results are not significant. Employment legislation, again, has a profound impact on
employment, having caused a reduction of 58,077 workers since 1980, significant at the 1
percent level. However, for every Z$1 increase in real wages, employment drops a negligible
36 workers, consistent with estimates in other models.
Model D uses provincial data to increase the degrees of freedom in the statistical
analysis. Observations include yearly data from 1973 to 1988 for five provinces. While
models A, B, and C are national models, model D is regional. Dummy variables for
provinces help control for regional variations. Wage rates are excluded because data on actual
wages paid are unavailable at the regional level. Area variables represent the area of various
crop categories within each province. Statistical results are highly significant. Each hectare
of cereals increases labor demand by 0.38 persons, vegetables by 3.77 persons, industrial
crops by 0.22 persons, and tree crops by 6.48 persons. Employment legislation enacted since
1980 has reduced total labor employment by 8,474 workers on average per province.
Inflation has tended to erode minimum wages over time to such an extent that real
wages by 1988 were only slightly higher than in 1980. Also, the minimum-wage-rate variable
is highly correlated with the employment-legislation variable. It is not surprising, therefore,
that real wage rates in the model show only a negligible impact on employment. The dummy
variable for employment legislation, on the other hand, has a profound and highly significant
effect on reducing labor demand. It is possible that the employment variable is picking up
trends that are implicitly occurring over time. Model C was re-estimated with a time variable
included to help control for this possibility. Coefficients changed only marginally; the effect
of the dummy variable for employment legislation is a 60,364 reduction in total labor.
It would be difficult to conclude from this analysis that the employment legislation of
1980 and subsequent amendments have not adversely affected employment in the LSCS.
Indeed, results suggest that the legislation has reduced employment by somewhere around
58.1 to 73.7 thousand workers. These results present an obvious dilemma, however.
Removing restrictions on the ability to fire labor should increase employment and land
utilization. Yet, a more viable LSCS also will exacerbate government efforts to acquire land
for resettlement.89
6.6 SUMMARY
A number of important trends in land use have occurred in the LSCS and communal
sectors during the 1980s. A general downward trend in total land area in the LSCS has been
under way due to the resettlement program. Despite this decline, industrial crops have been
increasing both in nominal terms and as a percentage of crop mix. A sharp decline in maize
in the LSCS has been counterbalanced by a strong growth in maize area in the communal
sector.
As the 1970s was a decade of strong growth in productivity in the LSCS, the 1980s
marked the diffusion of technology to the communal sector. Growth in maize production in
communal areas was primarily a function of improved market access that enhanced production
incentives and provided market opportunities. Changes in land use in the LSCs primarily
reflected changes in real prices and growth in productivity.
A sharp upward spike in labor costs in 1980 also influenced farm labor employment
and land use patterns in the LSCS. Labor costs and hiring practices are fundamentally
influenced by the minimum wage (what firms must pay for labor) and restrictions on labor
use (e.g., higher costs associated with firing bad workers or with loss of flexibility to
downsize the work force in times of cyclical downturns in the economy). While minimum
wage legislation sharply drove up wage costs in the early 1980s, inflation had eroded real
wages to near pre-1980 levels by the end of the decade. Consequently, minimum wage
legislation was found to have had negligible effect on labor demand by large-scale commercial
farms. However, other restrictions imposed by employment legislation, specifically
restrictions on firing labor, were found to have had a profound adverse impact on farm
employment.
This analysis further raises a number of fundamental issues: (1) To what extent has
government market interventions distorted optimal land use? (2) Given the predominance of
maize in the cropping systems of communal area farmers and growers in resettlement
schemes, what are the prospects for improving income from maize production? (3) Which
sectors hold a comparative advantage in crop and livestock production? These questions are
addressed in the next chapter.91
Chapter 7
RATES OF PROTECTION AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Three important studies by Masters (1990),
19 Morris (1988), and Woldu (1990) have
attempted to measure the effect of government pricing and macro policy on the economics
of land use and on implicit levels of taxation and subsidization of primary commodities. Each
study estimates rates of protection and the comparative advantage of selected commodities in
Zimbabwean agriculture. Although empirical assumptions and time frames vary among
studies, the final outcomes are consistent and complementary.
7.1 NOMINAL AND EFFECTIVE RATES OF PROTECTION
The nominal rate of protection coefficient (NPC) measures the absolute level of
financial (distorted) prices in the economy relative to import and export parity equivalents
(i.e., border prices). The effective rate of protection (EPC) measures the combined effect of
distortions in both commodity and input markets. Financial prices, either the price producers
receive or that consumers pay, may be distorted by quotas, tariffs, subsidies, or taxes on
goods crossing international borders. They may also be affected by official marketing
operations, restrictions on interregional trade, and taxes or subsidies that influence
interregional input and commodity trade flows. Border prices are also distorted from a global
perspective because of commodity interventions by major producers and consumers elsewhere
in the world. For small countries like Zimbabwe, however, which are unable to modify prices
by exerting market power, world prices must be considered as a given for the foreseeable
planning horizon. Nominal and effective rates of protection are estimated in equations 7.1 and
7.2.
Pk




19. This chapter draws heavily on the work of Will Masters, from the MLARR, who developed the
crop budget models and who collected the data used to estimate rates of protection, private and social
indicators, and domestic resource costs referred to so extensively in this paper. Any misrepresentation
of the model or misinterpretation of results, however, remain the sole responsibility of the author.
(7.1)92
(7.2) EPCk = (PkQk-wiX~
for j =1,...n inputs
b b
(
Pk Qk-wj X j)
where Pk = financial price of the k
m commodity;
Pk
b = economic border price of the k
m commodity;
Qk = output of the k
m commodity;
w. = financial price of thef
t input;
w p
b = opportunity cost (for nontradables) or economic border
price (for tradables) of the input; and
quantity of the?' input X used in the production of the
kth commodity.
An NPC less than 1 indicates that producers of the commodity are being taxed; greater
than 1 means they are being subsidized. Having an NPC and an EPC less than 1 indicate that
producers of the commodity overall are being taxed after considering the combined effect of
policies in both output and input markets. Having an NPC less than 1 and an EPC equal to 1
means that producers are being taxed in the commodity market, but overall are being just
compensated by input subsidies. Having an NPC less than 1 and an EPC greater than 1 means
that producers are being taxed in commodity markets, but subsidized input prices result in
net positive subsidization of producers of the commodity overall.
Official prices in Zimbabwe are usually fixed on a cost-plus margin basis and
administered according to a pan-seasonal pricing system. Woldu's (1990) analysis in table 7.1
shows that border parity prices, calculated on the basis of the official exchange rate, were
roughly equivalent to producer prices of maize, wheat, sorghum, and tobacco, indicating
neutral commodity price policy; and below producer prices of groundnuts and cotton,
implying positive production incentives. The NPC for soyabeans (.90), on the other hand,
suggests that output is implicitly taxed. Woldu points out, however, that the official exchange
rate in Zimbabwe was overvalued by about 30 percent at the time of his study, malting export
prices for tobacco and cotton more expensive, and making imports (e.g., for wheat, spare
parts, etc.) cheaper than would otherwise be the case. If the exchange rate were valued at its
true opportunity cost, the analysis indicates that commodity prices of cereals were covertly
taxed in 1988 by 16-24 percent; cotton, 16 percent; tobacco, 23 percent; and soyabeans, 29
percent.93
TABLE 7.1
Nominal and effective rates of protection
MZ WT SG SF SB GN CT TB
Nominal rates of protection (NPCS)
Woldu (1988):
NPc .98 .99 1.03 .90 1.20 1.19 1.00
ANPC  .80 .76 .84 .71 .95 .84 .77
Masters (1989):
Lscs .92 .68 1.00 .75 .69 .82







Effective rates of protection (EPCs)
1.48 .40 .70 .31 1.22 .02
Rain-fed (Lscs) .54 .30 .45 .39 .44
Rain-fed (communal) .76 .13 .52
Masters (1989):
Irrigated (Lscs) .63
Rain-fed (Lscs) 2.09 -3.07 .84 .69 1.05
Rain-fed (communal) 1.13 1.22 1.10 1.05 .84
MZ = maize; WT = wheat; SG = sorghum; SF = sunflower; SB = soyabeans; GN =
groundnuts; CT = cotton; and TB = tobacco.
a. NPC is calculated at the official exchange rate; ANPC, at the estimated shadow
exchange rate.
Source: Mathewos Woldu, "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Zimbabwe" (Emena
Region, Technical, Agriculture Division, January 1990); Will Masters, unpublished
data, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Government of
Zimbabwe, Harare, 1990; and Michael L. Morris, "Comparative Advantage and
Policy Incentives for Wheat Production in Zimbabwe," CIMMYT Economics Working
Paper no. 88/02 (Harare: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, 1988).
In Will Masters's (1990) collection, official producer prices are reported for the 1989
cropping season. Border prices are calculated as the long-term price of a commodity, that is,
average international price (1980-1988) converted by the 1989 official exchange rate. With
regard to large-scale producers, output prices of wheat are effectively taxed 32 percent;
groundnuts, 31 percent; soyabeans, 25 percent; cotton, 18 percent; and maize, 8 percent.
Communal prices are some unknown weighted average of prices received via official market
sales and prices received from sales on the private market to neighbors and local shops. These94
weighted prices are generally higher than the official prices received by large-scale producers,
reflected in the higher nominal rates of protection. Maize prices in communal areas appear
to have been only slightly taxed in 1989, while cotton is heavily taxed at about the same rate
as large-scale producers (21%)." Pricing of sorghum, sunflower, and groundnuts indicates
relatively neutral incentives.
Although producers are generally taxed implicitly in the commodity market, input
subsidies result in overall positive production incentives for certain crops. By also taking
account of input prices at their opportunity costs, Woldu's (1990) analysis for 1988 indicates
that positive production incentives existed for irrigated wheat and groundnuts, while govern-
ment policies heavily discriminated against maize, cotton, and tobacco. The EPC of .02 for
soyabeans indicates that financial profits were nearly zero. Masters's (1990) estimates of EPCs
for 1989 shows that once economic prices of inputs are considered, rain-fed production of
maize and cotton in the LSCS received positive production incentives (EPC = 2.09 and 1.05,
respectively), while soyabeans and groundnuts were effectively taxed overall. In the
communal sector, on the other hand, all commodities with the exception of cotton (.84)
received positive production incentives, indicated by EPCS of 1.13 for maize, 1.22 for
sorghum, 1.10 for sunflower, and 1.05 for groundnuts.
7.2 PRIVATE AND SOCIAL PROFITABILITY INDICATORS
Private profitability is calculated by valuing inputs and output at their financial prices.
Social profitability measures tradable products and inputs at their world equivalent prices,
converted at the shadow exchange rate.
21 Social profitability indicators thus remove
commodity-specific price and macro-policy distortions.
The three studies in table 7.2 calculate private profitability per hectare under rain-fed
and irrigated conditions. Tobacco is the most profitable crop by far, based on either private
or social prices in all studies. Irrigated cotton is the next most profitable crop, followed by
irrigated and rain-fed groundnuts. While soyabeans in 1986 were only modestly profitable,
by 1988 and 1989 they had become the third most profitable crop, followed generally by
wheat then maize. The negative return for sorghum implies that production of this crop under
rain-fed conditions is either not profitable in the LSCS or only marginally so in the communal
sector. In communal areas, groundnuts appear to be consistently profitable; results for cotton
and maize are mixed between the Woldu (1990) and Masters (1990) studies.
20. The fact that communal farmers report an average sale price slightly lower than large-scale
producers suggests that transport differentials are being capitalized into the sale price.
21. Woldu (1990) estimated that the exchange rate was 30% overvalued in 1988; Masters (1990)
estimated that by 1989, it was overvalued by 50%.95
TABLE 7.2
Private and social profitability indicators
MZ WT SG SF SB GN CT TB
Morris (1986)
Irrigated (PP) 177 178 144 170 751 2,783
Irrigated (se) 679 682 255 385 1,550 8,703
Rain-fed (PP) 122 93 82 259 852
Rain-fed (se) 315
Woldu (1988)
159 201 637 5,137
Lscs: irrigated (PP) 128 325 12 590 618 4,640
Lscs: irrigated (se) 204 266 630 400 815 6,659
Lscs: rain-fed (PP) 99 -32 158 74 -28 2,394
Lscs: rain-fed (se) 7 188 684 354 -203 5,422
CA: rain-fed (PP) 75 225 48
CA: rain-fed (sP) 95
Masters (1989)
465 -27
Lscs: irrigated (PP) 588
Lscs: irrigated (se) 2,667
Lscs: rain-fed (PP) 143 -3 114 107 296
Lscs: rain-fed (se) 557 184 875 1,582 1,383
CA: rain-fed (PP) 45 -111 -19 45 169
CA: rain-fed (s
p) 209 -53 86 212 652
MZ = maize; w r = wheat; SG = sorghum; SF = sunflower; SB = soyabeans; GN =
groundnuts; CT = cotton; and TB = tobacco.
PP = private profitability; sP = social profitability.
Source: Mathewos Woldu, "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Zimbabwe" (Emena
Region, Technical, Agriculture Division, January 1990); Will Masters, unpublished
data, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Government of
Zimbabwe, Harare, 1990; and Michael L. Morris, "Comparative Advantage and
Policy Incentives for Wheat Production in Zimbabwe," CIMMYT Economics Working
Paper no. 88/02 (Harare: International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, 1988).
A number of points are worth highlighting. First, with few exceptions, the ranking of
profitability of crops has remained relatively constant over time: tobacco followed by cotton,
groundnuts or soyabeans, wheat, then maize. Second, since tobacco is nearly 4-8 times more
profitable than cotton, and cotton is again several times more profitable than cereals, these
crops are likely to retain their ranking for the foreseeable future. Third, price and market
policies sharply reduced the social profitability of all crops in the latter half of the 1980s
under both irrigated and rain-fed conditions. The net difference between private and social96
costs equals the net effect of government policy (ND = PP - SP). A positive difference (ND
< 1) implies that government policies on the whole favored production of the crop by
making it more profitable than it otherwise would have been. A negative difference (ND > 1)
implies that government policies discriminated against the production of that crop. Results of
table 7.2 indicate that the government discriminated against all crops in the latter part of the
1980s.
7.3 DOMESTIC RESOURCE COSTS
The domestic resource cost ratio (DRC) measures the efficiency of domestic use of
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A positive DRC between 0 and 1 indicates that the value of domestic resources used
in production is less than the value of the foreign exchange earned or saved. Thus, a country
has a comparative advantage in the production of that good. A positive DRC greater than 1
indicates that the value of domestic resources used in production exceeds the value of foreign
exchange earned or saved, suggesting that the country does not hold a comparative advantage
in that good. A negative DRC implies that resources are being wasted (i.e., more foreign
exchange is used in production of a commodity than it is worth).
Results by Morris (1988) suggest that under normal rainfall conditions, Zimbabwe
enjoys a comparative advantage in wheat, cotton, and tobacco, all with DRCS less than 1 (table
7.3). With regard to wheat, for example, Z$0.28 of domestic resources are required to save
Z$1.00 of net foreign exchange. For cotton and tobacco, Z$0.62 and Z$0.59 of resources are
needed to earn Z$1.00 in foreign exchange. Under drought conditions, however, water
becomes the limiting factor because water is insufficient for both summer and winter
irrigation. The high private and social returns to tobacco suggest that irrigating tobacco makes
the best economic use of resources. If any water is left over after all available tobacco land
has been utilized, the opportunity cost of water decreases to what it is worth in the next most
profitable use (i.e., in maize and cotton cultivation). The DRC analysis then indicates that97
Zimbabwe has a comparative advantage in irrigated maize (DRC = .72) and cotton (DRC =
.76), once tobacco lands have been fully exploited. Both the Morris (1988) and Masters
(1990) studies indicate a comparative advantage in wheat as long as water is abundant.
However, once water is scarce and water prices are assigned to the next most profitable use,
wheat represents an inefficient use of resources.
Under rain-fed conditions, commercial farmers hold a comparative advantage in all
goods relative to the rest of the world. The DRC for soyabeans is .22; groundnuts, .24;
cotton, .25; maize, .36; and sunflower, .58. With the exception of sorghum, communal
farmers also show a comparative advantage relative to the rest of the world. However, DRCS
for the communal sector indicate that it is relatively less efficient than the LSCS in the
production of maize, sunflower, groundnuts, and cotton.
Inherent in these DRCS, however, is the problem that production systems and yields
vary according to differences in ecological region. Unfortunately, two intractable problems
are experienced in estimating DRCS by ecological zone. First, the crop budgets prepared by
the Commercial Farmers Union and National Farmers Union, which are the basis of the
Woldu (1990) and Masters (1990) studies, do not give a breakdown of input use by natural
region. Second, detailed data on input use are not reported in official statistics, despite the
fact that fertilizer data are collected.
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TABLE 7.3
Domestic resource cost ratios
MZ WI  MG SF SB GN CT TB
Morris (1986)
Normal conditions 2.12 .28 4.93 4.06 .62 .59
Drought scenario .72 1.56
Masters (1989)
1.51 2.42 .76 .15
Lscs: irrigated .11
Lscs: rain-fed .36 .58 .22 .24 .25
Communal: rain-fed .51 1.23 .78 .59 .33
Source: Will Masters, unpublished data, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development, Government of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1990; and Michael L. Morris,
"Comparative Advantage and Policy Incentives for Wheat Production in Zimbabwe,"
CIMMYT Economics Working Paper no. 88/02 (Harare: International Maize and
Wheat Improvement Center, 1988).
22. These data could presumably be estimated from the original data if they were accessible from
Cso.98
DRCS in table 7.4 are calculated using the budget models estimated by Will Masters
(1990) with several modifications: (1) Yields for the LSCS by natural region are 1988 yields
taken from CSO data; yields in NRs I through IV are assumed to be nonirrigated; the high
yields observed for region V suggest that crops had been irrigated. (2) Yields for the
communal areas are assumed to be three-year averages reported by DERUDE for resettlement
farmers (1984-86 cropping seasons) in Annex J. Cusworth (1990) reports elsewhere that yield
data for resettlement farmers are quite comparable to those of communal area farms. (3)
Irrigated treatments are 6.5 (1,000 m
3) of irrigation water/hectare for wheat; maize, 2.4;
sunflower, 2.4; soyabeans, 2.4; groundnuts, 5.28; and cotton, 6.24 (Morris 1988). No
comparable crop budget models were available for tobacco or livestock.
TABLE 7.4
Domestic resource costs by natural region






NR v .73 .24 8.05 .18 .10 .26
NR I 1.11
LSCS: rain-fed
.37 .35 -.27 .20
NR II .58 -.40 .22 .15 .19
NR III .96 -.36 .20 .17 .26
NR Iv 4.01 -.38 -.57 .28 .21
NR I 1.15
Communal: rain-fed
3.45 .19 1.08 .84
NR II .47 .38 .46 .7 .19
NR III .75 .96 .49 .75 .24
NR Iv 2.35 1.77 .56 .48 .47
NR v -3.30 1.91 2.78 2.17 8.50
Based on these data, the LSCS shows a strong comparative advantage in the production
of irrigated wheat in all regions except NR I. DRCS of .10 for groundnuts, .18 for soyabeans,
.26 for cotton, and .73 for maize also indicate comparative advantage relative to the rest of
the world given the average rainfall and yields in 1988. However, under drought situations,
one would apply limited water to tobacco, first, followed by groundnuts, soyabeans, then
cotton in NR V.
In the rain-fed sector, NR I appears to hold a comparative advantage in soyabeans
(.20), cotton (.35), and groundnuts (.37), and a comparative disadvantage in maize (1.11) and99
sunflower (-.27). DRCS for NR II suggest a comparative advantage first in groundnuts (.15),
followed by cotton (.19), soyabeans (.22), then maize (.58). In NR III, groundnuts (.17)
again appear to make the best use of land, followed by cotton (.26) and soyabeans (.20). The
DRC of .96 for maize indicates only a slight comparative advantage. The LSCS is relatively
inefficient in the production of all crops (for which DRCS were calculated) in NR IV. Crops
in NR V are primarily irrigated.
Based on average yields for the 1984-86 season, communal area farms show a strong
comparative advantage in cotton (.19) and sunflower (.84), and a comparative disadvantage
in maize, mhunga, and groundnuts relative to the rest of the world. In NR II, communal
farmers are relatively efficient producers of cotton (.19) groundnuts (.27), mhunga (.37),
sunflower (.46), and maize (.47). While large-scale farms in NR II appear to be more
efficient producers of groundnuts (.15 vs. .27), given current technology, communal farmers
appear to be relatively more efficient producers of sunflower (.46 vs. -.40) and maize (.47
vs. .58). Similar patterns hold for NR III. Both large-scale and communal farmers hold a
comparative advantage in cotton, groundnuts, and maize compared with the rest of the world.
But communal farmers appear to be relatively more efficient producers of sunflower (.49 vs.
-.36) and maize (.75 vs. .96). The LSCS is relatively more efficient in groundnut production
(.17 vs. .48). Soyabeans and maize appear to be inefficient uses of land in NR IV. Both
sectors continue to hold a comparative advantage in cotton and groundnuts, though farms in
the LSCS appear to be relatively more efficient producers. All crops appear to be inefficient
users of resources in both sectors in NR V, unless irrigated.
7.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
Price policy has established appropriate economic incentives for producers by aligning
producer prices with border parity prices (at the official exchange rate). However, because
official exchange rates are overvalued, the private profitability of all crops is sharply reduced,
resulting in taxation of producers. Disincentives are fairly widespread because social
profitability exceeds private profitability for all crops. Yet, since all prices are taxed
uniformly, resource allocation and crop mix do not seem to be grossly distorted.
Although government policies have discriminated against producers on output prices,
certain crops have been more than compensated through input subsidies. Current price policy
provides overall net subsidies to commercial producers of irrigated wheat and groundnuts and
rain-fed maize and cotton. Farmers receive substantial subsidies on both credit and tradable
inputs (fertilizers and chemicals). The LSCS is the major beneficiary of these subsidies, though
small net subsidies are also received on nearly all crops in communal areas.
Results of the DRC analysis for NRs II and III suggest that the LSCS holds a
comparative advantage in tobacco, groundnuts, and soyabeans. Communal farmers appear to
have a comparative advantage in maize and sunflowers. Both groups tend to be nearly equally
efficient in cotton production. It is clear from chapter 6 that both sectors have been moving
in the direction of their comparative advantage. For the LSCS, cropping patterns have been100
shifting away from maize toward industrial crops. For the communal sector, cropping patterns
have been shifting toward maize and cotton.
A number of policies affect the prices paid by farmers for purchased inputs. Import
tariffs and sales taxes exert upward pressure on input prices. But these are more than offset
by an overvalued exchange rate, which makes imports appear cheaper in local currency, and
exports, more expensive. Still, given that the exchange rate is estimated to be overvalued by
50 percent, there has been considerable incentive to substitute capital imports for land and
labor.
While minimum wage-rate policy had a substantial influence on profitability in the
early 1980s, real minimum-wage rates have now eroded to near pre-1980 levels due to
inflation. Nominal wage rates are higher than in the communal sector, but this in part reflects
the higher marginal value of labor from industrial crop (versus cereal) production.
Employment legislation in chapter 6 was shown to have profoundly decreased labor demand
on farms. This implies a real cost for hiring new people (given employer uncertainties
whether or not those hired will prove to be good workers), but does not affect the cost of
already hired employees.
Agricultural credit policy—specifically, the provision of AFC credit at rates several
points lower than formal lending institutions—have reduced borrowing costs and shifted
incentives toward the utilization of capital-intensive technology. LsCS farmers, who receive
about 80 percent of the credit provided by the AFC, are the main beneficiaries. Tight
foreign-exchange allocations to agriculture have helped dampen the substitution of capital
machinery for labor. But current donor programs to supplement foreign exchange will almost
certainly exacerbate the decline in labor employment in the LSCS, all else being equal.
Comparative advantage is dynamic, constantly changing with investment in human
capital, agricultural research, and extension. Rates of growth in yields in the communal sector
will continue to converge toward the slower rates in the LSCS as the diffusion of technology
spreads. Communal farmers now hold a comparative advantage in maize production. But due
to record stock levels, slow export demand and scarce foreign exchange in surrounding
SADACC countries, and transport constraints (internally and externally), production from
communal areas will continue to place downward pressure on maize prices. As long as its
comparative advantage holds, a continuing decline in LSCS maize production is expected.
Under the current situation of transport bottlenecks, there is a high economic rent to
scarce transport capacity. Until rents decline, economic incentives will be biased toward the
production of commodities with high value per unit of volume in transport (e.g., tobacco,
cotton, fruits, and vegetables) and against commodities with low value per unit of volume
(e.g., grain). As transport costs rise, grain producers will find themselves increasingly at a
disadvantage relative to other commodities. Thus, while the communal sector's comparative
advantage in maize production is apparent, the long-term prospects of a maize-based economy
to drive income growth is not encouraging.101
Chapter 8
LAND UTILIZATION IN THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
8.1 BACKGROUND
Many attempts have been made to estimate the extent of land utilization in the LSCS.
A 1960 study, cited by Cliffe (1986), estimated that only 24 percent of total arable land in
the sector was cultivated, and that the cattle herd operated at only 35 percent of potential
stocking rates. The sector's substantial contribution to agricultural production and export
earnings mask a number of inefficiencies (Riddell 1978a, 1978b). Riddell notes that over 60
percent of commercial farms in 1975/76 were not profitable enough for income-tax payments;
only 15 percent of the potentially arable land was actually cultivated. A 1982 study by
Hawkins Associates for the World Bank presents an opposite view. It found that the
utilization of net arable land ranged between 58 and 128 percent in five of the six intensive
conservation areas they assessed in the country's main cropping region.
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A study by Weiner et al. (1985) tried to untangle some of these apparent contradic-
tions. It calculated rates of land utilization for 14 districts and 3 provinces of Mashonaland,
which incorporate most of NR II and some of NR III. Based on 1981/82 cropped area, only
24.7 percent of arable land in Mashonaland West, 33.3 percent of Mashonaland Central, and
14.9 percent of Mashonaland East were actually cultivated in crops. Even after making the
very conservative estimate that 20 percent of the arable land is needed for squaring of fields,
construction of roads and homesteads, and pockets of inaccessible land, and that another 15
percent is needed for mechanical conservation measures (contouring, waterways), land
utilization increased to only 36, 49, and 22 percent, respectively. Further, none of the
district-level data came even remotely close to the efficiency rates reported in the Hawkins
Associates (1982) study, raising serious doubts about their validity.
A more recent study by the World Bank (1986) divided commercial areas into grazed,
cropped, fallow, and unusable land. Actual stocking rates of livestock were then compared
with safe stocking rates recommended by AGRITEX for grazing areas. It concluded that of the
12.7 million hectares in commercial areas, only 1.0 million hectares of truly surplus land
would be available for additional livestock grazing, most of that in NR V. Also, only 549,000
hectares out of 3.0-3.5 million hectares of potentially arable land were used for crop
cultivation, with the remainder used mainly for livestock grazing. Rather than representing
an inefficient use of resources, the study argues that a number of factors have helped make
livestock a lucrative enterprise on this arable land: (1) restrictions until recently on Africans'
ability to purchase land in European areas; (2) the low purchasing power of Africans; (3)
23. An "intensive conservation area" is an administrative boundary within the commercial farming
area.102
tribal lands in communal areas being off-limits to commercial farmers; (4) restrictions on
purchases and sales in the land market; (5) absence of a formal leasing market; (6) the sharp
increase in minimum agricultural wage rates since independence; and (7) a shortage of capital
equipment brought about by the acute rationing of foreign exchange to the agricultural sector.
These market imperfections have tended to keep land prices low by limiting demand for
arable land, thus increasing incentives for extensive (i.e., livestock) farming systems.
Since the work of Weiner et al. (1985) in 1981/82, four fundamental forces have
continued to dramatically shape land-use patterns and thus land utilization:
► The LSCS has declined from 15.0 million hectares in 1979 to 11.2 million
hectares by 1988, a 26.6 percent decline. Some unknown but sizable area of
this land comprised abandoned farms with high rates of underutilization.
► As a result of pricing policy, there has been a dramatic shift in cropping
patterns away from cereals toward industrial and specialty crops. These crops
are less land intensive, requiring higher inputs of labor per unit of area.
► Total labor employed on farms has declined from 286,825 permanent and
casual farm employees in 1979 to 227,626 employees by 1988, a 20.6 percent
decline.
► The number of beef and dairy cattle has declined from 2.2 million head in
1980 to 1.8 million head by 1988; cattle numbers in NRs I and II have
declined only marginally.
Item (1) should in general have led to increased aggregate land utilization by removing
abandoned and inefficient farm enterprises from the sector. However, items (2) through (4)
would tend to decrease land utilization in the aggregate depending on the magnitude of
changes involved. Moreover, changes in land redistribution and land-use patterns have not
been uniform across either provinces or natural regions. Accordingly, a number of
fundamental issues arise. The first is concerned with the extent of utilization of arable land
for crop agriculture. The second is concerned with stocking rates of livestock and the extent
of underutilization of grazing land. The third is concerned with whether using livestock for
arable land constitutes an economically efficient use of resources.
8.2 LAND UTILIZATION
8.2.1 CROP PRODUCTION ON ARABLE LAND
Assessing potential arable land normally requires detailed soil surveys and/or farm
plans because of the wide variation in geological formations and soil types in Zimbabwe.
Because land utilization is so central to proposals for land redistribution, a number of authors
have recommended that regular studies on land use be undertaken, and that a better data base103
be established, beyond simple national and regional aggregations (Chavunduka 1982; Cliffe
1986). While AGRITEX has continued its work on assimilating farm plans, the work is not
sufficiently advanced to permit either ready access to data or immediate analysis.
Two somewhat dated studies have tried to estimate the area of arable land. As
mentioned earlier, the Weiner et al. (1985) study estimated total arable land from a 10
percent sample frame of farm plans compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture over a 3-year
period prior to 1981, when the study was conducted. Amble land was estimated for three
provinces, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, and Mashonaland West. The most
comprehensive study, however, is the now famous work of Vincent, Thomas, and Staples
(1962), who conducted a detailed agro-ecological survey of then-Rhodesia from 1950 through
1956. This exhaustive survey estimated, in detail, the amount of arable land by natural
region.
Column A in table 8.1 shows total area of land by province and natural region as of
1988 (CSo). Only the three provinces in Mashonaland are selected to take advantage of the
data on arable land from the Weiner et al. (1985) study. Column B contains estimates of
arable land. For the three provinces of Mashonaland, data from Weiner et al. (1985) are
used, adjusted downward to reflect land acquired for resettlement.' For natural regions,
percentage arable land in column C is adapted from detailed data reported in Vincent,
Thomas, and Staples (1962, p. 107).
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Column D reports crop area by province and natural region for the 1988/89 cropping
season. Only 19 percent of gross arable land in Mashonaland East was planted in crops, 24
percent in Mashonaland West, and 34 percent in Mashonaland Central. Comparable figures
in Weiner et al. (1985) were 15, 25, and 33 percent, respectively, for 1981, showing only
marginal changes in land utilization between 1981 and 1988, the higher utilization in
Mashonaland East being the exception.
Estimates of cropping efficiency in NRs II and III are generally higher than provincial
totals because all three Mashonaland provinces contain sizable areas of NR IV, which has a
very low rate of land utilization (measurement differences are partly responsible as well).
Based on the percentage arable land figures taken from Vincent, Thomas, and Staples (1962)
in column E, 40 percent of the gross arable land in NR I was cultivated, 36 percent in NR II,
24. Arable land in 1988 was assumed to have the same proportion to total land as in 1981, the time
of the Weiner et al. (1985) study.
25. Arable land, according to Vincent, Thomas, and Staples (1962), is "land which has adequate
depth of soil for satisfactory plant growth, and which can safely be cultivated using normal rotations,
cultural practices, and protection methods. This definition excludes certain areas of potentially arable
land. For example, much of the land in NR I is not classified as arable because of excessive slope.
Yet this land is quite suitable for forestation and for orchards and plantation crops. Land in Nrs IV
and V is also potentially arable with irrigation, but would require large capital investment in land.TABLE 8.1
Efficiency of arable land use for crop production
















































Mashonaland Central 732.6 307.3' 41.9 105.4 34.3 262.7 40.1 152.7 58.1
Mashonaland East 957.8 522.1' 54.5 97.6 18.7 446.4 21.9 139.1 31.2
NR I
b 202.2 27.9 13.8
6 11.7 39.7 23.9 49.0 12.1 50.6
NR II 3,686.9 1,047.1 28.4 379.1 36.2 895.3 42.3 556.0 62.1
NR III 2,405.4 574.9 23.9 48.4 8.4 491.5 9.9 74.9 15.2
NR IV 2,429.1 10.1° 0.0 8.9 88.1 10.1 88.1 10.2 101.0
NR V 2,489.7 102.5° 0.0 52.3 51.0 102.5 51.0 53.1 51.8
a. From Dan Weiner et al., "Land Use and Agricultural Productivity in Zimbabwe," Journal of Modern African Studies
23 (1985): 252-85, less land acquired for resettlement, assuming that 1988 totals contain the same proportion of arable
and nonarable land as in 1981.
b. Percentages for natural regions are adapted from V. Vincent, R.G. Thomas, and R.R. Staples, AnAgriculturalSurvey
ofSouthern Rhodesia: Part I, Agro-Ecological Survey (Harare: Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement,
1962), p. 107.
c. Arable land is irrigable land times a cropping intensity of 2.
d. Crop area in 1988/89 (Central Statistics Office).
e. Arable land less 10% for squaring of fields, tree lines, roads, homesteads, and pockets of inaccessible land, and less
5% for mechanical conservation measures.
f. Crop area adjusted to include recommended fallow rotations.105
and 8 percent in NR III. The amount of arable land in NRs IV and V is zero (column C)
because rainfall is too low and variable. Data for arable land in column B are thus area under
irrigation times two for double-cropping. Data in column E report fairly high rates of
utilization, at 88 and 51 percent for NRs IV and V, respectively.
As was earlier pointed out in the Weiner et al. (1985) study, however, these
calculations are misleading because not all arable land is available to farmers. Column F in
table 8.1 provides a figure for net arable land which makes the following adjustments:
► arable land in column C is reduced by 10 percent to account for land lost due
to squaring of fields, tree lines, and construction of roads and homesteads, and
for pockets of land that are inaccessible; and
► a further reduction of 5 percent is made to account for land lost for mechanical
conservation measures, contouring, access roads, and artificial waterways.
The Weiner et al. (1985) analysis, in order to remain consistent with Ministry of
Agriculture plans, used the figures of 20 and 15 percent, respectively, to cover the above
losses. But it later points out that these figures are themselves policy recommendations based
on commercial farming systems. While commercial farms may require surplus land for
squaring of fields and inaccessible pockets, these areas may be quite suitable for small-scale
agriculture. Estimates of net arable land in table 8.1 are thus less conservative than those in
Weiner et al. Using net arable land in column F, cropping efficiency increases to between 22
and 40 percent in Mashonaland, and to between 10 and 49 percent in NRs I, II, and III.
Actual cropped area ignores two factors in determining rates of land utilization: (1)
certain crops such as wheat are irrigated under double-cropping systems and thus result in
double accounting of crop area; and (2) certain crops, principally tobacco, require grass
fallow according to AGxITEX recommendations. The first overstates the area of crops actually
planted. The second underestimates the effective amount of land required for sustainable crop
yields. To account for double-cropping and the need for fallowing the system, crop area in
column H is adjusted by the formula:
X (1+au) * Xa for all i crops in region j
adjusted area of crop i in region j;
ley or discount factor for crop i in region j derived from
Annex I; and
X;, j = actual area of crop i in region j.
As shown in Annex I, 3 hectares of grass are recommended for every hectare of
tobacco, resulting in a ley factor of 3. Maize requires 3 hectares of grass for every 2 hectares
of maize on light soils but no rotation on heavy soils. Assuming that 50 percent of soils are
heavy and 50 percent light, the ley factor is 3 hectares of grass for every 4 hectares of maize,106
giving a ley factor of 0.75. A discount factor of -1.0 is assigned to wheat because it is
generally double-cropped (i.e., two crops per year, one wheat, followed or preceded by
another) and thus its area is already accounted for by other crops. A discount factor of -1.0
is also indicated for fodder crops. Aside from the issue of the economic profitability of
forages compared with crop production, fodder crops can be substituted for grass fallow in
the tobacco and maize rotations. Finally, other crops are assumed to be cultivated under 100
percent cropping systems for lack of more detailed data on type and frequency of rotations.
The ley factor for these other crops has thus been set at 0.0.
After making these adjustments for double-cropping and fallow, cropping efficiency
in column I increases to 31 percent in Mashonaland East, 42 percent in Mashonaland West,
and 58 percent in Mashonaland Central. In NRs I and II, cropping efficiency increases to 51
and 62 percent, respectively, while cropping efficiency in NR III is 15 percent. Although land
utilization has increased from a decade ago, approximately 40-50 percent of the arable land
in the LSCS in NRs I and II, respectively, remains unutilized for crop production. Arable land
in NR III remains grossly underutilized at only 15 percent.
While these data are imperfect, it would be difficult not to reach the conclusion that
there is a large area of unutilized land in NRs I, II, and III that could potentially be
redistributed without depressing commercial crop production and exports. 26 But crop
production represents only one facet of agriculture. Livestock is also an important industry,
raising two fundamental issues: whether stocking rates on remaining arable land and on
grazing land indicate full utilization of grazing areas, and whether grazing livestock on arable
land in NRs I, II, and III makes the most economical use of resources.
8.2.2 UTILIZATION OF GRAZING LAND
Use of grazing land for extensive livestock production is examined in table 8.2.
Grazing land in column E is calculated as total area in column A, less cropped area in column
C (minus planted fodder crops), less unusable land in column D (estimated at 20% of total
land area). Livestock units in column F were estimated from 1988 numbers of cattle, sheep,
and goats, and the conversion factors of 0.7 LU for each head of beef or dairy cattle and 0.15
LU for each head of sheep and goats. Unfortunately, livestock numbers are known with some
certainty only at the provincial level. Numbers of livestock units by natural region are thus
adapted from national totals and regional percentages reported by the World Bank (1986).
Regional results should be viewed with caution since the methodology for estimating livestock
numbers by region is unclear from the World Bank report and data are somewhat dated.
Given that more accurate regional numbers become available, results can be updated
accordingly.
Potential grazing area per livestock unit in column G is compared with three grazing
strategies: column H is the optimal stocking strategy recommended by AGRITEX to permit
26. This of course depends crucially on the process used to redistribute land (see ch. 9).TABLE 8.2
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(ha/LU) (000 ha) (000 ha)
A B C D E=A-C-D F G=E=F H I J
Manicaland 760.7 43.6 40.0 I52.1 568.6 67.5 8.4
Mashonaland 3,576.5 387.7 343.2 7I5.2 2,5I8.I 570.9 4.4
Midlands I,689.I I8.I I5.6 337.8 1,335.7 215.8 6.2
Masvingo 2,406.7 41.8 40.7 48I.3 I,884.7 153.5 I2.3
Matabeleland 2,780.4 9.4 6.8 556.I 2,217.5 254.4 8.7
NR I 202.2 II.7 I0.5 40.4 I5I.3 23.3 6.5 3-4 2 1
NR II 3,686.9 379.2 334.I 737.4 2,6I5.4 545.3 4.8 3-4 2 I
NR III 2,405.5 48.4 43.3 48I.I 1,88I.I 295.7 6.4 6-8 3-4 2
NR IV 2,429.I 8.9 6.2 485.8 1,937.I 296.6 6.5 8-I0 4-5 3
NR V 2,489.7 52.4 52.2 497.8 I,939.7 I0I.2 19.2 10-I5 5-8 4
National II,2I3.4 500.6 446.3 2,242.5 8,524.6 1,262.1 6.8108
sustainable use of resources with ample capacity for drought years; column I is a moderately
risky strategy, enabling higher stocking rates considered by some to be more efficient use of
pasture (this stocking strategy would probably require some destocking in drought years); and
column J is a very risky strategy enabling very high stocking rates in ample rainfall years,
but requiring extreme destocking in poor rainfall years. Columns I and J are included to
present the arguments of critics that AGRITEX-recommended stocking rates are too low.
Conversely, strategy J is probably too optimistic.
Based on recommended stocking rates, the herd in NR I could be grazed on about half
of the grazing area, indicating surplus grazing land. But the surplus area represents only
about 75,000 hectares. Stocking rates in NR II (4.8) are not greatly out of line with the
recommended stocking rate of 3.5 hectares/LU. However, assuming that regional data are
valid, approximately 700,000 hectares of grazing land could be counted as surplus (2,615.4
- 3.5 x 545.3). Stocking rates for NRs III and IV appear to be optimal with perhaps some
overstocking in NR IV. Significant understocking appears to exist in NR V. Based on
recommendations of 15 hectares/LU, about 420,000 hectares of residual land is available.
Overall, about 1.2 million hectares could potentially be considered surplus. If the more
risky stocking rates in column I are considered, perhaps 2.4 million hectares are available.
But it remains controversial whether these more liberal estimates can be considered optimal.
Because of the high capital investment, time requirements for building a herd, and frequency
of drought, strategy J appears far too optimistic.
8.3 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
A central issue in the land policy debate concerns the amount of land either idle or
underutilized in the LSCS. Redistributing land that is currently being utilized would entail the
prospect of production losses if commercial farmers are more efficient or productive,
however defined, than settler farmers. However, if sizable amounts of unutilized land exist
in the LSCS, then the possibility arises of redistributing this idle land to settler farmers and
increasing aggregate output from the resettlement sector without disrupting commercial farm
production. Perceptions are pervasive, among government officials, that a sizable amount of
unutilized land does exist, reinforcing demands for an expanded resettlement program.
Using crude and aggregate data, this chapter has tried to estimate the area of
unutilized land in the LSCS by starting with estimates of arable land and crop area, then
making the following corrections: (1) calculating net arable land available to farmers,
deducting areas lost to squaring of fields, tree lines, roads, homesteads, artificial waterways,
and mechanical conservation measures; and (2) adjusting cropped area for double-cropping
and required fallow.
Based on this analysis, approximately 50 percent of the arable land in NR I and 40
percent of the arable land in NR II are not being fully utilized for crop production (crops and
fallow). In area terms, unutilized arable land in NRs I and II amount to 351.1 thousand109
hectares, and total land area (including nonarable and arable land) of 1,497.2 thousand
hectares. The latter figure is most relevant since farms acquired by the government would
include arable, grazing, and waste land. If NR III is considered also, an additional 416.8
thousand hectares of arable land, or 2,039.8 thousand hectares of total land, could be
acquired for resettlement without sacrificing commercial crop output and/or exports.
While idle land could conceivably be resettled with minimum adverse impacts on
large-scale commercial producers, current targets being proposed by government are calling
for the resettlement of 6.0 million hectares. Important issues thus arise about the relative
efficiency of commercial versus resettlement production. Yield comparisons for maize in
Annex J indicate that commercial farmers obtain maize yields 2-3 times higher than the
communal sector. Acquiring and resettling land beyond the 3.5 million hectares above raise
fundamental concerns about the impacts of resettlement on food security and export crop
production. The weak comparative advantage of communal farmers in maize production and
their comparative disadvantage in industrial crop production highlight these concerns (see
ch. 7).
The above estimate of 3.5 million hectares of unutilized land implicitly assumes that
communal crop production is a more efficient land use than livestock production. No evidence
either for or against this assumption is presented in this report. This issue is of fundamental
importance to the analysis of land use and resettlement, but was beyond the scope and
resources of this study. If it is shown in subsequent studies that commercial livestock
production is more efficient than either settler crop or livestock production, then the data in
table 8.2 suggest that only 1.2 million hectares of grazing land (some arable plus nonarable
land) are underutilized assuming low-risk stocking rates, and 2.4 million hectares given risky
stocking rates. Sixty-five percent of this land is located in NRs I and II.
Questions concerning appropriate policies to identify and acquire land for resettlement




After a decade of resettlement, land distribution in Zimbabwe is still highly skewed.
About 4,660 farmers in the commercial sector control 29 percent of the nation's land area,
located mainly in the highest rainfall zones. More than 1 million families remain in
overcrowded communal lands on 42 percent of the nation's land area, located mainly in the
poorest rainfall zones.
Low productivity and natural resource degradation from overcrowding in communal
areas are fueling demands for land redistribution. Yet, any radical redistribution of land risks
undermining production and export earnings. The LSCS sector provides employment for over
225,000 farm laborers and produces 68 percent of the nation's gross agricultural output, 82
percent of crop sales, 94 percent of marketed livestock offtake, and 50 percent of export
earnings. The two most pressing problems currently confronting the government—high
unemployment and acute shortages of foreign exchange—depend crucially on how the
resettlement process is handled and on the confidence of the commercial farming community.
In the past, land has been acquired by the government on a willing buyer-willing seller basis
under the provisions of the recently expired (April 1990) Lancaster House Constitution.
Critics argue that this provision has hampered the acquisition of the best land because of
collusion among sellers and high land prices, and/or has resulted in an inadequate supply of
land coming to market.
The currently skewed land distribution and the need to alter it are common ground
among virtually all who have considered these issues and would not be challenged by any of
the participants in the public policy discussions in Zimbabwe. The issues instead concern how
fast and how far rectification can and should go and what mechanisms might work best to
achieve it. Given the disparities in landholdings and the cultural barriers impeding the flow
of land among sectors, resettlement is the best policy option for achieving both economic
growth and stability in the long run. The most crucial issues hinge on the process used to
acquire land, select settlers, and settle them on the acquired land.
How great a need still exists today? So far, 53,968 families have been settled on
roughly 26 percent of the LSCS land that existed in 1979, 60 percent of these coming from
the communal areas. Government's target is 162,000 families; if present proportions hold,
another 40 percent of the LSCS land would be required. The government's target figure of
162,000 families seems to have no very clear basis, but other estimates are higher. Bratton
(1990) indicates that only a small portion of the real need has been met. He estimates that112
180,000 households are truly landless, mostly households of young men, while 150,000
households are near landless, a total of nearly 42 percent of the total agricultural population.
Landlessness figures which include young men who are farming their fathers' land may,
however, overstate the need. The more modest figure of between 6 and 12 percent of the
peasant population being without land is probably a better indication (MLGRUD 1987).
About 150,000 families have registered for the resettlement program in various
provinces (MLARR 1986); it is not clear whether this figure includes the members of the 200
registered cooperative societies who are waiting for land in the model B schemes. These
numbers of registered applicants for land are probably our best guide because they reflect not
just some inchoate need, but households ready and willing to resettle.
These numbers will be swollen to the extent that the commercial farms taken will have
labor forces which must somehow be accommodated in resettlement schemes. This extent is
difficult to gauge because statistics on the labor force in the LSCS are in terms of laborers
rather than households, and because the choice of land acquisition strategies (e.g., acquisition
of underutilized land or block acquisition of whole farms) could dramatically affect the
numbers of laborers who would be released from commercial agriculture.
9.2 1992 LAND LEGISLATION
The Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment Bill no. 11, was passed by Parliament in
December 1990, and the Land Acquisition Bill, in March 1992. Under the 1992 Land Act,
6.9 million hectares would be acquired by the government from the LSCS.
27 Of this amount,
5.0 million hectares would be added to the resettlement sector, expanding its size from 3.3
million hectares to 8.3 million hectares, and 1.9 million hectares would be added to the state
farm sector, increasing its size from 0.5 million hectares to 2.4 million hectares. Land
allocations in the communal and small-scale commercial sectors would remain unchanged at
16.3 million hectares and 1.2 million hectares, respectively. Only land in "designated" areas
will be acquired. The government has stated its intent to concentrate first on acquiring
underutilized land, and only after these farms have been acquired will it begin acquiring more
intensively utilized farms.
28 More resources will be provided to the Rural State Land Office
27. Zimbabwe's total land area is 39,070.0 thousand ha. In 1988, the communal sector comprised
(in 000 units) 16,355.0 ha; the Lscs, 11,213.4 ha; the Sscs, 1,238.7 ha; resettlement areas, 3,290.0
ha; state farms, 500.0 ha; parks and wildlife areas, 4,978.1 ha; and "other" land, 1,494.8 ha. Masoka
(1993) states that 6.3 million ha will be acquired from the Lscs, but resettlement will receive 5.0
million ha, and the state sector, 1.9 million ha, for a total of 6.9 million ha. No explanations are
offered for the source of the additional 0.6 million ha.
28. See Masoka (1993). Despite government's stated intent to keep "efficient" farms on the land,
the provision of one farm per individual and the government's desire to establish large-scale
resettlement schemes would eventually compel the government to purchase significant numbers of
intensively utilized farms. This problem could be circumvented if large
"pockets" of underutilized113
and the Farm Management Section of the MLARR to strengthen their capacity in carrying out
land inspections to detect land underutilization and absentee landlordism." To facilitate the
government's acquisition of land, the new land policy stipulates state control of land prices,
limits on number of farms and farm size, and the "designation" of areas for land acquisition
and resettlement. The government asserts that the target of 6.9 million hectares can be
acquired and redistributed without reducing agricultural output and export earnings.
9.3 LAND UTILIZATION AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Current proposals to resettle 110,000 families on 6.9 million hectares of land without
causing significant economic destabilization would appear to be unrealistic.
First, 3.5 million hectares of land can be considered underutilized in NRs I, II, and
III only if crop production is more "efficient" than livestock grazing or wildlife management.
To the author's knowledge, there are no studies on Zimbabwe that either support or refute
this argument. Should livestock represent an economically efficient use of land, then only 1.2
million hectares would be underutilized assuming low-risk stocking rates, and 2.4 million
hectares assuming risky stocking rates.
Second, while available data suggest that between 1.2 and 3.5 million hectares of land
are potentially underutilized, these aggregate figures disguise two important variations: the
underutilized land is spread over many farms (each farm has a core area of utilized land with
other land that is less intensively utilized); and not all farmers are equally efficient. Acquiring
and redistributing the underutilized "pieces" would have a positive impact on aggregate
production. However, acquiring and redistributing entire farms within a "designated" area
would have important output implications, either positive or negative depending on the
comparative advantage of resettlement farmers relative to the commercial farmers being
displaced.
The domestic resource cost (DRC) coefficient measures the comparative advantage of
a group or region for a given commodity based on foreign exchange earnings or savings
relative to domestic resources spent. DRC coefficients computed for NRs II and III (see ch. 7)
land containing no operating farms could be designated. However, as Roth (1990) points out, these
pockets have already been largely absorbed into the resettlement program.
29. Unlike Masoka (1993), who feels that criteria can be designed to measure land underutilization,
the proposed criteria—output value/hectare, livestock offtake, speculation, and derelict lands—would
be empirically intractable, time consuming, and very costly to implement. Commercial farms now
voluntarily provide data on land use and production. The above criteria would encourage farms to
overstate land use and production in data reporting. The existence of truly derelict land is in practice
very difficult to measure, and nearly impossible to prove in the courts; e.g., the presence of grassland
might mean either idle land, ley fallow, grazing for livestock, soil conservation, or land reserved for
future use.114
indicate that the LSCS holds a comparative advantage in tobacco, groundnuts, and soyabeans,
and communal farmers, in maize and sunflower. Both groups tend to be nearly equally
efficient in cotton. Both sectors also appear to be exploiting their comparative advantage.
Cropping patterns in the LSCS have been shifting away from maize toward industrial crops.
For the communal sector, cropping patterns have been shifting toward maize and cotton.
Unfortunately, a DRC analysis of the resettlement sector has not been undertaken. However,
average maize yields on resettlement schemes in higher rainfall zones are one-third to
one-fourth those achieved in the LSCS, and one-half those in the communal sector (see Annex
J). While yields are an unsatisfactory proxy for profitability, the data do at least raise a
concern about output effects.
Many structural problems have contributed to the low productivity of resettlement
schemes, including past selection of settlers lacking farm management skills and experience,
permits of occupations that confer only temporary use rights, poor access to agricultural
research and extension, and poor access to input and commodity markets. Also, enough
consideration has not been given to the importance of social cohesion in the communal sector
in promoting growth and equity, the difficulty of achieving this cohesion in resettlement areas
with settlers taken from around the country, the inability of the government properly to
expand input distribution and marketing services at the scale of resettlement experienced in
the last decade, and inappropriateness of AGRITEX extension advice to small farming systems.
These problems imply that benefits to resettlement will require a much longer time horizon
than originally planned. They further suggest that the learning curve of both settlers in
schemes and the government in implementation of resettlement programs are much flatter than
originally believed.
All else being equal, an overvalued exchange rate makes imports appear cheaper in
local currency, and exports appear more expensive. The provision of AFC credit at rates
several points lower than formal lending institutions has reduced borrowing costs primarily
for large-scale farmers. Both policies combined are biasing investment toward capital-
intensive technology. Tight foreign exchange allocations to agriculture have helped in the past
to dampen imports of capital goods (farm machinery, spare parts) and the substitution of
capital machinery for labor. Devaluing the exchange rate will increase the export competitive-
ness of tobacco, cotton, and beef, and increase the price of wheat imports. Largescale
producers will be the major beneficiaries to the extent that higher prices are passed on to
producers. Higher cotton prices will benefit communal farmers.
The policy establishing minimum wages adversely affected profits in the large-scale
sector in the early 1980s. However, by 1989, due to inflation real minimum wage rates had
eroded to near pre-1980 levels. Nominal wage rates are higher than in the communal sector,
but this in part reflects the higher marginal value of labor in industrial crop production.
Employment legislation, on the other hand, has profoundly decreased labor demand on
commercial farms by driving up the cost of permanent labor. Restrictions on firing have
shifted incentives to hiring seasonal labor. Both the reduction of the work force and the shift
to seasonal labor have had adverse consequences on farm workers' income and employment
stability. Current programs to increase allocations of foreign exchange to agriculture will115
further exacerbate the substitution of capital for labor on farms, unless provisions in the
Employment Act are modified.
Given the current transportation bottlenecks posed by the deteriorating quality of the
transport fleet and infrastructure, and the foreign exchange constraints affecting imports of
equipment, tools, and parts, there is a high economic rent to scarce transport capacity.
Economic incentives are shifting toward commodities with high value per unit of volume in
transport—e.g., tobacco, cotton, fruits, and vegetables—and against commodities with low
value per unit of volume—e.g., grain. Producers of higher value crops bid up transport rates.
As transport costs rise, grains and cereals are increasingly at a disadvantage relative to other
commodities.
Prospects for maize producers, especially communal and resettlement farmers, are not
bright. Stock levels of maize in 1989, just prior to the drought, had reached record levels.
Due to slow export demand in neighboring countries and transport constraints, the
government had had no other recourse but to dampen nominal increases in maize prices, as
demonstrated by the real decline in maize prices over the 1980s. Unless domestic or export
demand increases, and barring droughts that would bring stocks down to more affordable
levels, production from communal areas will continue to place downward pressure on maize
prices. Maize production in the large-scale sector will continue to decline. Although the
communal sector's comparative advantage in maize production seems assured, the long-term
prospects of a maize-based economy continuing to drive income growth is not encouraging.
Real growth in income in agriculture over the next decade will come from strategic
crops other than maize, specifically, tobacco, cotton, dairy, horticulture crops, and oilseeds.
Improvements in management and access to processing facilities will be essential to increase
smallholder participation in these enterprises. Model A schemes as they are currently
designed are not suited to developing higher-value crops. Greater attention will need to be
given to model B schemes that give smallholders, through collective action, the means to
acquire greater economies of scale in processing and marketing, or to model C schemes
involving a nucleus estate that provides the technical management, central processing, and
marketing expertise. Unfortunately, both model B and model C schemes have poor track
records.
It would be unfair to suggest that settlers have not been provided with sufficient
support services without applauding the remarkable achievement of settling 3.2 million
hectares of land over the decade. The fact remains that government has its limits. If services
cannot be provided due to limited resources, and models B and C are constrained by lack of
skilled manpower and capital, incentives shift to getting people on the land as soon as
possible. The model A accelerated scheme is most relevant to this end. Since communal
farmers receive an economic gain in the form of a superior land endowment, they should pay
compensation accordingly. Payment will act to both supplement resettlement costs and help
allocate limited supplies of resettlement land among the communal population. Good farmers
who have been made destitute by chance or other circumstances can still be accommodated
by reserving some portion of land for resettlement on a no-fee basis.116
Given the available evidence, the acquisition and resettlement of 6.9 million hectares
in "designated" schemes would have the following consequences:
► Livestock production and exports would fall sharply unless resettlement
livestock production and marketing prove equally competitive with the LSCS.
► Resettlement would lower agricultural productivity on land now intensively
utilized, at least in the short run; these losses may or may not be offset by the
increased production on currently underutilized land.
► Smallholders lacking capital and markets for higher-value crops would tend to
shift cropping patterns toward lower-value maize and oilseeds.
► The displacement of commercial farmers would precipitate a decline in the
marketing network, especially for marketing skills and information.
► The government would be unable to provide production and marketing services
on par with the private sector operations displaced.
9.4 OPTIONS FOR LAND ACQUISITION
There are a number of bases on which compulsory acquisition of land could be
expanded and costs of the program controlled. The first is simple utilization of the existing
provision of the Land Acquisition Act, with its current or an amended definition of underutil-
ization. This would become more feasible once the constitutional requirement on remittances
of compensation is deleted, as should and will certainly happen. The underutilization criterion
is supported by the Joint Presidents' Agricultural Committee (1990, p. 3), but the arguments
made earlier against a tax which targets underutilized land apply here as well: the difficulty
of definition and application, and the marginal and scattered nature of the land which would
be subject to compulsory acquisition. Other alternatives include the imposition of a ceiling
on landholdings, a restriction on the number of landholdings per household or person, and
a ceiling on land prices paid.
9.4.1 CONTROLS ON NUMBER OF FARMS AND FARM SIZE
Land ceilings have been a classic land approach, utilized extensively in Asian and
Latin American reforms. A ceilings approach has one major advantage over a program of
compulsory acquisition targeted on underutilized land. The Land Acquisition Bill stipulates
one farm per individual or company unless exemptions are justifiable.
3° This policy also
calls for government to fix minimum and maximum farm sizes for different agro-ecological
30. This policy can be contravened by registering farms in the names of different members of the
family or kin.117
regions and farm typologies. AGRITEX has conducted a study of minimum farm sizes for
various activities in the commercial and small-scale sectors by natural regions (Chaonwa
1989). Such studies reflect AGRITEX
' S technocratic approach to farm planning and land
redistribution. Ceilings on farm ownership and size are appealing to government administra-
tors. They provide a predictable yardstick for determining whose land should be taken and
they are easy to legislate. Once set, they provide clear guidelines for subdividing farms.
Perceptions that a strong inverse relationship exists between farm size and efficiency give
them further an economic rationale. Unfortunately, virtually no research on the economics
of farm size has been undertaken in Zimbabwe.
Economic efficiency is concerned with how certain elements of the profit function vary
with land size. Of primary importance is the relationship between total farm size and costs,
in particular, average costs per unit of land area. Rising average costs with increasing farm
size suggest diseconomies to scale; falling average costs suggest economies to scale. Lacking
information on costs, data on farm revenue would be illuminating. A positive relationship
between revenue per hectare and farm size would provide weak evidence against disecono-
mies to scale. Unfortunately, data on neither farm revenues nor farm costs could be located
for this study.
The relationship between crop yields and size of crop area planted can be estimated
from CSo data. Since prices are pan-seasonal and pan-territorial, crop yields are also a good
proxy for revenue. This relationship is illustrated for maize, wheat, sorghum, flue-cured
tobacco, cotton, and soyabeans in figure 9.1. With the exception of sorghum, all crops show
a positive relationship between crop area planted and yields. A strong positive trend is
indicated for cotton and wheat, providing weak evidence against the argument that larger
farms are more inefficient. The obvious problem remains that large farms may have rising
economies for certain crops, yet are inefficient overall (e.g., crop area is less than 100
hectares while individual farms average 1,402 hectares per farm and companies, 3,885
hectares per farm). This hypothesis was untestable given available data.
Even if one could conclude that diseconomies exist in the LSCS, restrictions on the
number and size of farms should be avoided for the following reasons:
► Policies delimiting allowable farm-size categories create institutional rigidities
that increase the cost of adapting to changing market conditions. Small- to
medium-size farms often prefer to have multiple parcels of land in different
locations and with different soil-quality characteristics (lowland, upland) to
"hedge" against ecological risk. Controls on the number or size of farms
prevent smaller commercial farmers from acquiring land in a timely manner
for inheritance or from expanding in a timely manner to take advantage of
entrepreneurial skills and farming opportunities.
► Policies aimed at limiting the number and size of farms would force the
poorest quality land onto the market, exacerbating government attempts to
acquire higher quality land for resettlement. Further, it is not clear what118
FIGURE 9.1
Relationship between crop yields and crop area planted
,co 5000 - - - - - - - - - -7






0-10 20-30 40-50 100+















0-10 20-30 40-50 100+
FARM SIZE (ha planted)119
process government would use to redistribute farms divested from multiple
farm holdings, given its emphasis on large-scale and consolidated resettlement.
► Economies to scale are dynamic, changing with prices and technological
innovation. Declining relative prices of mechanization increase incentives for
farm size expansion and industry consolidation. Increased incentives for
tobacco and tree crop production increase incentives for more intensive use of
capital and labor per unit of land area and for smaller farm size. Changing
returns in livestock agriculture from pricing policy affect herd adjustments and
grazing land utilization. The notion of setting land sizes to achieve minimum
or maximum returns is based on fixed price ratios and constant technology,
while historical data on land use demonstrate that both the LSCS and the
communal sector are highly price responsive.
► Not all farmers are equally efficient. Land-size ceilings that are set too high
protect or miss smaller, inefficient farms. Set too low, they discriminate
against larger, efficient producers. Since most farms are partially utilized,
forced divestiture of multiple farms (beyond the one allowed) and land in
excess of farm-size ceilings would displace high-yielding commercial
production on some land.
31 Government policy should seek to encourage
keeping "efficient" farmers in agriculture, regardless of size, and discriminate
against the "inefficient" producer or land speculator. Controls on number of
farms and land ceilings tax the efficient and inefficient alike.
► Ceilings force those farmers affected to designate land in an amount under the
ceiling to be retained. This process of choice can be complicated and delay
implementation. Also, where corporate ownership of land is extensive, it is
difficult to "pierce the corporate veil" and include shares of interest in land in
ceilings calculations so as to deal equitably among owners. If the corporations
are largely closely held family corporations, the problems will not be so great;
if they are conglomerates of diverse investors, including, for instance, other
corporations, the difficulty will be much greater.
► The land acquired would be scattered and involve the less intensively
developed portion of larger holdings. This disadvantage is at the same time an
advantage. Both the underutilization and ceilings approaches, because they
affect the less intensively developed areas of farms, would have less of an
31. Mandating one farm per individual raises the unanswered question of which farms to divest.
Normally, the government would allow the farmer to choose. For a farm exceeding the maximum
size allowable, subdivision according to current laws would be permitted only as long as the excess
land is itself a viable farm (for emerging black commercial farmers) or can be consolidated into a
resettlement scheme. The government may thus feel compelled to acquire the largest farms if these
conditions do not hold.120
impact on intensive production of export crops, which cannot easily be
produced in the resettlement sector, and displace much less wage labor.
9.4.2 CONTROLS ON LAND PRICES
The 1990 Amendment to the Lancaster House Constitution stipulates payment of a
"fair price" for land acquired for resettlement. According to government, soaring land prices
no longer reflect the productive potential of agricultural land. To determine a fair price, the
government will continue negotiations with farmers using professional land valuation officers
of the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing. Instead of paying compensation
promptly, as stipulated in the old constitution, the new policy stipulates payment in a
"reasonable" period, opening the door for staggering of payments.
As long as high-price inflation persists, investors are given the incentive to preserve
wealth in land rather than keeping money in bank deposits, which yielded low or negative real
rates of return in the 1980s. The analysis of implicit land values calculated on the basis of
crop profitability indicated that land prices did not appear to be greatly distorted from the
value of land in agricultural use. The analysis further suggests that government pricing policy
is being capitalized into land values. The problem remains that not all land is fully utilized,
and such land has lower use value. But restrictions on subdivision prevent underutilized
portions from being sold and land prices of such areas from falling in the land market.
Arguments are also made that land value should be based on purchase price of plus
investments made in the land. Besides more practical problems of how to measure the value
of investments, this argument ignores two fundamental relationships. First, inflation erodes
the purchase price of any asset over time. Selling land at its purchase price at a future date
in an inflationary climate would result in a loss in real terms to the landowner. Landowners
would be more reluctant to sell land; in the aggregate there would be a reduction in land
offered for sale on the market. Second, land investments increase costs, but demand for land
should determine what the investment is worth. Otherwise, the government or other investors
are forced to pay for the investment mistakes of others.
Prices can vary considerably, even within a natural region. Land prices tend to
increase with better location to markets and urban centers, better soils and access to water,
higher rainfall, and rising profitability of the land investment. Prices tend to decline with
poorer soils, more arid land, and declining profitability. Psychic costs and benefits associated
with rural lifestyles are also important but in practice immeasurable. Inflation has an
important effect on land prices over time. The ability of the government to perform a better
job than the land market in determining land prices is slim, and the risk of doing worse is
high.
Clearly, there are differences of opinion between commercial farmers and government
over what constitutes a fair price for land. The fact that government has been dissatisfied with
past offers implies a felt need to impose a ceiling on land prices, at least in certain situations.
The Land Acquisition Bill shifts economic power from the land seller to the government.121
Under the former system, the government acted as buyer of first resort and declined the
opportunity to purchase land if prices were too high. Under the new policy, the government
has the power to "force" sales at predetermined land values. While government has
emphasized its intent to be flexible and to negotiate with farmers, one senses a desire to
decouple land values from prices determined by market supply and demand. Land assessments
in market economies are usually pegged to market prices. The criteria to be used by real
estate assessors are far from clear.
Unless sales are coerced, ceilings on land prices will have five principal outcomes:
► The government will have a higher demand for land than will realistically
come to market (redistributing 6.9 million hectares would thus require some
compulsion to sell).
► Incentives for land improvement will decline. Investment returns are derived
from its use and liquidation value to meet future financial uncertainties.
Controls on land prices would lessen the expected conversion value of the
fixed asset into a financial asset, thus reducing returns on investment.
► The collateral value of agricultural land in designated areas would decline,
thereby decreasing the supply of credit in agriculture.
► At any effective land-price ceiling, sellers have the incentive to sell marginal
lands and keep land with higher use value or intrinsic qualities.
► Urbanization tends to increase the value of land above its use value in
agriculture. Basing agricultural land only on its value in agricultural production
would prevent an adequate supply of land from coming to market for nonfarm
uses.
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9.4.3 DESIGNATED AREAS FOR LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT
Government has long seen the major drawback of the willing buyer-willing seller
approach as its inability to control the location of the land acquired and to acquire land in
blocks of sufficient size. A figure representing government's sense of how large is large
enough has not been seen, but if a typical resettlement scheme is to accommodate 500
families, and a settlement of 52,000 families has required 3,387,614 hectares of land, or
about 65 hectares per household, then 500 families require very roughly 32,000 hectares,
more than ten times the size of the average LSCS farm. Government's rejection of many farms
consisting of several thousand hectares of good land offered by willing sellers has been
justified on the ground that these farms are too small for effective administration as a
resettlement scheme.
32. See Roth (1992) for price trends in South African farmland.122
The block approach was defined by government and incorporated into the draft of the
Land Acquisition Act which was submitted to Parliament before the seriousness of the
constitutional impediment became clear. An Interministerial Land Identification Advisory
Committee was set up at that time to select large blocks of land on the basis of certain
criteria, including availability of water and suitable soils, and to give advice to a Land
Selection Committee, which recommends acquisitions to the minister. Agreements of sale
were then to be negotiated with each of the farms within the block. When an agreement was
reached on price, each farm was to be acquired. As presented in the "Intensive Settlement
Policies and Procedures" (MLRRD 1985, p. 11), there is no explicit element of compulsion,
and so the scheme might have met constitutional requirements. But without compulsion, such
an approach is clearly unworkable. Some, indeed most, of the holders in the blocks could
refuse to sell.
According to government, controlling the number and size of farms to acquire land
would result in the acquisition of pieces of farms on scattered farm units. The government
feels strongly that large resettlement schemes are required to spread the costs of infrastructure
development—access roads, dip tanks, boreholes, staff housing, clinics, and schools—over
a greater number of settlers. By "designating" lands, the government is seeking to acquire
blocks sufficient in size to establish large-scale resettlement schemes. While the government
in the past has tried to acquire land in large blocks of upward of 6,000 hectares to achieve
these economies of scale, most of the large farms and blocks of underutilized lands have
already been acquired. In 1988, only 1,267.3 million hectares remained on farms in excess
of 4,000 hectares in the higher rainfall zones of Manicaland and Mashonaland. Only 855.7
thousand hectares remain if farms greater than 6,000 hectares are considered. Most of the
largest farms are located in Masvingo and Matabeleland in NRs IV and V.
Designating areas would involve the immediate set-aside of blocks of land (e.g.,
> 30,000 ha) for resettlement. Their location would be determined by government.
Commercial farmers with land in a designated block would be given a fixed time horizon
(e.g., 10 years) to sell to the government.
33 Landholders with farms outside the designated
areas are assured that their land will not be claimed by government in the future. Commercial
farmers within the designated areas will be able to acquire farms in other areas with
guarantees that they will not be asked to move again. Commercial farms may not immediately
sell out, yet the increased certainty of knowing that land for resettlement will be available at
a future date will help soften political demands for immediate large-scale resettlement. While
certainty is a major benefit, the policy has severe shortcomings:
33. According to Masoka (1993), the government will let "efficient" farmers stay on the land and
live side-by-side with the settlers to avoid output losses. But this intent is contravened by provisions
mandating maximum farm sizes and one farm per individual. It has yet to be seen how efficient
farmers will be distinguished from the inefficient. The current proposed criteria—underutilized land,
derelict land, and speculation—seem too vague to confer genuine security to commercial farmers living
in designated areas.123
► Smaller farms could be acquired then later pooled to form a block. But it
would be highly unnatural for contiguous parcels in a large area to be put up
for sale on the market at the same time. Holding parcels for long periods of
time entails significant opportunity and holding costs by the government.
► Commercial farmers within designated areas have incentives to accelerate
depreciation of fixed-place investment (by curtailing maintenance), to divest
assets, and to mine the land of its natural resources unless there are expecta-
tions of full compensation.
► Commercial fanners living in designated areas disproportionately bear the
policy cost. Sellers must incur the transactions' cost of reallocating wealth
from land to other assets (stocks, agribusiness, etc.). Land prices in undesig-
nated areas would be driven sharply higher due to the added demand of
farmers exiting designated areas and to the reduced supply of land in the LSCS,
resulting in a loss of purchasing power of those being displaced.
34 Converse-
ly, commercial farms outside designated areas receive a windfall gain as
farm-asset values increase. The staggering of payments would further reduce
the sale price to the seller because of inflation, unless government raises the
purchase price to take future inflation into account or it makes the payment in
the form of long-term bonds at competitively determined market rates.
► It is questionable whether, after selling out, large-scale farmers would acquire
land elsewhere in NRs II, III, and IV. Once uprooted from their homes, the
transaction cost of moving out of agriculture has already been incurred. Capital
would need to be reallocated to homesteads, farm buildings, utilities, tobacco
barns, and land improvements. The decision to reinvest will depend heavily
on family circumstances (age, children) and on alternative investment and
employment opportunities outside of agriculture.
► The policy does not discriminate against inefficient farmers. For the policy to
achieve its outcome of redistributing 5.0 million hectares, most farmers in a
designated area would have to liquidate their landholdings. The losses in farm
output under the designated area approach are thus higher than under
quasi-land market options.
► Rather than achieving a more integrated agricultural sector, the government
runs the risk of developing enclaves geographically separated from the
commercial sector, and dependent on government for support services.
Possibilities for diffusion of technology and improved management skills from
34. Farmers selling land to the government would receive a price pegged to its use value in
agricultural production. However, the price they must pay to buy land outside the designated areas
would be market determined and in theory higher due to the same white farming population's bidding
for a reduced supply of agricultural land in the Lscs.124
large-scale producers to settler farmers are weakened by large-scale resettle-
ment. Despite a commendable effort at redistributing land since 1980, the
government has done a less than exemplary job at providing infrastructure on
schemes and at improving settlers' access to research, extension, and markets.
The removal of commercial farmers from designated areas increases the
burden of government to provide these services.
► Current resettlement policies ignore the large population of laborers on
commercial farms. By establishing facilities only for resettlement populations,
the plan disregards potential economies of scale in locating public schools and
clinics according to the total population. Costs per settler may increase, but the
social cost is lower once school and health costs are spread over settlers and
the families of farm workers combined. Resettlement costs can be recovered
through taxation. Those large-scale producers currently providing good
education and health care would incur no additional cost (higher taxes are
offset by lower education costs). Commercial farms providing poor care would
incur higher costs. Overall, the quality of education and health comes under
greater public scrutiny and standards.
Once government policies are cast toward the social development of farm laborers and
settlers alike, most of the justification for large block development is weakened. Possibilities
would be opened for acquiring and settling smaller parcels of land. Between April 1986 and
September 1989, land offers totaling 1.15 million hectares were rejected because either the
price was too high and/or the farm size was too small. The mean sizes of these farms were
in excess of 1,000 to 2,000 hectares. Such farms, had they been acquired, would have
permitted a substantial increase in the size of the resettlement sector. A 1,000-hectare farm
would be quite adequate for settling 50 families at 20 hectares per farm. This small-scale
resettlement model would enable smallholders to take advantage of already existing physical
infrastructure around commercial farms; resettlement based on model A accelerated schemes
would enable immediate settlement of settlers on the land; there is greater possibility for
diffusion of technology from commercial farmers to settlers; and possibilities are opened for
commercial farms in the vicinity of resettlement areas to play the role of a nucleus estate
under the model C construct.
9.4.4 LAND TAX
Land taxation has long been considered an optimal way of raising revenues from
agriculture; bringing about redistribution of land and wealth, chiefly from large- to
smallholders; and inducing more efficient land utilization. An agricultural land tax can be
based either on the value of land or on the size of individual landholdings. Chelliah (1986)
has correctly noted that the land asset is price inelastic; an increase or decrease in its price
will not significantly affect market transactions in the aggregate. But it does affect the very
inefficient users, who, because of lack of resources to invest in land, may have no other
opportunity but to sell. A well-functioning land market would provide them with the chance
to exit agriculture.125
Governments generally prefer fixed taxes per unit of land area because they are easier
to administer. Taxes based on area do not affect incentives to increase output per unit of land.
Producers, however, prefer income taxes or taxes levied per unit of output because taxes vary
proportionately with drought and other uncertainties that affect yields. Following are several
tax considerations.
A fixed property tax is preferable to an income tax in redistributing wealth since
income taxes are zero if land is idle. However, requiring individuals to pay both high
property taxes and high income taxes is unreasonable and potentially regressive against
agriculture. One option is to make income taxes deductible from property tax payments.
A land tax lowers land values accruing to the landlord, thus decreasing capital asset
value. Owners of larger farms (assuming they are relatively inefficient) will tend to sell,
particularly if tax rate structures are progressive, and costless subdivision enables downsizing
of property. Because land prices are highly price inelastic, any increase in land taxes is
capitalized in lower land prices.
Inefficient producers are most affected. Efficient producers must pay higher taxes, but
inefficient producers investing the least resources in agriculture are affected the most
negatively. A tax forces either use of the land to generate income to pay the tax or lease of
the land for the same purpose. Otherwise, threat of tax foreclosure forces sale of land on the
market.
Large-scale commercial farms already pay taxes to rural councils, which use revenues
for executing, maintaining, or operating roads and bridges within the council area. The Rural
Councils Act makes provisions for four different types of levy, only two of which can be
imposed at the same time: a rural tax, a special rural tax, a rural rate, and a special rural
rate. In urban areas of the council, an urban rate and a special urban rate may also be levied.
Hence, a land tax on commercial farms is not without precedent.
Given these considerations, the following recommendations are made with regard to
tax policy:
► Tax rates should be levied to help raise revenue for resettlement; however, any
taxes levied should be carefully coordinated with the Rural Councils to avoid
excessive taxation.
► The tax base should be broadened to avoid excessive taxation of the commer-
cial sector. A head tax imposed on communal areas through district councils.
A land tax would be difficult to assess because of communal grazing. Tax
rates should be high enough to cover administrative costs and to generate
sufficient revenue. Tax revenues should be spent in improving infrastructure
in communal areas. Federal resources would be freed for reallocation to
resettlement programs.126
► Any consideration to raising land taxes should involve a thorough evaluation
of general taxes in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's current tax structures already are
some of the highest in the world.
► Previous studies (Chelliah 1986) have recommended taxes on the basis of rated
value of output. Given the precedent established in the rural councils and the
unnecessarily complicated nature of output taxing schemes, it is recommended
that a progressive land tax be levied per unit of land area.
► Powers will need to be widened to allow tax revenues to be spent on education
and health, beyond simple road and bridge development.
Some of the proposals, such as a legislative recommendation discussed in the ministry
in the early 1980s, specifically target unutilized or underutilized land and impose a frankly
punitive tax, in this case, 20 percent of the value of the land annually. The approach suffers
from the difficulty of defining and monitoring utilization. As Moyo (1987, p. 173) suggests,
in debates about underutilization it is usually not the facts which are in dispute. It is generally
acknowledged that only roughly 5 percent of the land in large-scale commercial farms is
under cultivation at any given time. But there are vast differences in assumptions,
interpretations, and definitions. Different assumptions about the extent of arable land (which
differs with farming technology), necessary fallow, land required for conservation measures,
and the like, make vast differences in conclusions. So do definitions: does underutilized mean
unprofitably utilized or not used as profitably as might be the case if resettled?
A tax targeted on underutilized land has the further disadvantage of lack of control of
what comes on the market; the pieces of land forced onto the market would likely be of lesser
potential and widely scattered. If a definition of underutilization similar to that in the Land
Acquisition Act were used, it is questionable whether much land would be affected.
An obvious alternative is a land tax which is not so directly targeted on underutilized
land, but simply based on the assessed value of land. Such a tax would be to the disadvantage
of those who were not using land productively, targeted or not. Its impact on productive
landholders could be reduced or even canceled out by allowing the land tax to be offset
against the income tax, as proposed by Green (1985) and endorsed by Cliffe (1986, p. 88).
The World Bank's land subsector study (1986, p. 25) endorses a land tax as a stimulant to
the land market. Such a tax has also been recommended as a means of reducing land prices,
both because an asset encumbered by a financial obligation is worth less and because
significant amounts of land forced onto the market at the same time could even more
substantially lower land prices. Such a tax could be used as a source of revenue for
government to allow it to purchase the land which the tax pushes onto the market, attacking
the problem from both ends (Bratton 1990). There are some obvious trade-offs among these
objectives; Green's setoff against income taxes would not be so useful for a land tax
conceived as a major revenue-earner to finance land acquisitions, nor would it be very helpful
in the case of a tax which was intended to force divestiture of underutilized portions of farm
operations which are relatively profitable overall.127
The case for a land tax was discussed in the Chavanduka report (1982, p. 165), but
it was concluded there that an equitable and efficient land tax would be expensive to initiate
and administer. More recently, a thorough review of Zimbabwe's tax system (Commission
of Inquiry into Taxation 1986, pp. 228-36) considered again the case for a land tax. It noted
that a land tax that is less than the rental value of a given piece of land is an efficient way
of raising revenues since it does not penalize productivity. It is not the proper way, the report
continues, of obtaining relatively fertile land for resettlement since the land to be first offered
would be that whose yields could not meet labor and other variable costs and the tax. Because
utilization is so difficult to evaluate, no tax based on extent of utilization could be
recommended. But the commission concluded that a land tax is needed to raise revenue and
to mitigate inequalities in the distribution of good quality land. The report suggests that a
mild progressiveness, based on the rated value of output, would be justified. The consultant
considers that such an assessment might pose difficulties in assessment and penalize
productivity. The redistributive objective might be better served by progressiveness based
simply on area of land held.
A further issue concerns the destination of revenues from a land tax. Some proponents
recommend the tax as a means of generating revenue for land acquisition by government. But
Zimbabwe already has a land tax: the development levies and rates by which rural district
councils finance their activities and local infrastructure. Both the Chavanduka report (1982,
p. 238) and the Commission of Inquiry into Taxation (1986, p. 236) conclude that the
appropriate niche for a land tax in the national system of taxation is the generation of
revenues to support local government and its activities. This conclusion is supported by
experience elsewhere: a relatively simple land tax can be assessed and administered
effectively by local government with quite modest capabilities in financial administration,
partly because the asset taxed is immovable and local.
There is need to coordinate subdivision policy with any land tax which is calibrated
to force land onto the market. Patterns of utilization on commercial farms are very uneven,
the typical case being an intensively utilized farm core together with a large area in far less
intensive uses. A land tax will likely incline an owner to dispose of the less intensively
utilized portion of his farm. Only if subdivision is permitted will this be possible. If
subdivision is not permitted, the tax incentives to sell off less intensively utilized land are
undermined by requiring simultaneous loss of a more profitable asset.
More information would be needed about the economics of the commercial farms to
work out exactly how such a tax might be framed and the level of the tax. It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that the effectiveness of this tax approach will depend on getting the
level of the tax right. But several parameters can be suggested for consideration: such a tax
should not be imposed on "underutilized" land but on all land; it should be progressive with
area of land rather than on some other basis; it should be locally administered; the first call
on revenues from the tax should be the expenses of local government, though other revenue
produced might be used to fund land acquisitions; and a liberalization of subdivision policy
would be needed to allow the tax to have its desired redistributive effect.128
Such a tax could be utilized as an adjunct to either a willing buyer-willing seller
program or a compulsory acquisition program. In the former case, government would
continue to purchase land and distribute it, but presumably at a somewhat suppressed price
and with coming onto the market from which to choose. In the latter case it would simply be
used to lower land prices. As will be suggested later, there are reasons why a compulsory
acquisition approach should not be placed on the underutilized land criterion. Imposition of
such a tax would require legislation but not a constitutional amendment.
9.4.5 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The pros and cons of the various approaches can be summarized as follows.
Any approach which relies upon a determination of underutilization, whether a
tax/land market or a compulsory acquisition approach, is likely to become seriously bogged
down in disputes over interpretation and produce extended uncertainty as to impact. A land
tax on all the holding (and all holdings) would provide much greater certainty as to impact,
as would a ceilings approach which allows the owner to select the portion to be retained.
All the above options, however, would tend to produce land for resettlement which
is scattered and consists of less intensively developed portions of existing farms. While this
would make resettlement administration and provision of services more complex and possibly
more costly, it would at the same time minimize the problem of LSCS farm-wage labor, which
is concentrated on the more intensively utilized portions of farms which would not be
affected.
Compulsory acquisition of whole farms in large blocks would produce better quality
land under more complex, intensive use and management patterns, would provide a high level
of predictability once announced, and would simplify and possibly reduce the costs of
resettlement administration and provision of services. It would, however, exacerbate the LSCS
farm-wage labor problem.
Any imagined advantage of acquiring whole operational farms should also be
discounted, given that model B, intended for LSCS management in that case, has performed
so poorly. On the other hand, the problem of LSCS farm-wage labor seems to be one of the
most critical facing the resettlement program, and the acquisition of whole farms would
greatly intensify this problem.
Imposing tighter regulations on the land market would release land for resettlement.
Commercial farmers in the aggregate would suffer welfare losses. Settler farms would be the
direct beneficiaries of the land transfer. Land released for resettlement would likely be
smaller parcels, widely dispersed. Government costs are low once ceilings are set. A number
of limitations, however, make them intractable from the standpoint of implementation.
Determining appropriate levels of ceilings or prices is extremely difficult and the risks and
costs of incorrectly setting levels prohibitively high. Land ceilings exacerbate producers'
flexibility to respond to changing economies of scale on the upside. Changing prices and129
technology, which in turn alter economies to scale, greatly confound attempts to establish
ceilings. Controls on land prices will reduce the flow of land onto the market, and fixed-place
investment in land will tend to decline. In the case of both ceilings on land areas and prices,
farmers have the incentive to rid themselves of the worst farms. Both policies indiscriminately
affect both efficient and inefficient producers alike.
Designating areas for resettlement has different aims, principally to achieve economies
to scale in resettlement, that run counter to the expected effects of tighter regulations on the
land market. Land ceilings and to a lesser extent controls on land prices would result in
smaller farms with the poorest quality land being sold on the market, or the most marginal
lands being sold off (if subdivision is possible and the cost low). Both result in many
dispersed areas of land available for acquisition. Designating large areas (60,000+ ha each)
would achieve economies to scale given current modes of resettlement, but engenders two
problems. The policy discriminates against the efficient and inefficient producers alike within
the designated area and provides a windfall gain to commercial producers living outside the
area. By establishing enclaves of settlers of such large magnitudes, the possibility for
integration of smallholder agriculture with commercial agriculture is retarded. Further the
"economics of scale" rationale for designated areas is based only on the settler population,
and ignores the population of commercial farm workers in the establishment of schools,
clinics, and so forth.
As a counter to the above proposals, this paper recommends relaxing restrictions on
the land market to ease the flow of land resources from the commercial sector to the
resettlement sector. Available evidence indicates that real land prices offered by commercial
landowners are not excessively high once inflation and the profitability of agriculture are
taken into account. Further, the large number of "offers" of sale of land to the government
indicates that the market is sufficiently robust. However, restrictions against the subdivision
of farms, allowing smaller portions to be sold off, present a major barrier to the downsizing
of the LSCS and to the release of land for resettlement. A land tax (all land)/land market
measure, progressive with the size of the holding, coupled with a continued willing
buyer-willing seller program ought to be imposed to help pay for land acquisition and to
facilitate sale of land by the most efficient producers. A better functioning land market
combined with taxation leaves the decision of who exits agriculture (through the decision of
sale) to current landowners, provides the flexibility to farms of downsizing by selling off
underutilized portions, and further discriminates against the most inefficient of producers.
However, while taxation can help provide revenue for land acquisition and drive down the
cost of acquired land, donor support will still be needed to help finance land acquisition costs
and support for the resettlement program.130
9.5 LAND TENURE REFORM
9.5.1 COMMUNAL SECTOR
The priority need, and precondition, for any tenure reform in the communal areas
which will result in other than more confusion is the establishment of an effective institutional
framework at community level for development and land administration.
► Basic legislation to define the roles and powers of the WADCOS and VIDCOs
is needed. For purposes of land administration, the VIDCO should be the
critical institution. The objective should be to create an effective local
institution (a more effective VIDCO), empower it with respect to management
of its land resources, and link it to MLARR in a relationship in which MLARR
plays an advisory and supportive rather than a planning role.
► The VIDCOS should be given legal capacity and made more democratic by
having their entire membership elected.
► To empower the VIDCOs, title to the land should be transferred to the VIDCOs
from the state.
So far as substantive rules of tenure for arable land are concerned:
► Customary rules can be retained for most arable land, but freehold should be
available where the VIDCO decides that it is appropriate for the community as
a whole, in which case MLARR should carry out the process of demarcation
and registration of title on a systematic basis, or on application by an individ-
ual landholder for his parcel or parcels for a particular purpose, in which case
the applicant shall bear the legal and survey costs.
► The changing attitude toward transactions in land in communal areas should
be legally recognized, the permissible limits of transactions established, and
the enforceability of such contractual relationships affirmed through an
amendment to the Communal Lands Act. Research should precede such
legislation to establish de facto norms.
► The single most urgent need of women with respect to access is creation of a
legal framework for widows which gives them a secure right to a portion of
their late husband's land during their own lifetime. A law on transactions
should allow a VIDCO to refuse an application to sell based on the wife's
objections, both for transactions under the customary system and for sales
where full private ownership has been instituted.
Land use planning should be confined to a pilot basis in a variety of areas and should
not be expanded until some positive results—economic results—are evident. VIDCOs should131
be able to veto any proposed land use plan in whole or in part, and only on adoption by the
VIDCO should any plan be implemented.
► Attempts at villagization should be dropped and replaced by a "magnet"
strategy whereby social services are provided at a central site and households
allowed to judge the balance of costs and benefits involved in a move to that
site.
► Attempts at consolidation of arable land are in most cases likely to produce
less efficient land use than current opportunistic strategies. It should be
undertaken only where a special case can be made for it, as for a community
irrigation project.
► Land use planning should focus on demarcation of village areas and consoli-
dation and demarcation of the grazing commons. The emphasis should be on
institutional development, with grazing associations being given much more
adequate constitutions, legal personality, and title to grazing commons.
Dispute settlement would need to be handled differently in a system in which
ownership rights emerged and in which the legal validity of transactions was recognized.
Provision should eventually be made for land disputes to be taken into the court system. This
might involve restoring the power to hear certain categories of land disputes (e.g., inheritance
disputes) to the local and primary court system.
9.5.2 COMMERCIAL SECTOR
► Government needs to reexamine its assumptions about scale and modernization
of agriculture and adopt a much more flexible approach to subdivision. Such
a liberalization of the land market should produce positive impacts on land
distribution and on production.
► A transition to a state leasehold system would achieve little and has some very
real dangers based on the potential for favoritism and arbitrariness within such
systems.
► There is a need to examine the state of titles in the SSCS sector, and if the
system has lost contact with the reality of landholdings in the sector, system-
atic adjudication and redeeding may be necessary. If so, a legal basis for the
process would need first to be established.
► The system of land development levels is salutary and should be maintained.
► There is a need for a new marital property regime for freehold owners in
which a husband and wife can own land jointly and make decisions regarding
it jointly, and in which the widow shares in the inheritance.132
9.5.3 RESETTLEMENT SECTOR
9.5.3.1 Model A schemes
► The residential and arable permits should be converted to a limited ownership,
which is perpetual and inheritable but cannot be subdivided except with the
consent of the scheme; which can be leased; which can be utilized as security
for credit with consent of the scheme; and which can be sold but only after a
substantial period, say twenty years.
► These permits should be jointly allocated to husband and wife and be
inheritable by the survivor for his or her lifetime.
9.5.3.2 Model B schemes
If MLARR wishes to continue to promote this model, it should limit the number of
these schemes; accept that a significant degree of subsidization of their operations is likely
to be necessary; and monitor carefully their economic performance under different regimes.
Those regimes should include property rights for the cooperatives and more effective
constitutions under an improved cooperative law, and must necessarily emphasize institutional
redesign rather than heavier subsidization through machinery, training, and management
assistance. Large investments may increase productivity per hectare and intensiveness of land
use, but they are likely to worsen the economic performance of the cooperatives and make
it impossible to replicate them on a significant scale.
Until more efficient cooperative production models have demonstrated their worth,
subdivision of operating farms acquired into model A settlement schemes must be accepted
and other means found of conducting functions (not usually production) which need to be
done on a larger scale. Government should seek to utilize input-supply, marketing, and
multipurpose cooperatives to perform on that larger scale those functions which they have
elsewhere demonstrated themselves capable of performing.
► A new cooperative law is required to provide an adequate framework for
cooperative production enterprises and to protect the interests of members as
they enter and leave the cooperative.
► Membership should be recruited primarily from displaced commercial farm
labor.
► The cooperatives should be given ownership of their land and be responsible
for regulating distribution and use of land among their members.
► The cooperatives should have the right, if they so desire, to dissolve
themselves and distribute the land in ownership among their members, on
terms similar to those envisaged above for model A schemes, and create other133
cooperative forms to meet nonproduction needs such as input purchase and
marketing.
In both model A and model B schemes, common pasture management should generally
be organized on the same basis as in the communal land communities. Where individualiza-
tion of pasture is possible given rainfall and other resource endowments, it should be pursued.
9.5.3.3 Model C schemes
► Options to purchase contained in leases should be honored where these exist.
► The Zunde model appears to have little potential because it would attempt to
entrust vastly complicated management tasks to a cooperative, which has little
ability in this area.
► An alternative which deserves consideration is individualization of most
production coupled with use of the Chinese production responsibility system
for the core estate and particular nonproduction tasks in the larger operation.
9.5.3.4 Model D schemes
► The objective should be the actual integration of the former freehold land into
the landholding on the communal area community by merger with that
community's land or, in case of several communities, by deeding the land to
them jointly, subject to an agreement among the communities on coordinated
use.
9.5.3.5 ARDA projects
► Unprofitable schemes should, if capital-starved, be made the subject of joint
ventures with the private sector which can supply the capital and management
skills needed.
► Unprofitable schemes whose problems cannot be met in this manner should be
converted to settlement schemes.
► Where options to purchase exist in contracts, the exercise of the option should
be permitted, even in irrigation situations, where coordination in fanning
activities can be achieved through water user associations. Again, the
production responsibility system could provide a useful model for the core
estate.134
9.6 AGRARIAN STRUCTURE IN A POSTREFORM LAND TENURE SYSTEM
The great danger for Zimbabwe's land tenure system in the long term is that it will
continue to be largely state administered, generating an ever-larger bureaucracy, never
making the transition from reform to a postreform situation, and never allowing MLARR to
turn its full attention to the many other urgent needs of agricultural development. On the
other hand, government will have a continuing and legitimate concern about land distribution
and agrarian structure.
In classic market economies, the agrarian structure is the product of land markets
operating upon some original pattern of distribution established by simple appropriations of
land by individuals and/or allocations of land by the community or state. Through the
operation of the land market, agrarian structure changes with other transformations in the
economy as development proceeds. Sizes of units increase or decrease and distributions
change depending on changes in relative factor prices and other economic changes.
Interventions in land markets are not at all unusual to manage change. In most socialist
systems, by contrast, agrarian structure is stipulated by planners, with the stipulations
modified as necessary as other circumstances change, to achieve the objectives of public
policy.
Zimbabwe, as part of its colonial heritage, has acquired a stipulated agrarian structure.
The colonial state intervened to acquire large areas of the best land in the country for
European settlement. That a colonial power whose internal economy relied heavily on market
mechanisms should have put such a stipulated system in place may be a little surprising, but
it is only a particular case of a more general phenomenon: market forces in colonial Africa
were founded upon an elaborate base of legal and administrative compulsion (Seidman 1968).
In Zimbabwe, a large-scale agriculture was created for settlers, and to serve it, the state
developed extension and marketing institutions which effectively interfaced with that
agriculture. African landholdings were restricted to reserves on which crowding, a low level
of technology, and restricted market access created a pattern of small peasant holdings
producing primarily for their owners' family consumption.
A basis was thus created upon which land markets could have begun to operate, but
two public policies led the colonial government to dramatically restrict the operation of a land
market. First, lines of racial segregation of landholding hardened over time, excluding
Africans from the land market in the freehold areas. Second, when opportunities to participate
in that market did exist, a preoccupation with maintaining a scale of operation which could
provide a certain standard of living prevented the subdivision of large farms. Smaller holdings
became available for Africans only in the small African Purchase Areas—again a stipulated,
segregated, tenure sector, which has become today's "Small Commercial Farm Sector." This
structure of agriculture and others like it in eastern and central Africa have proved durable.
The stark dualism within the land tenure systems of the former settler colonies—LSCS, SSCS,
communal, resettlement—has been difficult to erase or even blur.135
Zimbabwe's program of resettlement seeks to restipulate the country's agrarian
structure. Government has approached the problem of an unacceptable structure of agriculture
as a historical imbalance to be redressed by direct intervention to reallocate land. Government
is planning the emerging agrarian structure through its decisions about which lands to
purchase and which to reject, and how to distribute the lands purchased.
The reform seeks to break up some of the very large units into smaller units through
resettlement, and to this extent the structural change sought is consistent with current
economic thinking on scale in agriculture. In another sense, however, the structural changes
sought in the Zimbabwean reform do not accord with current economic thinking. Explanations
of the prosperity of many of the Asian countries which underwent land reforms in the years
after World War II now stress that the reforms created "unimodal" rather than "bimodal"
distributions of land, thereby distributing increased income from agriculture so as to generate
domestic demand for new goods and services and creating a new stimulus for industrial
growth (Johnston and Clark 1982). Zimbabwe's reform of its agrarian structure is primarily
a shifting of the boundaries between tenure sectors, creating a resettlement sector in which
scale and farming system resemble those in the communal areas. The size of the large-scale
commercial farm sector is reduced but the agrarian structure remains almost as strongly
bimodal as before.
The reform is a further stipulation of agrarian structure, with no role for the market
to blur sharp boundaries in recognition of the diversity of agricultural opportunities and their
different implications for scale. In terms of scale, little or no middle ground is created.
Moreover, reform will tend to stretch indefinitely into the future, so long as there are
no market mechanisms in place which adjust agricultural structure to meet new needs. Instead
of finite reform, government is liable to be drawn into second-guessing again and again the
needs created by economic change and adjusting and readjusting agrarian structure to meet
those needs. This is not desirable. Reform in its very nature implies the upsetting of
established expectations. Its objective should be to establish a new equilibrium within which
predictability exists, rather than continuing uncertainty. Reform objectives need to be
achieved, the reform program brought to closure, and the new interests secured.
Here the question of the mechanisms for adjusting agrarian structure and appropriate
tenure for farmers in the different sectors come together. Particular tenures include
specifications as to the marketability of land. Freehold tenure is a readily alienable interest
and so "contract" (the market) can act as the basic mechanism for determining agrarian
structure. Policymakers in Zimbabwe need to consider how to bring the reform to closure,
and whether markets in land rights can play an increasing role in adjusting agrarian structure
to meet new needs over time.
There are a number of suggestions made in the course of this paper concerning
stronger individual and group rights in land, implying a relaxation of direct state control over
this resource. Taken together, they can give some sense of the shape of a post-reform tenure
system for Zimbabwe and the means of arriving at that point.136
► A land tax would act as a continuing stimulant to a land market which tended
to favor more efficient producers.
► A loosening of government controls on subdivision would allow transactions
to adjust scale to meet the need for diversity of scales for various crops and
farming systems.
► In the commercial areas: ownership of land for the local communities;
legalization of leasing and borrowing; and the option for communities to deed
to their members ownership of land and, with it, the right to transfer that
ownership, subject to community controls for the benefit of household
members.
► In the model A schemes, ownership for settlers, but only alienable after
perhaps 20 years.
► In the model B schemes, ownership of land for the cooperatives, with the
authority to confer land rights up to and including ownership on their mem-
bers, possibly with a restriction on sales similar to that suggested in model A
schemes.
► In model C and ARDA nucleus/outgrower schemes, use of leaseholds with
options to purchase and redesign of core operations on the production
responsibility model.
The scene would then be set for a land market, which would diversify scale and blur
distinctions between the tenure sectors, gradually to begin operation.
Policymakers express understandable concerns about the impact of a land market on
land distribution, but these are exaggerated. The present large scale in the LUCS sector is a
social and historical artifact, not the product of economic competition among farms of
different scale. A land market will almost certainly break up those large holdings gradually,
especially if there is a significant land tax (if government does not insist upon holding them
together with prohibitions of subdivision). The possibility of accumulation on the market of
very large holdings in the communal areas seems unlikely, given the nature of this land and
its limited potential. Some degree of concentration might occur in these areas, what critics
might refer to as "kulakization" or more neutrally "peasant differentiation," but this should
be seen as part of a positive process. In the long term, there are complementarities between
differentiated households, as that in which a farmer with enough land to allow him to
purchase a tractor provides mechanized draft through tractor rental to households which farm
less because they are labor-short or rely on other sources of income. A similar process of
modest differentiation should be expected and accepted in the resettlement schemes with
individual holdings of arable land.137
Will landlessness be increased by a land market? It is not the market which may
produce landlessness but the economics of population and land. The market merely provides
a mechanism whereby a seller may take capital out of farming with him. His departure may
not be affected by whether he can sell or not. In countries in Africa with very dense
populations and substantial landlessness, such as highland Ethiopia, Lesotho, and central
Kenya, people become landless primarily through their leaving their inheritance to their
siblings and seeking opportunities elsewhere. It is not clear that the presence of a market
accelerates this creation of landlessness significantly, as opposed to simply providing a
different mechanism.
Finally, land markets can be regulated to reduce the creation of landlessness. Some
possibilities have already been suggested. The most effective regulation, however, will come
less directly through measures such as taxation, subdivision policy, and sound policies against
subsidization of mechanization, all of which should favor smaller-scale producers and promote
a continued broad distribution of land assets.139
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Chisekera Hot Springs 95
Mawari Raphia Palm 34
Tingwa Raphia Palm 290
Haroni Forest 20
Rusitu Forest 150
Sebakwe Acacia Karoo 60
Sebakwe Great Dyke 165























































Number and Area of Farms in the Large Farm





SOUTH MATABELELAND MIDLANDS VICTORIA ALL PROVINCES
(ha) No. I Area No. I Area No. I
Area No. I Area No. I Area No. I Area No. I Area
0-200 306 23,478 93 9,514 439 32,419 264 18,989 159 12,609 63 7,665 1,324 104,674
200-400 117 31,452 61 18,583 146 42,743 62 17,219 38 9,994 21 5,814 445 125,805
400-600 66 32,035 134 66,598 145 71,007 46 22,475 43 21,780 12 6,281 446 220,176
600-800 51 35,078 157 109,598 151 103,934 24 16,754 34 23,443 8 5,580 425 294,387
800-1000 57 50,391 163 145,343 123 107,906 24 21,253 36 31,997 20 18,026 423 374,916
1000-2000 179 249,109 489 681,113 405 569,186 122 172,367 137 202,065 40 57,349 1,372 1,931,189
2000-4000 110 305,102 253 678,410 214 578,377 123 356,330 144 413,926 61 171,446 905 2,503,591
4000-6000 32 155,190 48 241,493 49 239,213 57 280,967 78 382,179 25 124,693 288 1,423,735
6000-8000 10 68,002 16 108,732 24 164,817 38 267,447 36 204,806 18 120,425 142 974,229
8000-10,000 9 79,904 12 102,587 11 99,176 37 331,038 19 170,482 12 105,038 100 888,225
10,000+ 15 755,322 8 113,378 8 135,736 108 2,930,348 37 740,569 66 2,047,936 242 6,223,289
Total 952 1,285,063 I,434 2,275,349 1,7I5 2,I44,5I4 905 4,435,I87 761 2,253,850 346 2,670,253 6,I13 15,064,216











SOUTH MIDLANDS MASVINGO ALL PROVINCES
) No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area
0-200 322 23,919 70 5,807 427 29,063 19 1,231 179 12,658 120 8,792 214 17,202 59 6,530 1,410 105,202
200-400 105 29,201 45 14,186 106 30,801 15 4,532 48 13,623 41 11,246 54 14,566 20 6,042 435 124,197
400-600 61 29,286 106 54,091 96 46,875 45 22,476 25 12,659 30 14,223 46 22,813 7 3,728 415 206,161
600-800 39 26,506 122 83,169 79 54,401 44 31,189 12 8,173 26 17,902 31 21,503 10 6,797 363 249,640
800-1000 43 38,638 114 101,637 52 46,128 63 56,413 9 7,965 14 12,071 29 26,758 20 17,828 346 307,438
1000-2000 109 151,834 351 485,315 234 333,728 177 247,849 53 73,945 61 83,605 131 186,216 42 61,390 1,156 1,624,882
2000-4000 73 203,151 200 549,589 104 278,542 117 305,938 55 150,420 57 163,035 105 302,260 37 103,698 748 2,056,633
4000-6000 12 56,964 50 247,544 29 136,697 12 58,231 23 116,811 20 91,908 54 270,241 22 110,974 222 1,089,370
6000-8000 12 80,057 27 188,885 8 54,205 3 19,905 15 97,323 17 119,580 27 189,090 17 116,978 126 866,023
8000+ 10 219,346 29 328,042 3 48,634 3 52,662 45 793,200 65 1,800,318 45 837,104 64 1,764,134 264 5,843,440
Total 786 858,902 1,114 2,058,265 1,138 1,059,074 498 800,426 464 1,286,777 451 2,323,690 736 1,887,753 298 2,198,099 5,485 12,472,986











SOUTH MIDLANDS MASVINGO ALL PROVINCES
) No. I Area No. Area No. Area No. 1
Area No. I Area No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area
0-200 192 15,379 58 4,739 294 21,476 15 1,033 115 8,849 81 6,466 149 12,154 43 5,040 947 75,136
200-400 79 21,287 44 13,115 91 26,378 11 3,352 31 8,232 35 9,687 57 16,084 19 5,865 367 104,000
400-600 49 23,113 108 54,336 89 42,773 41 20,696 25 12,255 24 11,389 44 21,871 12 5,911 392 192,344
600-800 35 24,246 129 89,148 73 50,123 44 31,215 9 6,200 17 12,008 35 24,192 14 9,705 356 246,837
800-1000 38 33,115 111 98,920 69 61,465 64 57,538 6 5,329 16 13,915 30 26,246 14 12,539 348 309,067
1000-2000 96 133,841 328 454,745 212 299,944 177 247,905 39 55,577 57 81,078 115 164,022 39 53,931 1,063 1,491,043
2000-4000 64 173,166 182 497,109 108 295,902 104 273,778 36 98,666 50 143,089 95 274,115 34 97,337 673 1,853,162
4000-6000 12 55,797 40 194,194 21 99,463 12 62,190 17 87,902 18 89,985 44 214,701 18 89,473 182 893,705
6000-8000 7 47,151 23 162,238 6 38,820 2 13,611 9 63,444 18 127,625 19 131,966 15 102,184 99 687,039
8000+ 9 233,579 28 317,492 1 21,487 1 21,310 37 646,159 49 1,292,585 43 803,759 65 2,024,682 233 5,361,053
Total 581 760,674 1,051 1,886,036 964 957,831 471 732,628 324 992,613 365 1,787,827 631 1,689,110 273 2,406,667 4,660 11,213,386
Source: Central Statistics Office.145
ANNEX C
Area and Settlers in Resettlement Schemes
MODEL A MODEL AA
' MODEL B MODEL C MODEL D
Manicaland:
Number of schemes 2I 2 I9 3
Mean scheme size (ha) 23,359 3,541 I,620 4,3I6 -
Minimum size (ha) I,I35 I,996 85I 5I0 -
Maximum size (ha) I20,I26 5,086 4,657 7,000 -
Total # settlers I2,457 II4 1,4I2 508
Mean # settlers 593 57 74 I69 -
Mashonaland:
Number of schemes 29 3 43 I
Mean scheme size (ha) 23,385 I,620 I,460 260,000
Minimum size (ha) 3,033 1,475 346 260,000
Maximum size (ha) 76,795 I,709 3,962 260,000
Total # settlers 13,946 I40 3,876 4,462
Mean # settlers 48I 47 90 4,462
Matabeleland:
Number of schemes I3 7 3
Mean scheme size (ha) 25,545 I5,6I8 3,I66
Minimum size (ha) 3,035 1,7I3 2,568
Maximum size (ha) 78,965 50,728 3,857 -
Total # settlers 3,I8I 362 5I -
Mean # settlers 245 52 I7 -
Midlands:
Number of schemes I7 2 I3 -
Mean scheme size (ha) 24,211 2,I90 2,634
Minimum size (ha) 6,4I6 I,899 I,272 -
Maximum size (ha) 65,503 2,48I 5,232
Total # settlers 6,872 47 995 -
Mean # settlers 404 24 77 -
Masvingo:
Number of schemes I8 5 4 -
Mean scheme size (ha) 2I,675 2,365 1,I63
Minimum size (ha) 2,926 1,285 93I -
Maximum size (ha) 78,434 5,566 I,576 - -
Total # settlers 5,232 143 I70 -
Mean # settlers 29I 29 4 -
Total:
Number of schemes 98 I9 82 3 I
Minimum size (ha) I,I35 I,285 346 5I0 260,000
Maximum size (ha) I20,I26 50,728 5,232 7,000 260,000
Total # settlers 4I,688 806 6,504 508 4,462
a. Model A accelerated.147
ANNEX D
Growth Rates in Crop Production
Dl. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, NATIONAL
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals' 329,937 284,669 194,235 -4.8 -4 2
b
Barley 3,337 5,977 4,759 0.8 0.2
Maize 270,014 240,667 145,790 -4.3
6 -5.5
b
Sorghum 9,893 7,532 4,738 -5.0 -3.7
Wheat 26,362 34,478 38,949 6.9c ` 0.9
Industrial
s 162,941 177,162 190,636 3.4
b 0.8
Tobacco (flue) 54,603 52,939 54,103 2.3 0.0
Coffee 4,013 6,531 8,533 6.0
6 4.4'
Cotton 80,394 70,097 59,350 0.2 -1.6
Soyabeans 12,429 36,946 54,501 26.1' 4.2°
Sunflowers 3,748 1,821 7,904 -9.8° 18.7'
Groundnuts 4,802 4,084 5,032 -5.9 0.6
Dry beans 2,914 1,095 2,321 -15.1
0 8.8
Vegetables 7,872 5,035 7,900 -7.5
b 4.5
Fodder crops 86,049 64,020 55,534 4.9b -1.76
Fruit trees 5,844 3,939 4,882 -7.3' 2.4
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Significant at 10% level.
d. Missing sugarcane, tea, and other minor industrial crops.148
D2. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, NATIONAL
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 13,717 33,001 24,724 7.1 -1.1
Maize 1,216,124 1,122,894 594,472 -4.0 -5.3
Sorghum 13,534 19,832 12,864 4.2 -1.9
Wheat 102,142 163,641 202,097 10.2' 2.1
Tobacco (flue) 72,196 96,553 113,482 7.3  2.0
Coffee 2,516 7,359 10,972 20.3  6.9 
Cotton 119,674 131,244 125,282 2.9  0.3
Soyabeans 20,536 79,572 113,011 35.4 
Sunflowers 1,866 1,146 5,084 -7.9 17.5 
Groundnuts 6,463 11,191 14,743 6.5 1.4
Dry beans 1,031 547 1,947 -11.3' 15.0 
a. Significant at 5% level.
b. Significant at 10% level.
D3. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, NATIONAL
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 4,110 5,520 5,200 6.3 -1.3
Maize 4,500 4,670 4,080 0.3 0.3
Sorghum 1,370 2,630 2,720 9.7  1.9
Wheat 3,870 4,750 5,190 3.1' 1.2'
Tobacco (flue) 1,320 1,820 2,100 4.9 
Coffee 630 1,130 1,290 13.5' 2.3
Cotton 1,490 1,870 2,110 2.7 1.9'
Soyabeans 1,650 2,150 2,070 7.4  -0.2
Sunflowers 500 630 640 2.1 -1.0
Groundnuts 1,350 2,740 2,930 13.2' 0.9
Dry beans 350 500 840 4.5 5.7
a. Significant at 5% level.149
D4. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, MANICALAND
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals' 14,588 13,762 11,828 -3.9 -1.8
Barley 329 173 19 b -32.6'
Maize 13,250 6,901 4,398 -14.2' -4.5
Sorghum 78 142 95 16.0 -2.0
Wheat 1,150 6,709 7,317 34.8` 0.6
Industrial
s 14,910 17,388 19,218 2.3 1.3c
Tobacco (flue) 5,991 4,241 3,718 -2.7 -2.1
Coffee 3,902 4,952 6,456 2.9' 4.1'
Cotton 3,693 5,765 7,237 3.1 3.8'
Soyabeans 129 1,982 975 56.7' -11.0°
Sunflowers 291 89 203 -21.6' 7.2
Groundnuts 459 69 165 -35.2' 13.4
Dry beans 217 85 182 -14.8° 9.0`
Vegetables 1,163 614 824 -10.6 1.7
Fodder crops 10,001 3,338 3,039 -15.3' -1.4
Fruit trees 1,609 1,310 2,061 5.7
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
c. Significant at 5% level.
d. Significant at 10% level.
e. Missing sugarcane, tea, and other minor industrial crops.150
D5. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, MANICALAND
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 1,071 771 104 -29.8'
Maize 46,858 26,930 14,716 -14.5' -4.1
Sorghum 61 173 216 19.3 7.1
Wheat 4,002 27,689 30,598 41.0' 0.4
Tobacco (flue) 8,225 7,205 7,877 0.5 1.4
Coffee 2,509 5,580 8,182 16.3' 6.1'
Cotton 6,538 12,099 15,217 3.0 4.8
Soyabeans 239 4,766 2,273 63.0' -11.8'
Sunflowers 139 39 115 -20.9' 9.1
Groundnuts 494 162 286 -32.9° 18.1
Dry beans 61 58 434 -2.2 21.1°
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
D6. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, MANICALAND
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 3,260 4,460 5,590 4.2
Maize 3,540 3,900 3,350 -0.3 0.4
Sorghum 780 1,220 2,290 2.9 9.3
Wheat 3,480 4,130 4,180 4.6' -0.2
Tobacco (flue) 1,370 1,700 2,120 3.3° 3.5'
Coffee 640 1,130 1,270 13.1' 1.9
Cotton 1,770 2,100 2,100 -0.1 0.9
Soyabeans 1,850 2,400 2,330 -0.9
Sunflowers 480 440 560 0.9 1.7
Groundnuts 1,080 2,330 1,740 3.6 4.2
Dry beans 280 690 2,390 14.r 11.2
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Significant at 10% level.151
D7. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, MASHONALAND
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals° 247,353 243,401 164,426 -2.6' 4.2'
Barley 1,610 3,570
d 2,278 4.4
Maize 229,982 214,226 128,739 -3.6' -5.6'
Sorghum 7,303 6,406 3,794 -2.3 -4.4'
Wheat 9,531 21,578 29,616 19.4' 3.7
Industrial' 124,705 141,627 161,900 4.5' 1.6
Tobacco (flue) 48,373 48,573 50,060 2.8 0.1
Coffee 68 1,348 1,667
d 5.2
Cotton 57,247 53,568 47,039 1.2 -1.0
Soyabeans 11,373 32,184 51,736 25.3' 5.5'
Sunflowers 2,257 1,099 6,255 -12.0° 22.9'
Groundnuts 2,908 3,788 4,563 2.0 0.3
Dry beans 2,186 764 1,639 -15.7' 7.6
Vegetables 4,711 3,001 5,533 -8.5' 6.3
Fodder crops 64,695 52,699 45,275 -3.4' -1.7'
Fruit trees 2,504 1,766 2,133 -6.3' 2.1
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Significant at 10% level.
d. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.152
D8. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, MASHONALAND
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 6,492 19,245 11,152 -6.7
Maize 1,089,884 1,019,844 536,975 -3.7 -3.9
Sorghum 8,345 17,739 11,071 10.5 -2.5
Wheat 41,647 111,493 162,487 22.3
6 4.6
Tobacco (flue) 63,734 89,204 105,063 8.1
6 2.1
Coffee 67 1,579 7,792 21.5
6
Cotton 77,555 94,324 95,566 5.1
6 1.5
Soyabeans 18,777 69,412 106,992 34.9
6 5.2
6
Sunflowers 1,164 777 3,938 -8.6 19.7
6
Groundnuts 4,348 10,545 13,741 13.3
6 1.3
Dry beans 740 368 1,199 -11.0 14.2
6
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
D9. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, MASHONALAND
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 4,030 5,390 4,900 -2.5
6
Maize 4,740 4,760 4,170 -0.1 1.8
Sorghum 1,140 2,770 2,920 13.0
6 1.9
Wheat 4,370 5,170 5,490 2.4
6 0.1
6
Tobacco (flue) 1,320 1,840 2,100 5.1
6 1.96
Coffee 980 1,130 4,680 15.5
Cotton 1,350 1,760 2,100 3.8
6 2.6
6
Soyabeans 1,650 2,160 2,070 7.7
6 -0.3
Sunflowers 520 710 630 3.9 -2.6
Groundnuts 1,500 2,780 3,010 11.1
6 1.0
Dry beans 340 480 730 5.6° 6.2
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Significant at 10% level.153
D10. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, MATABELELAND
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals° 8,681 7,481 3,880 -2.0
6 -8.5
6
Barley 28 0 132
Maize 6,753 5,137 2,437 4.66 -9.4
6
Sorghum 882 268 413 -18.7
6 4.4
Wheat 1,037 2,076 898 18.3
6 -11.1
6
Industrial" 1,091 1,263 1,704 11.7
6 1.8
Tobacco (flue) 1 0 0 °
Coffee 0 0 2
c
Cotton 573 685 1,345 8.7 9.4
6
Soyabeans 63 588 125 100.9
6 -28.2 
Sunflowers 110 153 179 5.8` -1.7
Groundnuts 366 117 54 -17.3° -13.2
Dry beans 55 67 57 2.2 °
Vegetables 743 736 713 1.9 1.8
Fodder crops 5,147 3,156 2,494 -8.1
6 -3.1
6
Fruit trees 580 432 482 -5.8
6 0.4
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
d. Missing sugarcane, tea, and other minor industrial crops.
e. Significant at 10% level.154
D11. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, MATABELELAND
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 72 0 614
a a
Maize 22,089 20,557 9,052 -0.4 -9.6'
Sorghum 882 369 637 -13.5
b 11.7
Wheat 4,079 7,335 3,789 16.2
b -9.3
b
Tobacco (flue) 2 0 0 a a
Coffee 0 0 2 a a
Cotton 1,001 1,894 3,592 19.1' 9.5'
Soyabeans 87 1,156 152 110.9' -30.3'
Sunflowers 43 67 109 10.1 5.0
Groundnuts 545 368 109 -9.1 -17.9
Dry beans 18 26 32 9.8
a
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
D12. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, MATABELELAND
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 2,570 0 4,670 a a
Maize 3,270 4,000 3,710 4.4 -0.3
Sorghum 1,000 1,380 1,540 6.4 7.0
Wheat 3,930 3,530 4,220 -1.8 2.0
Tobacco (flue) 2,000 0 0 a a
Coffee 0 0 1,000 a a
Cotton 1,750 2,760 2,670 9.6
b 0.1
Soyabeans 1,380 1,970 1,220 5.0 -3.0
Sunflowers 390 430 610 4.0 6.9
Groundnuts 1,490 3,150 2,010 9.9' -5.4
Dry beans 340 390 560 7.4
a
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.155
D13. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, MIDLANDS
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals' 19,657 15,155 10,974 -5.8
6 -3.5
Barley 527 2,011 2,335 24.3 15.9
Maize 15,546 11,678 7,781 -6.8
6 -4.4
6
Sorghum 1,133 624 150 -9.3 -14.3°
Wheat 2,803 2,183 709 -0.9 -14.9
Industrial(' 4,738 3,100 3,601 -1.5 1.2
Tobacco (flue) 207 127 176 -11.66
Coffee 0 12 189 °
Cotton 2,728 2,028 624 -2.4 -12.96
Soyabeans 388 1,288 1,398 23.4
6 0.1
Sunflowers 673 356 1,010 -2.5 11.6
Groundnuts 842 70 206 -35.0
6 12.8
Dry beans 140 99 56 -6.8 -8.7
Vegetables 378 254 246 I. -1.7
Fodder crops 4,208 3,789 2,591 -3.4 -5.6
6
Fruit trees 141 63 116 -14.1
6 6.7
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Significant at 10% level.
d. Missing sugarcane, tea, and other minor industrial crops.
e. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.156
D14. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, MIDLANDS
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 2,252 12,121 12,854 32.2 14.8
Maize 43,176 43,538 27,330 -1.6 -3.8
Sorghum 1,163 1,368 231 1.9 -17.3 
Wheat 12,072 10,162 3,609 -0.5 -14.1
Tobacco (flue) 206 161 270 -7.1
b
Coffee 0 14 252
b b
Cotton 2,968 3,552 1,110 4.8  -12.6`
Soyabeans 549 2,568 3,254 32.1° 1.3
Sunflowers 281 153 713 -1.6 17.3
Groundnuts 779 81 556 -28.2
c 20.8
Dry beans 48 40 18 -3.4 -14.8
a. Significant at 10% level.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
D15. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, MIDLANDS
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 4,270 6,030 5,510 6.4 -1.0
Maize 2,780 3,730 3,510 5.5 0.7
Sorghum 1,030 2,190 1,550 12.3  -3.5
Wheat 4,310 4,660 5,090 0.3 1.0
Tobacco (flue) 1,000 1,270 1,540 5.0 
Coffee 0 1,140 1,330
Cotton 1,090 1,750 1,780 7.3  0.4
Soyabeans 1,410 1,990 2,330 7.1
b 1.1
Sunflowers 420 430 710 1.0 5.1
Groundnuts 930 1,160 2,170 10.6 7.1
Dry beans 340 400 310 3.7 -6.7
a. Significant at 10% level.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.157
D16. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, MASVINGO
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(ha) (ha) (ha) (%) (%)
Cereals' 17,230 4,496 3,108 -17.8
6 -5.0
Barley 1,063 0 0
Maize 4,482 2,492 2,435 -11.66 -0.1
Sorghum 497 108 289 -28.2
6 17.8
6
Wheat 11,896 1,932 385 -20.66 -20.2
6
Industrial(' 15,393 9,391 4,045 -3.4 -10.1
6
Tobacco (flue) 32 66 300 17.9`
Coffee 44 141 220 -6.4 18.9
Cotton 14,149 8,202 3,105 -4.1 -11.2
6
Soyabeans 496 801 268 17.26 -14.1
6
Sunflowers 416 283 258 -7.6
6
Groundnuts 228 53 45 -32.r -1.1
Dry beans 249 76 390 -18.6
6 16.1
Vegetables 334 106 592 -14.1
6 26.9
Fodder crops 1,901 881 1,475 -10.1' 5.9
Fruit trees 1,010 241 97 -20.06 -11.36
a. Missing munga, rapoka, and other minor cereals.
b. Significant at 5% level.
c. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
d. Missing sugarcane, tea, and other minor industrial crops.
e. Significant at 10% level.158
D17. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, MASVINGO
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 3,830 0 0
_a _a
Maize 14,116 10,980 6,399 -8.0 -6.2
Sorghum 507 201 709 -21.3 26.9
6
Wheat 40,339 6,962 1,615 -19.7
6 -20.0
6
Tobacco (flue) 30 85 545 25.2
6 a
Coffee 38 159 197 -5.6 17.4
Cotton 32,811 19,428 6,799 -6.2
6 -11.9
6
Soyabeans 913 1,670 341 21.8
6 -18.4
6
Sunflowers 240 208 211 -6.1 -9.4
Groundnuts 296 30 52 -38.4
6
Dry beans 159 72 472 -16.6 23.3
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
b. Significant at 5% level.
D18. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, MASVINGO
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1973-75 1979-81 1987-88 1973-80 1979-88
(tons) (tons) (tons) (%) (%)
Barley 3,600 0 0
_a _a
Maize 3,150 4,410 2,630 4.0 -6.1
Sorghum 1,020 1,870 2,460 9.6 7.7
Wheat 3,390 3,600 4,200 1.1 0.3
Tobacco (flue) 950 1,290 1,820 6.2
Coffee 880 1,130 900 0.9 -1.3
Cotton 2,320 2,370 2,190 -2.2 -0.7
Soyabeans 1,840 2,080 1,270 3.9 -5.0
Sunflowers 580 740 820 1.6 -1.2
Groundnuts 1,300 570 1,170 -9.2
Dry beans 640 950 1,210 2.4 6.2
a. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.159
ANNEX E
Cropping Patterns in the Large-Scale Commercial Sector
El. LAND USE IN THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
(in hectares)
CEREAL INDUSTRIAL FODDER TREE
YEAR CROPS CROPS CROPS CROPS OTHER TOTAL
1970 277,847 148,581 30,706 5,626 87,153 549,313
1971 293,309 143,626 29,403 5,538 82,573 554,449
1972 333,029 149,642 24,581 5,841 82,207 595,300
1973 325,039 168,947 23,424 6,189 81,762 605,361
1974 313,626 199,997 16,877 5,983 77,592 614,085
1975 285,193 208,317 15,711 5,359 76,015 590,595
1976 271,085 191,531 18,756 5,228 79,835 566,435
1977 286,974 199,197 14,723 4,752 68,834 574,780
1978 263,074 215,769 12,919 4,275 67,463 563,500
1979 246,368 216,671 12,382 4,864 62,684 542,169
1980 271,969 226,583 11,189 3,663 61,428 574,832
1981 345,832 181,989 11,067 4,005 56,982 599,875
1982 320,447 197,888 11,440 3,679 51,556 585,010
1983 264,537 214,468 13,673 3,543 52,204 548,425
1984 233,946 225,796 13,673 4,062 54,445 531,922
1985 258,885 212,643 12,748 3,415 53,359 541,050
1986
1987 186,738 230,247 14,185 4,051 49,577 484,798
1988 202,776 228,409 11,978 5,710 51,681 500,554
Source: Cso Statistical Yearbook, for 1970-1983; "Crop Production of Large Scale
Commercial Farms," for 1984 and 1985; and Cso, for 1987 and 1988.E2. Historical area and production of principal crops, large-scale commercial sector
(in 000 units)
HARVEST MAIZE SORGHUM WHEAT GROUNDNUTS SOYABEANS COTTON
TOBACCO
FLUE + BURLEY COMTEE
YEAR




area Prod. Area Prod.
1973 282.2 793.0 20.5 25.6 21.3 83.9 4.1 4.4 8.2 8.8 70.5 109.7 1.8 2.3 1.6 48.8 68.9
1974 279.5 1,580.7 6.5 10.6 26.0 97.1 5.0 6.7 11.4 21.8 88.4 124.9 2.6 1.3 2.6 58.5 73.6
1975 248.3 1,274.6 2.6 4.4 31.7 125.5 5.4 8.3 17.7 31.1 82.4 124.4 3.0 1.1 3.4 65.4 84.4
1976 226.9 1,219.2 5.8 15.3 32.7 141.1 4.3 9.6 24.5 44.3 57.7 107.7 3.8 0.7 4.9 65.9 108.3
1977 235.1 1,152.2 5.5 14.5 41.9 164.3 3.1 6.3 24.0 46.6 74.6 115.2 3.6 0.9 4.3 57.1 83.8
1978 207.8 1,114.6 6.8 15.6 44.8 202.8 2.5 5.8 34.5 69.4 86.1 129.0 3.9 1.1 5.0 55.4 83.1
1979 199.4 721.9 7.5 18.9 34.3 153.0 3.2 7.5 39.6 83.6 77.0 130.2 5.0 - - 60.1 107.3
1980 227.7 910.7 6.8 16.3 32.6 154.6 3.8 10.7 40.8 89.4 74.9 145.6 6.3 - - 63.7 119.8
1981 294.8 1,736.0 8.4 24.3 36.6 183.4 5.2 15.4 30.5 65.8 58.4 118.0 8.3 - - 39.3 69.1
1982 270.4 1,143.6 7.1 16.9 37.3 191.9 4.8 14.3 48.0 88.5 52.3 104.8 5.0 4.0 6.1 45.4 88.2
1983 235.2 601.8 5.1 7.2 21.5 111.0 3.0 8.5 54.5 78.6 59.9 111.1 7.0 2.3 8.2 46.0 93.2
1984 205.0 694.6 8.8 17.6 16.9 83.8 2.0 5.4 53.5 88.4 72.2 145.3 7.3 1.4 10.0 49.6 115.8
1985 205.0 1,112.5 13.9 53.1 35.1 174.3 1.9 4.4 40.4 84.4 70.3 155.0 7.0 1.7 9.2 51.0 104.6
1986 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1987 140.6 506.6 5.7 14.4 36.1 189.8 4.9 13.0 57.4 107.9 58.6 122.6 6.7 1.8 10.6 56.3 119.9
1988 151.0 682.4 3.8 11.4 41.8 214.4 5.2 16.4 51.6 118.1 60.1 127.9 6.5 2.1 11.3 54.3 I12.7
Source: "Crop Production of Large-Scale Commercial Farms," for 1973 to 1985, and Central Statistics Office, for 1987 and 1988.161
ANNEX F
Cropping and Livestock Producer Prices
Fl. CROP PRICES PAID TO PRODUCERS, 1980 TO 1989
(in Z$/mt)




  SOYA- SUN- TOBACCO
b COFFEE
b
GHUM  (unshelled) BEANS
  FLOWERS (flue)
1979 60.3 75.7 1I4.6 344.0 360.0 I46.3 I27.3
I980 89.0 97.8 I34.7 363.0 362.0 I59.6 I45.5 795 2,200
I98I II9.I I04.7 I73.4 380.0 398.5 I69.5 I,827 1,5I2
I982 II9.6 I05.2 I86.8 497.0 426.2 I99.I I,677 I,738
I983 II9.6 I09.0 219.7 493.0 451.7 256.9 245.8 1,886 2,I47
I984 152.I I33.5 249.0 550.0 506.9 285.9 276.7 2,066 2,988
I985 178.9 I7I.8 283.7 646.0 706.3 3I9.0 314.6 2,684 3,868
I986 I77.9 I73.I 298.8 722.0 673.0 336.4 332.0 3,I33 5,479
I987 179.4 I45.5 329.3 740.0 936.6 382.9 373.8 2,I79 2,983
I988 I93.2 156.8 362.I 788.0 416.4 4I9.2 3,935 2,894
1989 2I3.0 217.I 396.8 858.0 43I.3 443.6
a. Prices for maize, sorghum, wheat, cotton, groundnuts, soyabeans, and sunflower are
official producer prices. From Will Masters, unpublished data, Ministry of Lands,
Resettlement and Rural Development, Government of Zimbabwe, Harare (1990), for
1980 and earlier; and GMB annual reports, for I98I and later.
b. Prices for tobacco and coffee are the average weighted price paid to producers by
marketing authorities (Quarterly Digest of Statistics, I990, pp. 38, 39).162
F2. PRICES PAID TO PRODUCERS OF ANIMALS AND MILK
YEAR CATTLE SHEEP PIGS
MILK (WHOLE)
CONSUMPTION
(Z$/head) (Z$/head) (Z$/head) (Z$/ton)
1975 118.2 8.6 25.6 100.1
1976 112.6 12.5 26.3 102.7
1977 120.3 13.5 26.8 103.9
1978 115.9 11.2 26.5 116.0
1979 138.3 12.7 34.5 143.5
1980 168.2 16.8 44.3 175.1
1981 210.4 21.3 55.7 215.8
1982 283.6 31.4 62.4 276.6
1983 287.3 38.6 57.8 306.9
1984 320.6 33.3 78.2 348.8
1985 324.6 31.5 93.6 390.4
1986 377.2 36.3 99.9 398.3
1987 497.0 40.9 116.4 398.1
1988
1' 480.1 36.3 114.4 392.3
a. Weighted average price paid to producers by marketing authorities
(Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 1990, pp. 40, 41).
b. Through 30 June 1988.163
ANNEX G
Communal Area Cropping Patterns
G1. HISTORICAL AREA AND PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL CROPS
(in 000)
HARVEST MAIZE RAPOKO SORGHUM MHUNGA
GROUND-
NUTS BEANS COTTON
YEAR Area Prod. Area l Prod. Area Prod. Area l Prod. Area' Prod. Areal Prod. Area[Prod.
t
I970 61I 246 53 59 I99 65 I76 55 245 30 33 I3 I4 I7
I97I 672 455 35 5I 240 I37 I9I 73 2I6 16 32 I2 I8 I6
I972 665 555 30 47 240 I20 202 II0 22I 17 27 8 30 27
I973 475 I45 69 56 122 23 225 I09 200 24 30 II 26 I3
I974 725 470 - - 275 I50 - - 290 I87 42 I2 62 55
I975 725 435 76 38 2I0 105 44I I46 310 I10 40 I8 54 40
I976 760 550 120 8I 235 I20 456 165 325 173 - - 35 28
I977 600 400 I41 87 90 36 497 I9I 275 130 35 II 35 22
1978 700 450 35 1I 120 57 254 83 200 101 43 8 41 31
I979 600 420 I50 58 76 30 233 88 240 I00 1I 4 20 15
I980 900 600 I47 6I I20 66 293 I00 I75 67 - - I5 12
198I I,000 1,000 - - 200 100 - - 300 I00 - - 59 45
1982 I,100 595 - - 200 50 - - 240 95 - - 5I 27
I983 I,050 285 - - 280 44 - - 180 23 - - 65 33
1984 I,136 454 - - 156 37 - - 144 19 - - 100 70
1985 I,018 I,558 - - 2II 76 - - II8 6I - - I30 II0
I986 1,074 1,348 - - I50 66 - - I60 64 - - II4 99
I987 943 5I8 I09 40 I64 38 I87 56 I77 55 - - I38 83
I988 I,036 1,450 I20 84 206 I60 237 184 197 106 - - I61 137
1989 920 I,062 II6 44 15I 62 I64 90 160 72 - - 153 123
Source: Data for maize, sorghum, groundnuts, beans, and cotton, for I970-I984, are from the
1987 Statistical Yearbook, and for I984-I989, from the Cso Crop Forecasting Committee. Data
for mhunga and rapoko, for 1970-I980, are from Masters (I990).164
G2. COMMUNAL AREA CROPPING PATTERNS
GROUND- SUN- To-
MAIZE RAPOKO SORGHUM MILLET NUTS COTTON FLOWER BACCO BEANS OTHER
1984/85:
Manicaland 52.0 2.4 9.5 26.5 6.4 I.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.4
Mashonaland Central 65.0 2.1 0.9 1.4 2.7 25.7 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.1
Mashonaland East 62.9 1.6 0.9 24.8 5.3 0.9 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.9
Mashonaland West 58.0 0.9 8.6 0.2 2.6 26.1 2.6 0.1 0.0 0.8
Mashonaland North 60.2 0.0 23.2 13.7 0.5 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.0
Mashonaland South 30.9 0.2 28.2 28.0 10.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.2 0.0
Midlands 56.5 6.4 6.0 3.7 5.3 18.6 2.4 0.0 0.1 1.0
Masvingo 49.0 10.0 15.3 19.0 5.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0
1985/86:
Manicaland 36.3 2.1 2.2 20.2 35.9 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.1 2.2
Mashonaland Central 67.5 1.9 0.8 0.4 4.8 22.3 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.8
Mashonaland East 60.1 4.3 0.9 18.1 11.0 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.4 1.6
Mashonaland West 67.7 1.5 1.0 0.2 5.4 18.6 2.9 0.2 1.2 1.2
Mashonaland North 48.6 0.0 20.4 27.4 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.0 1.5 0.0
Mashonaland South 37.6 0.3 27.5 17.0 I0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.8 5.4
Midlands 62.2 4.1 4.6 4.5 7.0 14.1 2.0 0.0 0.2 1.3
Masvingo 52.6 11.5 8.9 12.6 12.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.2 1.5
Source: Zimbabwe, "National Household Survey of Communal Areas. "G3. Communal area cropping patterns by natural region, 1986-1989
GROUND- SUN- VEGETA- ALL
MAIZE RAPOKO SORGHUM MILLET NUTS COTTON FLOWER BLES BEANS FRUIT OTHER FALLOW CROPS
(hectares)
NR I 14.5 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.7 3.6 25.3
NR IIa 211.2 4.1 3.4 2.6 10.6 29.0 7.4 3.5 1.8 2.9 19.7 129.5 425.5
NR IIb 109.8 5.9 2.8 11.2 11.3 2.6 10.0 4.4 1.7 0.9 13.7 74.6 248.9
NR IIb, III 54.6 1.2 3.7 0.5 4.1 39.4 6.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 7.0 24.1 141.3
NR III 226.4 11.3 16.2 32.0 17.6 49.1 17.3 2.1 1.0 2.1 37.3 138.4 550.5
NR III, N 35.4 0.0 6.2 9.1 2.9 4.4 2.3 - 0.0 - 6.8 18.6 93.4
NR IV 674.4 55.8 142.2 318.6 90.5 87.4 60.7 12.0 4.2 8.8 177.7 499.0 2,131.6
NR IV, V 9.3 3.0 15.7 27.1 2.0 2.1 1.1 - 0.1 - 6.7 16.5 83.5
NR V 94.8 7.3 135.7 72.2 9.4 12.5 11.2 0.4 0.2 0.8 20.1 147.1 511.8
National 1,430.4 89.5 326.0 474.7 148.4 227.1 116.6 9.3 292.7 1,051.4 4,211.8
NR I 67.1 4.2 0.0 6.5 0.5
(percentages)
0.0 0.5 0.9 17.1 3.2 0.0
NR IIa 71.3 1.4 1.2 0.9 3.6 9.8 2.5 1.2 0.6 1.0 6.7
NR IIb 63.0 3.4 1.6 6.4 6.4 1.5 5.7 2.5 1.0 0.5 7.9
NR IIb, III 46.6 1.0 3.2 0.4 3.5 33.6 5.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.0
NR III 54.9 2.7 3.9 7.8 4.3 11.9 4.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 9.1
NR III, IV 47.3 0.0 8.3 12.2 3.9 5.9 3.1 - 0.0 - 9.1
NR N 41.3 3.4 8.7 19.5 5.5 5.4 3.7 0.7 0.3 0.5 10.9
NR N, V 13.9 4.5 23.4 40.4 3.0 3.1 1.6 - 0.2 - 10.0
NR V 26.0 2.0 37.2 19.8 2.6 3.4 3.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 5.5
National 45.3 2.8 10.3 15.0 4.7 7.2 3.7 0.3 9.3
Source: Calculated from district-level data, AGIUPEX Crop Production Section (Will Masters, unpublished data, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and
Rural Development, Government of Zimbabwe, Harare, 1990). Crop percentages are calculated on the basis of crop area, excluding fallow, to remain
consistent with table G.1.166
G4. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP AREA, COMMUNAL AREAS, NATIONAL
CROP AREA AREA GROWTH RATES
1970-72 1978-80 1987-89 1970-80 1979-89
(000 ha) (000 ha) (000 ha) (%) (%)
Maize 649 733 966 2.0 2.2
Sorghum 226 111 174 -_83a  3.8
Rapoko 39 105 115 13.Oa   -2.8 
Mhunga 190 260 196 5.8 -3.4
Cotton 21 25 151 1.6 25.0 




a. Significant at 5% level.
b. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.
G5. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP PRODUCTION, COMMUNAL AREAS, NATIONAL
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION GROWTH RATES
1970-72 1978-80 1987-89 1970-80 1979-89
(000 mt) (000 mt) (000 mt) (%) (%)
Maize 419 490 1,010 5.3 9.0
Sorghum 107 51 87 -6.6 5.0
Rapoko 52 43 56 -2.1 -1.2
Mhunga 79 90 110 4.2 1.1
Cotton 20 19 114 -1.1 26.5 




a. Significant at 5% level.
b. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.167
G6. RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP YIELD, COMMUNAL AREAS, NATIONAL
YIELD YIELD GROWTH RATES
1970-72 1978-80 1987-89 1970-80 1979-89
(kg/ha) (
kg/
ha) (kg/ha) (%) (%)
Maize 649 668 1,046 3.3 6.7
Sorghum 473 459 500 1.8 1.1
Rapoko 1,333 410 487 -13.4  1.7
Mhunga 416 346 561 -1.5 4.6
Cotton 952 760 755 -2.6 1.3






a. Significant at 5% level.
b. Indicates too few nonzero observations to permit the calculation of reasonably
reliable growth rates.169
ANNEX H
Employment in the Large-Scale Commercial Sector
H1. EMPLOYMENT IN THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR
OWNERS, TOTAL FARM TOTAL MALE TOTAL FEMALE
YEAR PARTNERS, AND FOREST PERMANENT SEASONAL WORKERS WORKERS
OCCUPIERS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES (%) (%)
1989 5,560 247,154 136,860 110,294 74.0 26.0
1988 5,281 227,626 137,154 90,472 76.7 23.3
1987 4,264 219,987 137,746 82,241 77.2 22.8
1986
1985 5,163 214,241 147,842 66,399 79.0 21.0
1984 4,934 216,905 162,325 54,580 79.8 20.8
1983 5,091 216,013 154,738 61,275 79.5 20.5
1982 5,206 220,228 164,044 56,184 80.3 19.7
1981 4,859 242,149
1980 4,926 271,291
1979 4,932 286,825 230,523 56,302 76.8 23.2
1978 5,534 283,731 232,137 51,594 77.7 22.3
1977 6,109 295,139 237,435 57,704 77.2 22.8
1976 6,211 307,225 233,873 73,352 75.6 24.4
1975 6,317 303,903 229,213 74,690 76.0 24.0
1974 6,163 311,913 233,766 78,147 76.5 23.5
1973 6,418 301,512 228,511 73,001 77.4 22.6170
H2. PERMANENT FARM AND FOREST EMPLOYEES BY PROVINCE
(as of September 30)
MANICA- MASHONA- MATABELE-
YEAR LAND LAND LAND MIDLANDS MASVINGO TOTAL
Permanent employees
1989 - - 136,860
1988 17,282 90,511 7,745 6,205 15,411 137,154
1987 - 137,746
1986
1985 18,696 97,368 8,251 6,423 17,104 147,842
1984 23,118 99,797 10,732 6,593 22,085 162,325
1983 20,244 97,759 10,576 6,887 19,272 154,738
1982 22,166 101,793 11,498 8,098 20,489 164,044
1981 -
1980 -
1979 35,708 147,557 15,385 10,523 21,350 230,523
1978 35,378 143,915 16,898 11,502 24,444 232,137
1977 35,872 142,895 18,512 11,729 28,427 237,435
1976 33,821 141,335 18,939 11,576 28,202 233,873
1975 34,548 137,296 18,279 11,838 27,252 229,213
1974 37,159 138,776 18,232 12,057 27,542 233,766
1973 37,752 134,704 18,071 12,018 25,966 228,511
1989
Seasonal or casual employees
110,294
1988 29,396 50,109 3,077 2,542 5,348 90,472
1987 82,241
1986 -
1985 18,363 40,086 3,047 2,365 2,533 66,399
1984 15,153 34,663 1,388 1,955 1,421 54,580
1983 17,583 35,962 3,085 1,790 2,855 61,275
1982 13,650 33,991 2,594 2,087 3,862 56,184
1981 - -
1980 -
1979 8,645 38,130 2,528 2,520 4,479 56,302
1978 8,216 34,309 2,011 2,741 4,317 51,594
1977 8,786 39,593 2,582 3,065 3,678 57,704
1976 11,593 49,315 3,488 4,068 4,888 73,352
1975 9,512 51,746 3,238 3,950 6,244 74,690
1974 10,225 52,760 2,708 4,516 7,938 78,147
1973 11,741 49,706 2,784 3,384 5,386 73,001171
ANNEX I
Crop Adjustment Factors
Using cropped area to estimate the extent of land utilization ignores two factors: (1) certain
crops such as wheat are irrigated under double-cropping systems and thus result in double accounting;
and (2) certain crops, principally tobacco, require grass fallow according to AGRITEX recommenda-
tions. The first overstates the area of crops actually planted. The second points out the need of a
fallow component to ensure sustainable crop yields in the longer run.
AGRITEX recommends the following crop rotations for tobacco and maize:
While it is not possible to determine accurately the area of light and heavy soils by region or the
extent of crop rotations planted, these theoretical rotations give broad guidelines for establishing fallow
requirements under sustainable resource use (table I.1). For example, 3 hectares of grass are
recommended for every 1 hectare of tobacco, resulting in a ley factor of 3. For every 2 hectares of
maize, 3 hectares of grass are required on light soils, but none is required on heavy soils. Assuming
that 50 percent of soils are heavy and 50 percent light, 3 hectares of grass are needed on average for
every 4 hectares of maize, giving a ley factor of 0.75. A discount factor of -1.0 is assigned to wheat
because it is generally double-cropped, and thus its crop area is already accounted for in other crops.
A discount factor of -1.0 is also indicated for planted pasture. Aside from the issue of the economic
profitability of grass compared with crop production, planted pasture is deducted from crop area since
it can be substituted for grass fallow in the tobacco and maize rotations. Finally, other crops are
assumed to be cultivated under 100 percent cropping systems for lack of more detailed data on type
and frequency of rotations.
Rotation
1. Groundnuts, maize,
maize, followed by 3-
year grass fallow.
2. Maize, tobacco, fol-
lowed by 3-year grass
fallow.
3. Cotton, soyabeans, and
maize (100% cropping)
4. Cotton, maize, maize,
followed by 3-year grass
fallow.
Conditions
NR II, light soils
NR II, light soils,
tobacco rotation
NR II, heavy soils
NR III, heavy
soils172









Mashonaland West 3.0 .75 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Mashonaland Central 3.0 .75 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Mashonaland East 3.0 .75 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Natural region I 3.0 .75 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Natural region II 3.0 .75 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
Natural region III 3.0 1.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.0
a. The weight of 3 means 3 ha of grass fallow for every 1 ha of
tobacco.
b. Assuming 50% light soils (3 ha grass fallow for every 2 ha
maize) and 50% heavy soils (100% cropping) in NR II, for a ratio
of 3:4. In NR IN, on light soils, 3 ha of grass is recommended for
every 2 ha of maize.173
ANNEX J
Crops Yields in ReSettlement and Large-Scale Sectors by Natural Region
J1. CROP YIELDS IN RESETTTLEMENT AND LARGE-SCALE SECTORS BY NATURAL REGION
(in kg/ha)
MZ WI MG SF SB GN CT TB I
Large-scale sector'
1988 NR I 3,904 2,000 333 2,413 1,769 1,533 2,235
NR II 4,647 5,482 1,220 743 2,280 3,200 2,199 2,070
NR III 4,026 5,410 2,170 648 2,410 2,973 1,780 2,022
NR IV 3,757 3,858 1,380 696 630 2,070 2,017 2,000
NR v 4,315 3,572 - 1,927 2,730 4,667 2,019 1,864
Resettlement'
677 - 168 60 1,101 - 1986 NR I
NR II 1,207 2,580 187 520 387 322 1,221 1,648
NR III 927 2,211 339 392 713 347 746 1,282
NR IV 256 192 279 172 556
NR V 308 263 199 168 228
1985 NR I 2,204 600 500 333 222
NR II 2,585 2,740 1,834 698 1,168 826 1,087 2,094
NR III 2,021 2,185 850 893 511 519 1,152 894
NR IV 1,344 4,747 432 834 438 548 552
NR v 596 547 89 75 48
1984 NR I 342 - 500 - 77
NR II 1,814 766 2,022 463 406 413 984 825
NR III 1,141 2,465 465 430 559 242 903 3,000
NR IV 794 1,000 363 294 296 181 531
NR V 125 - 121 - 239 250 -
MZ = maize; wr = wheat; MG - mhunga; SF = sunflower; SB = soyabeans; GN = groundnuts;
CT = cotton; and TB = tobacco.
a. From Central Statistics Office.
b. Means yields were calculated from two data files compiled by DERUD; area by natural
region for each scheme from the data file "settlers.wrk"; and crop area and production
from "Crop8485.wrk," "Crop8586.wrk," and "Crop8687.wrk." If a scheme fell into
more than one natural region, calculations assumed that area and production were
distributed proportionally to the area of scheme falling in each region. The majority
of schemes, however, fell into one natural region only.175
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